Malino II Agreement

Malino II Agreement
Name	Malino II Agreement
Date	December 2001
Location	Malino, South Sulawesi, Indonesia
Parties	GAM? (Note: see text)
Result	Local peace framework for Poso conflict (Note: see text)

Malino II Agreement The Malino II Agreement was a December 2001 accord reached in Malino, South Sulawesi as part of efforts to resolve sectarian violence in Central Sulawesi during the early 2000s. It followed national initiatives linked to the administrations of Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Sukarnoputri and involved local leaders, TNI representatives, and figures from Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. The accord aimed to halt the Poso conflict and establish mechanisms for reconciliation, restitution, and local stability.

Background and context

The lead-up to the Malino II talks was shaped by clashes rooted in disputes among communities in Palu, Poso, and neighboring districts following the fall of Suharto and the transition to the Reformasi period. Sectarian incidents in 1998–2001 drew responses from the TNI, Komnas HAM, and humanitarian actors like International Committee of the Red Cross and UNHCR. Regional dynamics were influenced by migrations linked to the transmigration program and historical tensions dating to the Darul Islam rebellion and local land disputes involving Palu Bay communities. National politics—shifts in policy under President Abdurrahman Wahid and succession by President Megawati Sukarnoputri—affected conflict mediation and security sector conduct.

Negotiation process

Mediation for the Malino II talks drew on facilitators from faith-based institutions such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, legal actors from KontraS, and political intermediaries associated with the DPR and provincial administrations in Central Sulawesi. Delegations included traditional chiefs from Lore and Tomini Bay areas, representatives of Christian organizations like the Toraja Church and Muslim organizations linked to Muhammadiyah branches. International actors—observers from Asia Foundation, representatives from the UNDP, and diplomats from the European Union—monitored talks alongside security actors from the TNI and Indonesian National Police. Negotiators used mechanisms similar to those in the Malino I Agreement and frameworks informed by prior accords such as the Dayton Accords insofar as ceasefire monitoring and power-sharing templates were concerned.

Terms and provisions

The agreement set out ceasefire commitments, disarmament initiatives, and community-based reconciliation processes involving restitution and local dispute resolution councils drawing on customary law from To Pamona and other indigenous institutions. It stipulated demobilization plans to be overseen by provincial authorities in Sulawesi with support from national ministries, and proposed mechanisms for returning internally displaced persons to areas like Lore Utara and Poso Pesisir Selatan. Provisions envisioned reconstruction funding channels coordinated by provincial spending bodies and non-governmental implementers such as Yayasan Sayangi Tunas Cilik and humanitarian wings of Ansor and Catholic Relief Services. The accord referenced transitional measures for local administration roles involving district heads from Poso Regency and municipal councils in Palu.

Implementation and outcomes

Implementation relied on collaboration among provincial offices, district administrations, and civil society networks including Forum Keadilan and local mosque and church committees. Short-term outcomes included localized reductions in large-scale clashes, the opening of humanitarian corridors coordinated with Palang Merah Indonesia, and some returns of displaced families to Pendolo and surrounding villages. Longer-term outcomes were mixed: reconstruction projects in parts of Poso proceeded with donor support from agencies linked to AUSAID and JICA, while sporadic violence and small-arms proliferation persisted, implicating elements of the TNI and local militias formed during earlier clashes.

Political and social impact

Politically, the Malino II talks influenced national approaches to managing communal violence alongside other processes such as the Aceh peace process and decentralization reforms under the regional autonomy law. It shaped discourse among parties in the DPR and affected relationships between provincial governors and central ministries. Socially, the accord encouraged interfaith dialogue involving actors from PGI and BKSUA, and stimulated reconciliation initiatives linking youth organizations like Pemuda Pancasila and student groups from Hasanuddin University and IAIN Palu.

Controversies and criticism

Critics—academics from Universitas Tadulako, human rights advocates from KontraS, and journalists at outlets such as Kompas and Tempo—argued that the accord lacked robust accountability mechanisms for crimes documented by Komnas HAM and failed to fully disarm militias with links to local elites. Humanitarian organizations noted slow progress on restitution for victims registered by Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi. Others contended that security sector actors, including units of the Kodam XVII/Cenderawasih and Brimob, were insufficiently reformed, leaving structural drivers of violence intact. Comparative critiques referenced outcomes from the Malino I Agreement and the Jakarta peace accords to question sustainability.

Category:Peace treaties