Naming and Necessity

Naming and Necessity
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Title	Naming and Necessity
Author	Saul Kripke
Pub date	1980 (book); 1972–73 (lectures)
Medium	Book (based on lectures)
Subject	Philosophy of language, Metaphysics, Modal logic
Notable ideas	Rigid designators, A posteriori necessities, Causal theory of reference

Naming and Necessity

Saul Kripke's Naming and Necessity presents a set of arguments reshaping debates in analytic philosophy, challenging prevailing views in the work of Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Willard Van Orman Quine, and G. E. Moore. Drawing on thought experiments and modal reasoning, the text argues for novel treatments of reference, necessity, and identity that influenced discussions in the circles of Harvard University, Princeton University, and University of California, Berkeley. It sparked exchanges with figures such as Hilary Putnam, John Searle, David Kaplan, P. F. Strawson, and Michael Dummett.

Overview and Thesis

Kripke contends that proper names are rigid designators that refer to the same object in all possible worlds where that object exists, in opposition to descriptivist theories defended by Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell and developed by P. F. Strawson and Frege's commentators. He maintains that there are necessary a posteriori truths and contingent a priori claims, challenging orthodoxies from Immanuel Kant through Willard Van Orman Quine and provoking reassessments by Hilary Putnam and David Lewis. Kripke advances a causal-historical theory of reference linking names to objects via baptismal events and chains of transmission, situating his claims against the analytic traditions represented by Ludwig Wittgenstein and G. E. Moore.

Historical Context and Philosophical Background

Kripke's lectures emerged in a post-war analytic milieu shaped by the influences of Bertrand Russell, Gottlob Frege, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and later figures like Willard Van Orman Quine and P. F. Strawson. Debates over descriptivism trace through Frege's sense and reference, Russell's theory of descriptions, and the criticisms by Quine in works like "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" and by Michael Dummett on meaning. The intellectual setting included institutional centers such as Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Oxford University, and Cambridge University, with interlocutors including Hilary Putnam, John Searle, David Kaplan, and Saul Kripke's contemporaries at Princeton University and New York University.

Development of Modal Logic and Kripkean Semantics

Modal logic developments by C. I. Lewis and formal work by Alfred Tarski, Kurt Gödel, and Stanislaw Lesniewski provided background for later semantics; Kripke built on semantic frameworks later named after him, which interface with models advanced by Ruth Barcan Marcus and model-theoretic contributions from Alonzo Church and Jerzy Łoś. Kripkean possible-worlds semantics shaped subsequent work by David Lewis on counterpart theory and by Saul Kripke's interpreters at Princeton University and Rutgers University. The formal tools intersect with scholarship by Alfred North Whitehead and logicians tied to Gödel's circle, and influenced treatments in texts used at Harvard University and Stanford University.

Core Arguments and Key Concepts

Kripke introduces "rigid designator" to describe names that pick out the same entity across possible worlds, contrasting with description-based identifications linked to Bertrand Russell and Gottlob Frege's legacy. He argues for the existence of necessary a posteriori truths—cases where identity statements like "Hesperus is Phosphorus" are metaphysically necessary but known empirically—contradicting Kantian boundaries endorsed by Immanuel Kant and contested by Willard Van Orman Quine. The causal-historical theory of reference locates reference in initial baptisms and communicative chains, responding to descriptivist accounts associated with P. F. Strawson and John Stuart Mill. Kripke employs modal intuitions familiar to readers of C. I. Lewis and analytic techniques influenced by Alonzo Church.

Criticisms and Responses

Critics such as P. F. Strawson, Michael Dummett, John Searle, and Hilary Putnam queried Kripke's dismissal of descriptivism, the robustness of rigid designation, and the status of a posteriori necessities. Descriptivist replies invoked modified theories tracing descriptions to speakers' epistemic practices in line with P. F. Strawson's rectifications of Bertrand Russell; theories by Hilary Putnam and David Kaplan refined contextsensitive semantics and indexicality concerns. Later defenses by scholars connected to Princeton University, Rutgers University, and Oxford University refined the causal chain model, while proponents of counterpart theory like David Lewis offered alternative modal analyses.

Influence and Legacy

Naming and Necessity reshaped analytic philosophy, influencing philosophers associated with Harvard University, Oxford University, Princeton University, Rutgers University, and Stanford University. It affected work in metaphysics by David Lewis, theory of reference by Hilary Putnam and John Perry, and semantics by David Kaplan and Ruth Barcan Marcus. Kripke's ideas permeated courses and debates across institutions such as Yale University and Columbia University, catalyzed new research programs in modal metaphysics, and informed contemporary discussions led by figures like Timothy Williamson, Kit Fine, and Jonathan Lowe.

Related Debates and Contemporary Applications

Contemporary applications extend to philosophy of mind debates involving John Searle and Daniel Dennett, to philosophy of science dialogues with Thomas Kuhn and Bas van Fraassen, and to logic and formal semantics work tied to Alonzo Church and David Kaplan. Theories of reference influence jurisprudence discussions in contexts such as United States Supreme Court decisions, linguistic theorizing in programs at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and University of California, Berkeley, and cognitive science research linked to Noam Chomsky and Steven Pinker. Debates continue in seminars across Princeton University, Harvard University, and Oxford University.

Category:Philosophy of language