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| National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian | |
|---|---|
| Name | National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian |
| Court | Supreme Court of the United States |
| Citations | 488 U.S. 179 (1988) |
| Decided | June 6, 1988 |
| Docket | No. 86-1752 |
| Litigants | National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Jerry Tarkanian |
| Majority | Brennan |
| Joinmajority | Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, Scalia |
| Concurrence | White (in judgment) |
| Dissent | O'Connor |
| Joindissent | Rehnquist |
National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian was a 1988 decision of the Supreme Court of the United States addressing whether the National Collegiate Athletic Association is a state actor for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution's Due Process Clause. The Court held that the NCAA was not a state actor, reversing a judgment that had imposed constitutional obligations on the organization. The case arose from disciplinary actions taken against Jerry Tarkanian, head coach of the University of Nevada, Las Vegas men's basketball program, and implicated institutional governance in collegiate athletics and administrative law involving Nevada state agencies and higher education authorities.
Jerry Tarkanian, a prominent coach with prior success at University of Nevada, Las Vegas and earlier at Long Beach State University, became embroiled in allegations of recruiting violations under NCAA enforcement procedures, which led to sanctions including probation and postseason bans. The dispute followed investigations by the NCAA Enforcement Staff and adjudication by the NCAA Committee on Infractions, with contested findings that intersected with enforcement actions taken by the University of Nevada System and the Nevada Board of Regents. Tarkanian pursued relief in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, asserting that the NCAA's actions, taken in close coordination with state actors, violated his procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and invoking remedies against the NCAA and university administrators.
In the district court, Tarkanian obtained a judgment that characterized the NCAA as a state actor because of its extensive relationship with the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, the Nevada Board of Regents, and the National Collegiate Athletic Association's integration with state-supported institutions. The court found that the NCAA's enforcement processes and its influence over eligibility and competition effectively delegated state authority to a private association, thereby subjecting it to the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution's constraints. Litigants referenced administrative precedents from cases such as Shelley v. Kraemer and Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority to argue that private conduct made public by pervasive entwinement could constitute state action. The district court awarded relief based on due process violations and enjoined enforcement of certain NCAA sanctions against Tarkanian and UNLV.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed. Writing for a plurality, Justice William J. Brennan Jr. concluded that the NCAA was not a state actor for Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution purposes despite its regulatory role over member institutions such as University of Nevada, Las Vegas and the Nevada Board of Regents. The Court distinguished precedents like Rendell-Baker v. Kohn and Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. to emphasize that mere regulation, public funding, and the NCAA's impact on state institutions do not automatically transform private entities into state actors. Justice White concurred in the judgment but wrote separately to address the factual record and the appropriate standard for entwinement. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor dissented, joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, arguing that the NCAA's pervasive involvement with state institutions and the practical delegation of authority required recognition of state action.
The Court's analysis centered on state-action doctrine and precedents governing when private actors are subject to constitutional constraints. Key tests examined included entwinement, public function, state compulsion, and symbiotic relationship principles discussed in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority and Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.. The plurality emphasized the importance of agency and compulsion rather than merely significant influence, limiting prior broad readings of Shelley v. Kraemer and related cases. The decision clarified that national associations like the NCAA, despite exercising regulatory control over college athletics, do not automatically become state actors solely because they enforce rules against state-supported institutions such as University of Nevada, Las Vegas or interact with state actors like the Nevada Board of Regents.
After the decision, the NCAA's enforcement model remained mostly intact, though the ruling prompted debate in the legal academy concerning private regulatory power affecting state entities, with scholars citing examples involving the National Football League, Major League Baseball, and National Basketball Association in comparative analyses. State courts and lower federal courts continued to grapple with entwinement questions in disputes involving organizations like the Big Ten Conference, Atlantic Coast Conference, and private accrediting agencies. Legislative and regulatory reforms in collegiate athletics, including governance discussions within the NCAA Division I Board of Directors and proposals in state legislatures such as California State Legislature, evolved separately from the state-action doctrine but reflected ongoing tensions highlighted by the case.
The case is frequently cited in litigation involving private associations interacting with public institutions, including disputes implicating the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and administrative due process claims in contexts like accreditation by the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools and eligibility determinations by the National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics. Jurists and commentators often reference the decision alongside Rendell-Baker v. Kohn and Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. when assessing when private regulation becomes governmental action. The legacy extends into contemporary debates over Name, Image, and Likeness rules, antitrust challenges against the NCAA, and the structural role of private governance in United States collegiate athletics, shaping litigation strategies involving entities such as the United States Department of Education and state higher-education authorities.
Category:United States Supreme Court cases Category:1988 in United States law Category:National Collegiate Athletic Association litigation