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German Armed Forces High Command (OKW)

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German Armed Forces High Command (OKW)
NameGerman Armed Forces High Command (OKW)
Native nameOberkommando der Wehrmacht
Active1938–1945
CountryNazi Germany
BranchArmed Forces
TypeHigh Command
GarrisonBerlin
Notable commandersWilhelm Keitel

German Armed Forces High Command (OKW) was the nominal high command staff established in 1938 to coordinate the armed services of Nazi Germany during the late Interwar period and World War II. Created amid reorganisation under Adolf Hitler, it served as Hitler’s principal military office for strategic direction and liaison with political leaders such as Hermann Göring, Heinrich Himmler, and members of the Nazi Party. The OKW’s authority and effectiveness were shaped by rivalries with the OKH, the Kriegsmarine, the Luftwaffe, and security organisations including the Schutzstaffel.

History and Formation

The OKW was formed by decree in February 1938 replacing the earlier Reich Ministry of War legacy and parts of the Reichswehr command structures after the Anschluss and the purge of the Blomberg–Fritsch Affair. Its creation followed decisions at meetings at the Berghof and directives from Wolfsschanze planning conferences, intended to centralise strategic control previously exercised by the OKH and service chiefs such as Walther von Brauchitsch and Erich Raeder. Early staffing drew from officers associated with the General Staff of the German Army, the Abwehr, and the Foreign Office military liaison offices. The organisation evolved through crises like the Sudetenland annexation, the Poland campaign, and the Battle of France, during which tensions over command prerogatives intensified.

Organizational Structure

The OKW comprised distinct departments including the Wehrmachtführungsstab, the Wehrmachtamt, and administrative sections for operations, intelligence, and legal affairs, staffed by officers seconded from the Heer, Kriegsmarine, and Luftwaffe. Its leadership sat in the Bendlerblock offices in Berlin, with liaison offices near the Führerhauptquartier system such as Wolfsschanze and Führerhauptquartier Felsennest. Subordinate units included liaison elements to the Waffen-SS, the Heeresgruppe commands, and staffs engaged with the OKH high commands on the Eastern Front and the Western Front. The OKW relied on signals units tied to Funkabwehr and cryptographic services linked to the B-Dienst and wartime codebreakers.

Roles and Responsibilities

The OKW's stated responsibilities encompassed strategic planning for theatres of war, high-level coordination of the Wehrmacht branches, and operational liaison with political authorities such as the Reich Chancellery and the Ministry of Armaments and War Production. It exercised control over operations in theatres outside the main Eastern theatre, including campaigns in the Balkans, North Africa, and the Norwegian Campaign. The OKW also managed interactions with foreign military missions from states such as Italy, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Finland and oversaw occupation administration interfaces with the Reichskommissariat structures in the Occupied France and Soviet territories.

Key Personnel

Senior figures included Chief of the OKW, Wilhelm Keitel, with deputies and chiefs such as Alfred Jodl (Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff), staff officers like Erich Fellgiebel, intelligence liaison officers connected to Canaris of the Abwehr, and legal advisers linked to Hans Frank and Wilhelm Stuckart through occupation law. Political overseers and influential civil-military figures included Martin Bormann at the Party Chancellery interface, and service chiefs such as Erich Raeder, Karl Dönitz, and Hermann Göring who negotiated operational authority. Numerous divisional and corps commanders — for example Erwin Rommel, Erich von Manstein, Gerd von Rundstedt, Friedrich Paulus, Walter Model, and Albert Kesselring — interacted with the OKW for operational directives.

Operational Activities and Influence

The OKW directed strategic planning for major operations including Fall Gelb, Operation Barbarossa, Operation Torch, Operation Market Garden, and defensive campaigns like Case Blue and the battle for Berlin. It coordinated logistics decisions involving the Reichsbahn and industrial mobilisation under Albert Speer’s Ministry of Armaments and War Production, and influenced directives affecting security operations executed by the Waffen-SS, SS-Totenkopfverbände, and Geheime Staatspolizei. The OKW played roles in controversial orders such as the Kommissarbefehl, anti-partisan directives in Yugoslavia, and policies that intersected with the Final Solution administered through the Reinhard Aktion and Wannsee Conference decision-making networks. Operational failures and micromanagement from Berlin affected conduct in campaigns like Stalingrad and the Battle of the Bulge.

Relationship with Other German Military Organisations

Relations between the OKW and the OKH were marked by institutional rivalry, particularly over control of the Eastern Front command and theater allocation, while the OKW maintained working but sometimes tense links with the Luftwaffe High Command (OKL) and the Kriegsmarine command. The OKW negotiated jurisdictional disputes with security organisations including the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, SS leadership under Heinrich Himmler, and the Abwehr under Wilhelm Canaris, which was later suppressed and absorbed amid plots such as the 20 July plot. Interactions extended to diplomatic and occupation organs like the Foreign Office under Joachim von Ribbentrop and civil administrators in the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories.

Dissolution and Legacy

Following decisive defeats and the fall of Berlin in 1945, the OKW ceased to function as an effective command; senior officers including Wilhelm Keitel and Alfred Jodl were captured, tried at the Nuremberg Trials, and convicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity. Postwar analyses by historians such as William Shirer, Ian Kershaw, Richard J. Evans, and David Stahel evaluate the OKW’s role in strategic failures, criminal orders, and the centralisation of authority under Adolf Hitler. The legacy of the OKW influenced postwar debates during the formation of the Bundeswehr and the NATO command structures, and remains a subject in studies of civil-military relations, command responsibility, and the institutional history of Wehrmacht leadership.

Category:Wehrmacht Category:Government of Nazi Germany Category:Military units and formations of Germany]