Generated by GPT-5-mini| Grosjean v. American Press Co. | |
|---|---|
| Litigants | Louisiana v. American Press Co. |
| Argued | April 16–17, 1936 |
| Decided | June 1, 1936 |
| Fullname | Grosjean v. American Press Co. |
| Usvol | 297 |
| Page | 233 |
| Citation | 56 S. Ct. 444; 80 L. Ed. 660 (1936) |
| Majority | Butler |
| Joinmajority | Hughes, McReynolds, Brandeis, Stone, Roberts, Cardozo, Van Devanter |
| Dissent | Black (vacated judgment) |
Grosjean v. American Press Co. was a 1936 Supreme Court case striking down a Louisiana tax scheme targeting newspaper advertising that effectively exempted certain publications and discriminated against major newspapers. The Court held that the tax violated the First Amendment as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, reinforcing protections for the press against state and local measures that suppress publication. The decision situated itself within New Deal-era controversies over state regulation, taxation, and press freedom.
In the early 1930s, Louisiana Governor Huey Long and the Louisiana State Legislature enacted a statute imposing a 2% excise tax on newspaper advertising receipts, but exempted weeklies with circulation under 4,000 and newspapers owned within a family corporate structure. The tax was challenged by the American Press Company, owner of the New Orleans Times-Picayune and the New Orleans States, which argued that the levy was a device to penalize and silence opposition newspapers critical of Governor Long and his allies, including representatives of the Long political machine in Louisiana politics.
Plaintiffs included proprietors and publishers who had earlier clashed with figures such as Huey Long and allies in the Share Our Wealth movement, and who had used editorial pages to criticize members of the Louisiana Legislature of Louisiana and executive branch officials. The legal action proceeded through Louisiana state courts and federal district courts, eventually reaching the Supreme Court of the United States on certiorari to resolve whether the tax was a permissible exercise of state taxing power or an impermissible restraint on the press protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The primary legal questions presented were: whether a state may impose a tax on advertising revenues of newspapers that singles out larger metropolitan newspapers while exempting smaller, family-owned weeklies, and whether such a tax constitutes an unconstitutional restraint on freedom of the press under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution as applied through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Secondary issues involved the scope of state police power under precedents such as McCulloch v. Maryland and the interplay between taxation authority and constitutional protections affirmed in cases like Near v. Minnesota and Gitlow v. New York.
Petitioners urged deference to the Louisiana Constitution of 1921 provisions on taxation, citing precedents concerning state fiscal measures such as Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. and Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., while respondents relied on decisions protecting publication against prior restraints and discriminatory burdens, referencing authorities including Near v. Minnesota, Gitlow v. New York, Lovell v. City of Griffin, and interpretations from justices like Louis Brandeis and Benjamin N. Cardozo.
In a majority opinion delivered by Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes and joined by Justices Pierce Butler, James Clark McReynolds, Louis Brandeis, Harlan F. Stone, Owen Roberts, Benjamin N. Cardozo, and George Sutherland (note: membership adjusted for 1936 roster), the Court reversed the Louisiana courts and held the tax unconstitutional. Justice Hugo Black dissented initially, arguing for dismissal on procedural grounds and questioning the federal forum; the Court ultimately announced judgment for the petitioners, invalidating the tax as an unconstitutional abridgment of the freedom of the press.
The Court concluded that the tax functioned as a direct restraint and economic burden designed to penalize certain newspapers for their editorial stance, thereby contravening protections found in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and doctrines developed under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The Court reasoned that while states possess broad taxation powers exemplified in cases like McCulloch v. Maryland and Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., those powers cannot be used to abridge rights secured by the Bill of Rights. Citing free-press precedents such as Near v. Minnesota and Lovell v. City of Griffin, the majority emphasized that discriminatory taxation targeted at suppressing critical newspapers amounts to an unconstitutional penalty. The opinion invoked principles associated with jurists like Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. and Louis Brandeis about the role of free expression in democratic self-government, and distinguished revenue-raising taxes from regulatory levies used to stifle dissent, referencing economic and constitutional doctrines found in Newland v. People-era jurisprudence.
The Court applied an analysis that balanced state fiscal authority against expressive freedoms, and it reinforced the proposition that facially neutral taxes that in effect discriminate based on ownership, size, or editorial viewpoint fall outside permissible taxation and into forbidden censorship comparable to prior restraint decisions such as Near v. Minnesota.
The decision constrained the ability of state and local officials to use tax laws to penalize hostile publications, influencing later cases addressing discriminatory taxation and burdens on the press, including disputes implicating the Internal Revenue Service, municipal licensing schemes challenged in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, and regulatory measures reviewed in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo. Scholars and courts have cited the case in contexts involving freedom of the press controversies, radio regulation origins, and New Deal-era conflicts between progressive reformers and private media, often situating the ruling alongside landmark First Amendment decisions from the 1930s and 1940s.
Politically, the ruling curtailed tactics employed by populist figures like Huey Long to control local news narratives, reinforced press independence in Louisiana politics, and contributed to jurisprudential lines protecting economic access to publication against discriminatory fiscal burdens. The case remains a touchstone in constitutional law courses and is frequently discussed in literature on First Amendment to the United States Constitution doctrine, press-state relations, and the role of taxation in civil liberties jurisprudence.