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| Integrated Review Refresh | |
|---|---|
| Name | Integrated Review Refresh |
| Country | United Kingdom |
| Released | 2023 |
| Jurisdiction | United Kingdom |
| Responsible | Prime Minister of the United Kingdom |
| Related | Integrated Review (2021), National Security Strategy (UK) |
Integrated Review Refresh The Integrated Review Refresh is a 2023 policy update that reassessed the United Kingdom's strategic posture, aligning national priorities with changing international dynamics. It synthesizes assessments from across Whitehall institutions and external partners to update defence, foreign, development, and domestic resilience planning. The Refresh informed decisions across ministries including the Ministry of Defence (United Kingdom), Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, and HM Treasury.
The Refresh responded to events such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine (2022), the China–UK relations tensions, and evolving alliances like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization enlargement. It sought to update priorities set by the Integrated Review (2021) and the National Security Capability Review. The purpose included adapting to technological shifts exemplified by actors such as Huawei Technologies controversies, countering malign influence linked to the Wagner Group, and reinforcing commitments under treaties such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
The Refresh covered defense posture changes involving the Royal Navy, British Army, and Royal Air Force; diplomatic strategies executed via the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office; and economic security measures involving Department for Business and Trade. Methodologically, it integrated analyses from agencies including Government Communications Headquarters, Secret Intelligence Service, and Defence Science and Technology Laboratory with inputs from academic partners like Chatham House, Royal United Services Institute, and King's College London. It employed scenario planning influenced by crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic, supply-chain disruptions connected to Suez Canal obstruction incidents, and cyber incidents attributed to groups linked to APT29.
Findings emphasized strategic competition with states such as the People's Republic of China, countering coercion from actors exemplified by the Russian Federation, and managing instability in regions including the Middle East and the Sahel. Priorities included strengthening deterrence via nuclear posture debates tied to the Trident (UK deterrent) system, boosting expeditionary capabilities akin to commitments in Operation Shader, and securing critical supply chains for technologies with links to ARM Holdings and semiconductor sectors. The Refresh highlighted partnerships with allies such as the United States Department of Defense, trilateral initiatives like the AUKUS framework, and multilateral fora including the United Nations and the G7.
Policy shifts recommended reallocations impacting the Ministry of Defence (United Kingdom), adjustments to export controls overseen by the Export Control Joint Unit, and investments in research institutions such as Defence Science and Technology Laboratory and universities including University of Oxford and University of Cambridge. Capability implications affected force structure decisions related to programs like the Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carrier deployments and procurement programs such as the Tempest (aircraft project). Cybersecurity responsibilities intersected with bodies like National Cyber Security Centre and legal frameworks including the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018.
Implementation phases mapped to fiscal cycles coordinated by HM Treasury and the Cabinet Office, with milestones tied to defense equipment plans and diplomatic initiatives. Short-term actions paralleled deployments similar to Operation Interflex, medium-term investments targeted programs like the Typhoon (aircraft) sustainment, and long-term modernization anticipated partnerships with industry leaders including BAE Systems, Rolls-Royce Holdings plc, and Serco Group plc. International cooperation timelines aligned with exercises involving NATO Response Force and bilateral engagements such as the UK–US Special Relationship meetings.
Consultations involved devolved administrations such as the Scottish Government and Welsh Government, local authorities, and industry groups including Confederation of British Industry. The Refresh sought inputs from think tanks like Institute for Strategic Dialogue, civil society organizations such as Amnesty International, and parliamentary committees including the Foreign Affairs Select Committee and the Defence Select Committee. It incorporated perspectives from international partners including European Union members, the Commonwealth of Nations, and security partners such as Australia and Japan.
Monitoring mechanisms included reviews by the National Security Council (United Kingdom) and audit processes involving the National Audit Office. Assessment drew on intelligence from MI6, MI5, and cross-government analytic units; outcomes informed parliamentary oversight via the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament. Future updates signalled engagement with emerging domains influenced by companies and research bodies such as OpenAI, DeepMind Technologies, and academic centers at London School of Economics and University College London.
Category:United Kingdom national security policy