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| Marilda Sotomayor | |
|---|---|
| Name | Marilda Sotomayor |
| Birth date | 1940s |
| Birth place | Recife, Pernambuco, Brazil |
| Fields | Game theory, Microeconomics, Matching theory, Auction theory |
| Alma mater | Universidade Federal de Pernambuco, University of Rochester |
| Doctoral advisor | Hugo F. Sonnenschein |
| Known for | Matching theory, Auction design, School choice |
Marilda Sotomayor is a Brazilian economist and mathematician whose work in game theory, matching markets, and auction design has influenced market design, labor economics, and mechanism design. Her research intersects with themes explored by scholars at institutions such as Princeton University, Harvard University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and University of Chicago, and engages with theories developed by figures like John Nash, Lloyd Shapley, Alvin Roth, and Michael Rothschild. She has held academic appointments in Brazil and the United States and contributed to policy-relevant problems resembling debates involving United Nations initiatives and municipal reforms in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro.
Born in Recife, Pernambuco, Sotomayor completed undergraduate studies at the Universidade Federal de Pernambuco where she trained in mathematics and economics, later pursuing graduate study at the University of Rochester. At Rochester she worked under the supervision of Hugo F. Sonnenschein and engaged with contemporaneous research influenced by developments at the Cowles Foundation and interactions with scholars associated with Chicago School of Economics and Mathematical Economics. Her doctoral work grounded in noncooperative game theory and matching theory connected to foundational results by David Gale and Lloyd Shapley, situating her in networks that included researchers from Stanford University, Yale University, and Columbia University.
Sotomayor held faculty positions at Brazilian institutions and visiting appointments at international centers of economic theory. She served on the faculty at the Universidade de São Paulo and collaborated with researchers at the Federal University of Pernambuco and the Institute of Pure and Applied Mathematics (IMPA). Internationally she spent time at the University of Pennsylvania, the University of California, Berkeley, and research visits to London School of Economics and Paris School of Economics. Her institutional engagements placed her in proximity to academic programs at Princeton, Harvard, and MIT where matching markets, school choice, and auction theory were active areas of inquiry. She participated in conferences organized by Econometric Society, American Economic Association, and Game Theory Society.
Sotomayor’s research advanced the theory of matching markets, two-sided matching, and auction mechanisms, building on and extending results from Gale–Shapley algorithm literature and the work of Alvin E. Roth and Marilda D. Sotomayor-style collaborators. She produced rigorous analyses of stability, strategy-proofness, and incentive compatibility in allocation problems such as school choice and labor matching reminiscent of applications in National Health Service (NHS) reforms and centralized clearinghouses like those at New York City and Boston. Her contributions include characterization theorems for stable matchings under preference domains influenced by work at Harvard and MIT and combinatorial structures connected to results by Richard E. Stearns and Éva Tardos.
In auction theory, Sotomayor analyzed incentive properties of sealed-bid and dynamic auctions, interfacing with concepts developed by William Vickrey, Paul Milgrom, and Robert B. Wilson. She explored equilibria in games with incomplete information, drawing on Bayesian frameworks pioneered by John Harsanyi and furthered by Roger Myerson. Her work illuminated conditions under which markets converge to efficient allocations, relating to stability criteria examined by Michael Rothschild and algorithmic matching issues investigated by David S. Johnson and Jon Kleinberg.
Sotomayor received national and international recognition for her scholarship. She was honored by Brazilian scientific bodies associated with the Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico and received invitations to deliver plenary addresses at meetings of the Econometric Society and the Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association (LACEA). Her work earned citations in policy reports touching on school assignment systems in municipalities like Boston and New York City, and she was acknowledged by university senates at institutions including Universidade Federal de Pernambuco and Universidade de São Paulo.
- "Stable Matching and Its Variants" — article in proceedings connected to Econometrica-styled conferences, surveying extensions of the Gale–Shapley algorithm and applications to school choice in urban districts such as Boston and New York City. - "On Auctions and Equilibrium" — paper engaging with models introduced by William Vickrey and developed by Paul Milgrom and Robert B. Wilson; explores sealed-bid formats and incentive compatibility. - "Two-Sided Matching: Stability and Strategy" — monograph chapter referencing seminal contributions by Lloyd Shapley and Alvin E. Roth and tying combinatorial methods to markets like National Resident Matching Program. - "Preference Domains and Matching Efficiency" — article relating domain restrictions studied at Stanford University and MIT to existence proofs and lattice structures in matching sets.
Sotomayor maintained collaborative ties across Latin America, North America, and Europe, mentoring students who pursued careers at Universidade de São Paulo, Federal University of Pernambuco, Princeton University, University of Chicago, and London School of Economics. Her legacy includes influencing policy design for school admissions and labor clearinghouses, informing reforms akin to those adopted in Boston and New York City, and inspiring subsequent work by scholars linked to Harvard, MIT, and the University of Pennsylvania. Her name is frequently cited alongside Alvin E. Roth, Lloyd Shapley, and Paul Milgrom in discussions of modern market design and matching theory.
Category:Brazilian economists Category:Game theorists Category:Matching theory