First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles

First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles was a 1987 decision of the Supreme Court of the United States addressing whether a temporary regulatory prohibition that denies all use of property constitutes a compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and whether a plaintiff may obtain just compensation through a damages action rather than seeking inverse condemnation for final relief. The case arose from floodplain regulations enacted by Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors after repeated floods, which led to litigation by a congregation seeking recovery for substantial property loss. The Court's ruling clarified the application of the Takings Clause and influenced subsequent disputes involving land-use controls, regulatory takings doctrine, and state procedures for compensation.

Background

In the 1970s, repeated flooding prompted the Los Angeles County Flood Control District and Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors to enforce an ordinance regulating repair and use of structures within the San Gabriel Valley floodplain, affecting properties such as the congregation's church building in Glendale, California. The plaintiff, represented in litigation by members of the First English Evangelical Lutheran Church congregation, had purchased and altered the church property after obtaining building permits from the City of Glendale, but was later restrained from repairing flood damage by a county cease-and-desist order enforced under the California Government Code and local ordinances. Lower courts, including the Superior Court of Los Angeles County and the Supreme Court of California, considered whether the county action amounted to a taking under Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, and other precedents, and whether the congregation's remedy was limited by California's inverse condemnation procedures.

Legal Issues Presented

The case presented several constitutional and procedural questions: whether a temporary regulatory prohibition that deprives an owner of all beneficial use of property constitutes a per se taking under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and whether a landowner may recover just compensation by sueing for damages in an ordinary civil action rather than pursuing an administrative inverse condemnation remedy prescribed by state law. The Court also confronted doctrines from Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and Dolan v. City of Tigard regarding exactions and the nexus of land-use conditions, as well as the standards set by Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City for regulatory takings balancing, and the categorical rule from Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council about total loss of use.

Supreme Court Decision

In a majority opinion authored by William Rehnquist, the Supreme Court of the United States held that a temporary regulatory prohibition on all use of property is a compensable taking under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and that a property owner may seek just compensation through a damages remedy in federal court without waiting for the state to deny compensation through inverse condemnation proceedings. The Court reversed the Supreme Court of California and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its holding, aligning relief mechanisms with precedents such as Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States and distinguishing state sovereign immunity arguments found in cases like Berman v. Parker.

Reasoning and Opinions

The majority reasoned that temporary regulatory takings impose sufficiently severe burdens—analogous to physical occupation—to warrant compensation, invoking the principle that the Takings Clause protects private property against uncompensated deprivations regardless of the regulatory or physical form of the interference. Rehnquist's opinion emphasized historical understandings of compensation, referencing constitutional framers and earlier decisions such as Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co. and articulating that the availability of state administrative remedies does not preclude a federal damages action for just compensation under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in the judgment but wrote separately on remedy scope, while Justice William J. Brennan Jr. dissented, arguing that the Court's approach disrupted the balance between state land-use regulation and property rights as framed in precedents like Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.

Impact and Subsequent Developments

The decision had broad effects on litigation strategy and municipal regulation, prompting property owners to bring federal takings claims for temporary regulatory deprivations and leading local governments such as Los Angeles County to reassess floodplain management practices and compensation procedures. It influenced later cases addressing regulatory takings, land-use stability, and remedies, including consideration in debates over eminent domain reforms and state inverse condemnation statutes, and it has been cited in opinions from courts such as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and in scholarship from institutions like Harvard Law School and Yale Law School. Legislative responses and administrative adaptations followed in jurisdictions confronting flood insurance policy, Federal Emergency Management Agency maps, and land-use planning statutes to mitigate takings exposure while pursuing public safety objectives.

Category:United States Supreme Court cases Category:1987 in law Category:Takings Clause cases