Gow Review

Gow Review
Name	Gow Review
Type	Review
Date	2013
Author	Michael Gow
Jurisdiction	United Kingdom
Subject	Operational review of defence acquisition
Outcome	Recommendations for reform of procurement processes

Gow Review The Gow Review was a 2013 independent examination led by Michael Gow into aspects of procurement and acquisition within the United Kingdom defence sector. Commissioned amid concerns about capability delivery, budget pressures, and industrial relationships, the review addressed acquisition practices across the Ministry of Defence, liaised with stakeholders including BAE Systems, Rolls-Royce plc, Airbus, and drew on precedents from inquiries such as the Chilcott Inquiry, the Leveson Inquiry, and the Serco investigations. Its findings influenced policy discussions in Parliament, resonated with reports by the National Audit Office, and intersected with reforms advocated by the Defence Select Committee.

Background

The review was initiated against a backdrop of high-profile procurement challenges involving projects like the Astute-class submarine programme, the Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carrier construction, and the Ajax (Scout SV) armoured vehicle procurement. Debates in the House of Commons and assessments by the Comptroller and Auditor General highlighted cost growth, schedule slips, and capability shortfalls. International comparisons referenced practices at the United States Department of Defense, NATO acquisition programmes, and industrial partnerships exemplified by MBDA, Thales Group, and General Dynamics. The review drew attention from unions such as Unite the Union and industry bodies such as the Confederation of British Industry.

Scope and Objectives

Gow was tasked to examine procurement decision-making, supplier engagement, programme management, and governance across the defence supply chain. The remit encompassed relationships with prime contractors including BAE Systems, Thales Group, Lockheed Martin, and component suppliers like Raytheon Technologies, Honeywell International Inc., and Leonardo S.p.A.. Objectives included assessing risk allocation seen in contracts such as the Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft agreement, scrutinising lessons from projects like F-35 Lightning II involvement, and proposing structural or cultural changes akin to reforms after the Strategic Defence and Security Review 2010. The review also considered procurement models used by the Australian Defence Force, Canadian Armed Forces, and the French Armed Forces.

Findings

The review identified systemic weaknesses in programme assurance comparable to critiques in NAO reports and echoed concerns raised by the Defence Equipment and Support organisation. It found misalignment of incentives between the Ministry of Defence and primes including BAE Systems and Rolls-Royce plc, inconsistent application of commercial frameworks used in deals with Airbus Defence and Space, and insufficient early engagement with SMEs exemplified by firms like QinetiQ and Marshall Aerospace. Governance gaps mirrored earlier criticisms in inquiries involving Serco and Capita. Specific problems included under-resourced programme teams, over-reliance on single-source suppliers such as General Dynamics UK, and inadequate integration of lessons from international partners like US Army acquisition reforms.

Recommendations

Gow proposed a suite of reforms to strengthen assurance, contract management, and supplier competition. Recommendations advocated for clearer decision gates modeled on mechanisms used by the US Defense Acquisition University and the NATO Support and Procurement Agency, enhanced commercial skills drawing on practices at the Crown Commercial Service, and expanded use of competitive frameworks similar to those used by NATO and the Australian Defence Force. The review recommended better transparency with Parliamentary bodies including the Public Accounts Committee, more proactive engagement with innovators such as MBDA, QinetiQ, and Rolls-Royce plc, and establishment of strengthened programme management offices with capacity comparable to those in Lockheed Martin and BAE Systems.

Implementation and Impact

Following publication, aspects of the review informed changes within the Ministry of Defence and influenced iterative reforms in Defence Equipment and Support. Some recommendations were incorporated into procurement guidance alongside ongoing work by the National Audit Office and scrutiny by the Defence Select Committee. Industrial responses came from entities such as BAE Systems, Rolls-Royce plc, and Thales Group, while parliamentary debates in the House of Commons referenced the review when considering amendments to acquisition policy. Internationally, lessons were noted by procurement authorities in the United States Department of Defense and partner militaries during collaborative projects like Joint Strike Fighter arrangements. The review contributed to renewed emphasis on supplier risk management and capability-led acquisition planning referenced in later iterations of the Strategic Defence and Security Review.

Controversies and Criticism

Critics argued the review under-emphasised structural reform and was cautious about recommending radical institutional change akin to proposals from the Institute for Government or the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Industry groups including the Confederation of British Industry and unions such as Unite the Union debated whether recommendations sufficiently protected sovereign capability in sectors represented by BAE Systems and Rolls-Royce plc. Some commentators compared its incremental approach unfavourably with reform agendas from the National Audit Office and the Public Accounts Committee, while think tanks like the Royal United Services Institute raised questions about implementation fidelity. Debates continued over balancing competitive procurement with industrial strategy priorities flagged by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills and parliamentary inquiries into defence acquisition performance.

Category:United Kingdom defence policy