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| Major Crimes Act (1885) | |
|---|---|
| Name | Major Crimes Act (1885) |
| Enacted by | United States Congress |
| Effective date | 1885 |
| Introduced by | Senators and Representatives |
| Status | amended |
Major Crimes Act (1885) The Major Crimes Act (1885) is a United States federal statute that extended federal criminal jurisdiction over specific serious offenses committed by Native Americans in Indian country, arising from tensions following the murder of Crescent City-area settler Levi Woodruff—an incident connected to the Murder of Matthew F. Travers and disputes involving the Sioux Wars and Reservation system. The Act marked a decisive moment in United States Indian law, intersecting with debates involving the United States Supreme Court, the Department of Justice (United States), the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and tribal nations such as the Oglala Sioux Tribe, Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma, and Cherokee Nation.
Congress passed the Act amid national attention on crackdowns after the Battle of Little Bighorn era and the Sioux uprising narratives that influenced policy during the administrations of Chester A. Arthur and Grover Cleveland. Congressional debates in the Forty-eighth United States Congress referenced reports from the Office of Indian Affairs and testimony by figures such as John M. Webster and William McGaa, with advocates drawing on precedent from statutes like the Indian Appropriations Act and the Trade and Intercourse Acts. Political coalitions among members of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs and the House Committee on Indian Affairs shaped the bill, reflecting interests of the Department of the Interior (United States) and regional representatives from South Dakota and Oklahoma Territory.
The statute enumerated specific felonies—initially including murder, manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to kill, arson, burglary, and larceny—subject to federal prosecution when committed by an Indian in Indian country, drawing statutory language from the United States Code and incorporating elements mirrored in the Federal Criminal Code of the era. It defined jurisdictional boundaries related to lands held in trust under treaties like the Fort Laramie Treaty and statutes involving the Homestead Acts and set procedures for transfer of cases between tribal courts and federal courts, implicating institutions such as the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota and the United States Attorney offices.
The Act’s constitutionality was upheld in the seminal case Ex parte Crow Dog's aftermath through the decision in United States v. Kagama, which the United States Supreme Court affirmed, invoking the Commerce Clause and doctrines related to plenary power first articulated in cases like Worcester v. Georgia and later affecting rulings such as Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe and Bryan v. Itasca County. Subsequent litigation including United States v. Wheeler and Curtis Act-era disputes tested limits of federal authority, while cases like Duro v. Reina and later reversals in statutory practice engaged the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 and decisions from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
By reallocating certain jurisdictional competences to federal courts, the Act affected the sovereignty of tribes such as the Pueblo of Zuni, Navajo Nation, and Pawnee Nation, altering the balance described in scholarship from institutions like the American Bar Association and commentaries in the Harvard Law Review and Yale Law Journal. The law interacted with treaty obligations under agreements like the Treaty of Canandaigua and doctrines emerging from the Marshall Court era, generating debates involving tribal leaders such as Red Cloud and Chief Joseph and scholars like Felix S. Cohen and Robert A. Williams Jr..
Implementation relied on federal prosecutors from the United States Department of Justice and local marshals, coordination with the Bureau of Indian Affairs Police and tribal police departments in places like Pine Ridge Reservation, and use of federal penitentiaries including the United States Penitentiary, Leavenworth. Enforcement practices varied by region—Oklahoma versus New Mexico—and involved evolving policies from the FBI and administrative guidance issued by the Attorney General of the United States.
Amendments and related statutes modified scope and procedure, including provisions in the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, and the Violence Against Women Act (1994) reauthorizations that engaged cross-jurisdictional concepts further refined by Congress and the Department of Justice (United States). Legislative responses to decisions like Duro v. Reina produced statutory clarifications such as the Duro fix enacted by Congress.
Critics—from tribal governments including the Ho-Chunk Nation and advocacy groups like the National Congress of American Indians and Native American Rights Fund—argued the statute undermined tribal autonomy and produced uneven justice in cases discussed in outlets such as the Indian Country Today and analyses by scholars affiliated with the Institute for Government Innovation and American Indian Law Review. Litigation continued in federal courts including challenges brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court of the United States, contesting application, due process, and treaty-consistency under doctrines emanating from precedents like Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.