Indian Expeditionary Force D

Indian Expeditionary Force D
Unit name	Indian Expeditionary Force D
Dates	1914–1916
Country	British India
Allegiance	British Empire
Branch	British Indian Army
Type	Expeditionary force
Role	Expeditionary operations
Garrison	Calcutta
Notable commanders	Lieutenant General Sir John Nixon; Major General Charles Melliss; Major General Sir George Gorringe

Indian Expeditionary Force D was a British Indian Army formation mobilized during World War I for operations in Mesopotamia. Raised from units stationed in India, the force sailed from Bombay and Basra areas to secure Persian Gulf interests, protect Anglo-Persian Oil Company installations, and support Ottoman Empire theatre operations. The force’s actions intersected with major figures and formations across Gallipoli, the Western Front, and the Suez Canal theatre.

Background and Formation

The decision to form the force followed directives from Lord Kitchener and the India Office amid concerns about Ottoman entry into the war and threats to Abadan oil refineries and the Shatt al Arab. Political pressure from Winston Churchill and naval assessments from the Royal Navy combined with intelligence from Henry McMahon and reports by T. E. Lawrence’s precursors influenced strategic priorities. Troops were assembled under orders from Viceroy of India Lord Hardinge and coordinated with the Mesopotamian Campaign Planning Committee. Initial planning involved liaison with the Indian Army (British) staff, coordination with the Military Secretary (India) and transport arrangements via the Royal Fleet Auxiliary and commercial liners requisitioned by Admiralty planners.

Composition and Units

The force included brigades drawn from garrisons across Punjab, Bengal, Madras, and Bombay Presidency. Key infantry regiments were the 6th (Poona) Division elements: battalions such as the 2nd Battalion, Royal Fusiliers, 1st Battalion, Highland Light Infantry, and Indian units like the 2nd Lancers (Gardner's Horse), 127th Baluch Light Infantry, 1st Brahmans, 120th Rajputana Infantry and the 45th Rattray's Sikhs. Artillery assets included batteries from the Royal Horse Artillery, Royal Garrison Artillery, and Indian Mountain Batteries such as the 21st Kohat Mountain Battery (Frontier Force). Engineering support came from the Sappers and Miners including the 1st King George's Own Bengal Sappers and Miners. Medical services were provided by the Indian Medical Service and the Royal Army Medical Corps, with transport by the Royal Army Service Corps and Indian mule and camel corps.

Deployment to Mesopotamia

For transit, convoys assembled at Bombay Harbour and transited via Aden and the Persian Gulf, docking at Basra. Naval escort was provided by ships from the Royal Navy's East Indies Station and support from the Royal Indian Marine. Initial objectives included securing Basra Vilayet, protecting the Abadan Refinery, and safeguarding oil lines to Port Said. Command relationships involved the India Office and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, with on-the-ground command by Lieutenant General Sir John Nixon and divisional commanders coordinating with political officers attached from the Indian Political Service.

Major Engagements and Campaigns

The force participated in early operations including the capture of Basra in late 1914 and subsequent actions along the Tigris River and Euphrates River. Notable battles included the Battle of Qurna, the Battle of Shaiba, the Battle of Ctesiphon, and the disastrous Siege of Kut culminating at Kut al Amara. Opponents included units of the Ottoman Empire reinforced by commanders such as Field Marshal Colmar von der Goltz’s legacy formations and fought against Ottoman corps drawn from the Dicle (Mesopotamia) Front. The campaign saw coordination and competition with Arab Revolt sympathizers, Persian Cossack Brigade movements, and Ottoman garrisons in Amara. Relief attempts involved formations under General Fenton Aylmer and later Major General George Gorringe with links to operations elsewhere such as the Sinai and Palestine Campaign.

Logistics, Challenges, and Casualties

Logistical strains were severe: extended supply lines from Basra up the Tigris relied on river transport using steamers, river barges requisitioned from Mesopotamian Steam Navigation Company, and railheads limited to Baghdad approaches. Disease from cholera and malaria exacerbated by hot seasons, inadequate medical evacuation via the Red Cross, and shortages of suitable winter kit contributed to casualties. Command friction between the India Office and War Office, limitations in Royal Army Medical Corps capacity, and shortages of artillery and ammunition complicated operations. Casualties included thousands killed, wounded, and captured at Kut al Amara; many soldiers became subjects of prisoner-of-war camps under Ottoman POW administration.

Aftermath and Legacy

The failure to relieve Kut and the eventual reorganization of Mesopotamian forces prompted inquiries by the British Parliament and criticism from figures such as David Lloyd George. Reforms followed in imperial military administration, influencing later campaigns in Palestine and Persia. Veterans’ experiences affected regimental histories of units like the Poona Horse and Sikh regiments, memorials at Basra War Cemetery and Kadhimiya War Cemetery, and scholarly work by historians including Charles Townshend and A.J. Barker. The campaign reshaped British policy towards Iraq mandates and contributed to post-war arrangements codified in the Treaty of Sèvres negotiations and the later Anglo-Iraqi Treaty (1930).

Category:Campaigns and theatres of World War I Category:British Indian Army units