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| International Coalition Against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant | |
|---|---|
| Name | International Coalition Against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant |
| Formation | 2014 |
| Type | Multinational coalition |
| Purpose | Counter-ISIL operations, stabilization, capacity building |
| Headquarters | Baghdad, Ankara, Brussels |
| Region served | Iraq, Syria, Libya |
| Members | United States; United Kingdom; France; Germany; Canada; Australia; Turkey; Saudi Arabia; United Arab Emirates; Jordan; Iraq; Lebanon; Egypt; Italy; Spain; Netherlands; Belgium; Denmark; Norway; Sweden; Finland; Poland; Romania; Estonia; Latvia; Lithuania; Czech Republic; Slovakia; Hungary; Portugal; Greece; Bulgaria; Croatia; Albania; Montenegro; North Macedonia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Georgia; Azerbaijan; Japan; South Korea; New Zealand; Bahrain; Qatar; Morocco; Tunisia; Kenya; Chad; Niger; Nigeria; Cameroon; Malta; Cyprus; Ireland |
International Coalition Against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant is a multinational partnership formed in 2014 to coordinate military, political, and humanitarian efforts against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. The coalition brought together NATO members, regional states, and partners from Africa, Asia, and the Middle East to synchronize air campaigns, train local forces, and support reconstruction in areas liberated from ISIL. Its activities intersected with major events such as the Iraq War, the Syrian Civil War, the Battle of Mosul (2016–17), and the Siege of Kobani.
The coalition emerged after rapid ISIL advances that included the Fall of Mosul (2014), the declaration of a caliphate in Raqqa, and the 2014 Sinjar massacre, prompting calls from leaders including Barack Obama, David Cameron, François Hollande, and Angela Merkel for collective action. Early meetings convened representatives from the United States Department of Defense, the Ministry of Defence (United Kingdom), the État-major des armées (France), and the Bundeswehr, alongside regional actors such as Abdullah II of Jordan, Salman of Saudi Arabia, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The coalition built upon prior frameworks exemplified by the Gulf Cooperation Council, the United Nations Security Council resolutions addressing ISIL (Daesh) resolutions, and lessons from the Global War on Terrorism.
Membership combined permanent partners like the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Turkey with rotating contributors from NATO and the Arab League. The coalition established a Combined Joint Task Force structure resembling the Operation Inherent Resolve headquarters, integrating liaison elements from the Iraqi Armed Forces, Syrian Democratic Forces, Peshmerga, Free Syrian Army, and Libyan National Army affiliates. Coordination relied on venues including the International Syria Support Group, NATO Allied Operations, and periodic ministerial meetings hosted in Brussels, Paris, and Baghdad.
The coalition executed an air campaign that supported ground offensives such as the Battle of Tal Afar (2017), the Second Battle of Tikrit, and the Siege of Raqqa (2017), often coordinating strikes from bases in Incirlik Air Base, Al Udeid Air Base, and Al Asad Airbase. Strategy combined targeted airstrikes, special operations forces deployments like Delta Force and Special Air Service, training missions modeled on the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service program, and intelligence-sharing networks among agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency, MI6, and the Direction générale de la sécurité extérieure. Logistics drew on assets including Airlift operations, Carrier strike group rotations, and overflight agreements with states such as Jordan and Kuwait.
Diplomatic initiatives sought to complement kinetic actions through forums like the Friends of Syria meetings, the Geneva peace talks (2012–present), and bilateral diplomacy involving John Kerry, Sergey Lavrov, Mohammad Javad Zarif, and regional ministers. The coalition engaged with Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi and Syrian Democratic Council representatives to support governance transitions, reconciliation frameworks inspired by the Anbar Awakening experience, and prisoner-handling protocols reflecting concerns raised at the International Criminal Court. Sanctions and financial measures coordinated with the Financial Action Task Force targeted ISIL revenue streams tied to oil smuggling, antiquities trafficking, and extortion.
Humanitarian responses in areas affected by ISIL drew on agencies such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, International Committee of the Red Cross, United Nations Children's Fund, and nongovernmental organizations including Médecins Sans Frontières and Save the Children. Stabilization programs funded by coalition partners supported demining via UNMAS, restoration of electricity and water infrastructure in Mosul and Raqqa, and rule-of-law projects implemented with the European Union and the United Nations Development Programme. Reintegration and countering violent extremism programs referenced models from Yemen and the Sahel to address displaced populations and former combatants.
Coalition operations invoked legal authorities ranging from bilateral status of forces agreements with Iraq to UN mandates under United Nations Security Council Resolution 2249 (2015), while domestic statutes such as the Authorization for Use of Military Force shaped American participation. Issues of detention and prosecution engaged legal institutions including the Iraqi Central Criminal Court, hybrid justice proposals discussed at The Hague, and debates involving the International Criminal Court regarding jurisdiction over alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity. Transparency challenges prompted parliamentary inquiries in states including France, United Kingdom, and Australia.
The coalition contributed to territorial defeats of ISIL in Iraq and Syria, notably in Mosul, Raqqa, and Al-Qaim, while enabling return of some displaced civilians and degradation of ISIL command-and-control. Critics, including analysts from Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and academic observers at Chatham House and the Brookings Institution, highlighted civilian casualties from airstrikes, coordination gaps with Russian Armed Forces activity, and insufficient post-conflict stabilization in liberated areas. Ongoing debates involve long-term prevention strategies informed by cases such as Benghazi, Fallujah, and reconciliation efforts exemplified by the Good Friday Agreement.
Category:Counterterrorism coalitions