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| Intuitionism (ethics) | |
|---|---|
| Name | Intuitionism (ethics) |
| Region | Western philosophy |
| Era | 20th century philosophy |
| Main interests | Moral epistemology, meta-ethics |
| Notable ideas | Moral intuition, non-naturalism, moral realism |
Intuitionism (ethics) is a meta-ethical position asserting that some moral truths are known directly via intuitive insight rather than by inference from empirical data or formal deduction. Proponents link moral knowledge to immediate apprehension akin to perceptual awareness, and critics associate the view with debates involving G. E. Moore, W. D. Ross, Immanuel Kant, David Hume, and later figures across analytic and continental traditions such as John Rawls, Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, Principia Ethica-affiliated thinkers, and commentators in journals like Mind (journal), Philosophical Review, and Ethics (journal).
Intuitionist accounts typically claim moral properties are objective and non-natural, asserting that agents can apprehend moral facts through intellectual intuition; key proponents include G. E. Moore, W. D. Ross, Henry Sidgwick, Immanuel Kant, and later defenders like Richard M. Hare and Edmund D. Pellegrino. The debate engages institutions and venues such as Cambridge University, Oxford University, Harvard University, Princeton University, and professional societies like the American Philosophical Association and Royal Institute of Philosophy. Intuitionism contrasts with positions advanced by David Hume, John Stuart Mill, Jeremy Bentham, and naturalistic accounts defended in works associated with A. J. Ayer, Gilbert Ryle, W. V. Quine, and contemporaries at University of Oxford and University of Cambridge.
Roots trace to early modern figures including Immanuel Kant's moral law formulations and to moral sense theories exemplified by Francis Hutcheson and David Hume; nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century articulations appear in Henry Sidgwick's works and culminate in G. E. Moore's Principia Ethica, which argued against naturalistic reductionism and introduced the open-question argument debated across conferences at Wittgenstein's circle and reviews in Mind (journal). The revival and refinement by W. D. Ross introduced prima facie duties, while mid-century responses by Elizabeth Anscombe and Philippa Foot connected intuitionist themes with virtue ethics discussions at Newnham College, Cambridge and in dialogues with figures like Stanley Cavell and Iris Murdoch.
Major theorists include G. E. Moore (non-naturalist realism), W. D. Ross (deontological intuitionism with prima facie duties), Henry Sidgwick (intuition linked to rationalist ethics), Immanuel Kant (transcendental moral law interpreted by some as intuitionist antecedent), and twentieth-century contributors such as Richard M. Hare (pluralist critiques), Elizabeth Anscombe (virtue-focused critique of modern moral theory), Philippa Foot (neo-Aristotelian affinities), Alasdair MacIntyre (historical virtue defense), and contemporary scholars including Michael Huemer, Paul Russell, and Russ Shafer-Landau. Variants span non-naturalist realism, moral sense theory, neo-intuitionism, deontological intuitionism, and hybrid accounts discussed at seminars in institutions like New York University, University of Chicago, and King's College London.
Central concepts include the non-naturalness of moral properties as argued by G. E. Moore via the open-question argument, the epistemic status of moral intuition as presented by W. D. Ross through prima facie duties, and the attempt to ground moral normativity in immediate apprehension analogous to perception found in discussions by Henry Sidgwick and defenders like Michael Huemer. Prominent arguments engage criticisms from A. J. Ayer's emotivism, J. L. Mackie's error theory, and naturalistic critiques associated with Charles Darwin-influenced ethical naturalists and philosophers such as John Dewey and Philippa Foot. Debates also involve methodological exchanges at venues including Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society and the British Academy.
Critics such as J. L. Mackie, A. J. Ayer, W. V. Quine, and proponents of moral naturalism like John Stuart Mill have challenged intuitionism on grounds of epistemic unreliability, cultural contingency, and explanatory insufficiency. Responses by intuitionists and neo-intuitionists—represented by W. D. Ross, G. E. Moore, Michael Huemer, Russ Shafer-Landau, and David Enoch—address skepticism by arguing for reflective equilibrium, phenomenological accounts of intuition, and defeasible justification comparable to perceptual belief justification defended in discussions at Princeton University, Yale University, and Columbia University.
Intuitionist ideas inform contemporary debates in meta-ethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics, influencing work by John Rawls in political philosophy, Thomas Nagel in moral luck discussions, Christine Korsgaard in constructivist responses, and bioethical discourse involving Edmund D. Pellegrino and Tom L. Beauchamp. Intuitionist themes recur in research programs at University of Oxford, Harvard University, Rutgers University, and think tanks such as The Hastings Center and journals including Ethics (journal), shaping curricula and interdisciplinary dialogue across law schools like Harvard Law School and medical ethics centers at Johns Hopkins University.
Category:Ethical theories