This article was accepted into the corpus but its outbound wikilinks were never NER-processed — typical at the deepest BFS hop or when the run's entity cap was reached. No expansion funnel to show.
| Hollingsworth v. Virginia | |
|---|---|
| Case name | Hollingsworth v. Virginia |
| Court | Supreme Court of the United States |
| Citation | 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798) |
| Decided | March 9, 1798 |
| Docket | null |
| Judges | Jay, Ellsworth, Cushing, Paterson, Chase, Iredell |
| Majority | per curiam |
| Laws applied | United States Constitution, Article Five of the United States Constitution |
Hollingsworth v. Virginia is a 1798 decision of the Supreme Court of the United States addressing whether the Constitution requires submission of a proposed constitutional amendment to the President for approval or veto. The Court's per curiam disposition arose in the procedural context of the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment following the Chisholm v. Georgia controversy and remains a touchstone in debates over constitutional amendment procedure and separation of powers. The case is notable for its brief opinion, its treatment of Article V mechanics, and its later citation in twentieth- and twenty-first-century litigation concerning amendment processes.
The dispute has roots in post-Revolutionary War controversies about sovereign immunity after the Chisholm v. Georgia decision, which provoked calls for an amendment to limit federal judicial power. The Senate and House of Representatives adopted a joint resolution proposing the Eleventh Amendment, which then proceeded to the state legislatures for ratification. At issue was whether the President must receive and approve proposed amendments under procedures ordinarily used for legislation and Treaty Clause submissions. Earlier practice and debates in the First Congress and commentary from figures such as Madison and Hamilton informed the context.
A private citizen, Hollingsworth, sought a writ of error from the Supreme Court in a matter connected to judgment enforcement in state suits, invoking questions about the effect of the Eleventh Amendment. The procedural posture produced a question whether the proposed amendment had become part of the Constitution without presidential action after Congress transmitted the amendment to the state legislatures without seeking presidential approval. The record showed that Congress had declared the amendment adopted once sufficient ratification was achieved, and the case reached the Court to test procedural propriety.
The primary legal issue was whether the President has a constitutional role in the amendment process under Article V — specifically, whether submission of a proposed amendment to the state legislatures requires presentment to, or approval by, the President, akin to the Presentment Clause procedure for ordinary legislation. Secondary issues involved the finality of the Eleventh Amendment’s adoption, the interpretation of early congressional practice, and the scope of judicial review over Article V processes.
The Court issued a per curiam judgment stating that the Eleventh Amendment was valid without presidential approval and that the President has no role in the amendment process. The decision was concise: the Court found that amendments proposed in conformity with Article V become part of the Constitution upon ratification by the requisite number of state legislatures or state conventions, and thus presentment to the President is unnecessary. The Court therefore dismissed the writ of error challenging enforcement inconsistent with the Amendment.
Although the opinion lacked an extended written majority analysis, the reasoning rested on textual and historical readings of Article V and early practice by the First Congress. The Court emphasized that Article V prescribes a distinct amendment procedure separate from the legislative presentment mechanisms detailed in the Presentment Clause. Contemporary proponents cited precedent from congressional resolutions and the actions of figures such as Washington and Adams to support the view that the President's signature is not part of amendment adoption. Critics have pointed to the terse nature of the ruling and subsequent interpretive disputes involving constitutional interpretation methodologies advanced by scholars like Hamilton and Madison.
Hollingsworth’s holding that presentment is unnecessary for amendments has been cited in later cases and debates over amendment mechanics, including twentieth-century controversies over proposed amendments and the role of state legislatures versus state conventions. The decision was referenced in debates during the Seventeenth Amendment era and in modern litigation concerning proposed amendments and constitutional change processes. Scholars and courts have relied on Hollingsworth as a short-form precedent while also noting its limited argumentative depth, prompting additional reliance on historical records, including Congressional Records and correspondence among Founders.
Academic commentary has both endorsed and critiqued Hollingsworth. Supporters cite its fidelity to textualism regarding Article V and rely on archival evidence from the National Archives to corroborate congressional practice. Critics argue the decision’s brevity leaves unresolved questions about separation of powers boundaries and presentment analogies, prompting articles in journals such as the Harvard Law Review, the Yale Law Journal, and the Columbia Law Review. Monographs on constitutional law history, including works by scholars associated with Harvard, Yale, and Columbia, analyze primary sources like the Annals of Congress and correspondence from Madison to assess the decision’s persuasiveness. Ongoing scholarship examines hypothetical consequences for amendment strategies involving interstate compacts and modern institutional actors such as the Congress and the President.
Category:1798 in United States case law Category:United States Supreme Court cases