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| Jemaah Ansharut Daulah | |
|---|---|
| Name | Jemaah Ansharut Daulah |
| Founded | 2015 |
| Founder | Aman Abdurrahman |
| Active | 2015–present |
| Area | Indonesia, Southeast Asia |
| Ideology | Salafi jihadism, Islamic State |
| Allies | Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda |
| Opponents | Indonesian government, Indonesian National Police, Indonesian National Armed Forces |
Jemaah Ansharut Daulah is an Indonesian extremist organization that emerged in the mid-2010s as a local pro-ISIL affiliate, implicated in multiple terrorist attacks and plots in Indonesia, Southeast Asia, and involving foreign fighters returning from Syria and Iraq. The group was associated with veteran militants, underground networks, and online propaganda channels linked to Aman Abdurrahman, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and regional cells tied to Jemaah Islamiyah veterans, prompting counterterrorism operations by the Detachment 88 unit of the National Police and legal action under Indonesian anti-terror laws.
Jemaah Ansharut Daulah formed amid the collapse of territorial control by ISIL in Iraq and Syria and the redeployment of foreign fighters, drawing on networks established by Jemaah Islamiyah, Darul Islam, and cells influenced by figures like Noordin Mohammad Top and Abu Bakar Bashir. Recruitment and radicalization intensified after high-profile events such as the ISIL territorial gains and the 2015 Paris attacks and used digital platforms associated with Jabhat al-Nusra sympathizers and other online nodes. The milieu included veterans from the Afghanistan conflict and returnees from ISIL caliphate territories, leveraging local grievances in provinces such as Jakarta, Central Sulawesi, Papua, and Riau Islands.
The group's ideology blends Salafi-inspired takfiri doctrine with loyalty to ISIL leadership, echoing calls by Aman Abdurrahman and rhetoric similar to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi while rejecting existing Indonesian institutions like the Pancasila framework and the Constitution of Indonesia. Objectives included establishing a territorial or symbolic caliphate in Indonesian lands, targeting symbolic sites associated with Western influence and pluralist institutions such as the Australian Embassy and conventions associated with United Nations agendas. The group shared messaging strategies with Al-Qaeda-affiliated and ISIS-aligned networks, adopting operational themes found in attacks by Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, and ISIL-inspired lone actors.
Leadership links pointed to clerical figures like Aman Abdurrahman and local commanders with histories in Jemaah Islamiyah and Darul Islam, while organizational structure resembled decentralized cellular network models used by Al-Qaeda and ISIL affiliates, allowing semi-autonomous cells in provinces including West Java, Central Java, and Sulawesi. The group reportedly coordinated with transnational operatives associated with Khorasan Province-linked networks and drew logistical support from facilitators linked to Malaysia, Philippines, and Middle East conduits. Indonesian security services identified financiers, recruiters, bomb-makers, and propaganda cadres operating within religious study groups and informal madrasa networks linked to figures formerly associated with Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia and similar organizations.
The organization employed a mix of tactics mirrored in the wider ISIL playbook: suicide bombings targeting security forces and public venues, coordinated shootings, vehicle-ramming, and small-unit assaults on symbolic targets such as churches, police stations, and shopping centers. Recruitment utilized encrypted messaging apps, social media channels, and returnee networks from Syria and Iraq, echoing techniques used by foreign fighter flows to Iraq and Syria. The group also engaged in illicit procurement of explosives and improvised explosive devices drawing on expertise from militants once involved in clashes with Task Force Sweep and other counterinsurgency efforts. Operational security resembled that used by ISIL cells in Europe and Southeast Asia during the 2010s.
Indicted or attributed incidents include the 2016 Jakarta campaign of small-scale bombings and shootings linked to ISIL sympathizers, the 2018 Surabaya church bombings involving coordinated suicide attacks against Christian congregations, and the 2019 Mako Brimob riot-adjacent arrests of suspected cadres. Other incidents tied to affiliated operatives included lone-actor attacks influenced by online propaganda, attempted bombings targeting diplomatic missions such as the U.S. Embassy, and plots disrupted in Batam and Bali by Detachment 88. The group’s footprint overlapped with attacks attributed to Jemaah Islamiyah splinters and ISIL-inspired cells in Marawi, Mindanao, and other Philippines conflict zones.
Indonesian authorities responded with arrests, trials under the 2003 Anti-Terrorism Law and its amendments, convictions of key figures in district courts and the Supreme Court, and disruption operations by Detachment 88 supported by international partners including Australia, United States, and INTERPOL. Counterterrorism strategies incorporated de-radicalization programs run by the BNPT, prison rehabilitation models used for high-profile detainees like Abu Bakar Bashir, and legislative updates following incidents such as the 2018 Surabaya bombings to expand investigative powers and financial surveillance coordinated with FATF-style standards.
The organization and affiliated individuals were designated by various international and domestic agencies alongside other ISIL affiliates, prompting cooperation among regional actors such as Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, and Australia in intelligence sharing and maritime security operations in the Strait of Malacca and Celebes Sea. Links to foreign fighters returning from Syria and Iraq and liaison with transnational networks like Al-Qaeda offshoots, Boko Haram sympathizers, and supporters in the Middle East resulted in watchlist additions by the United Nations Security Council sanctions regime and bilateral counterterrorism advisories from the U.S. State Department and the European Union.
Category:Islamist organizations Category:Terrorism in Indonesia