Field Marshal Erich von Manstein
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| Field Marshal Erich von Manstein | |
|---|---|
| Name | Erich von Manstein |
| Birth date | 24 November 1887 |
| Death date | 9 June 1973 |
| Birth place | Berlin, German Empire |
| Death place | Irschenhausen, West Germany |
| Rank | Field Marshal |
| Serviceyears | 1906–1945 |
| Battles | World War I; World War II; Battle of France; Operation Barbarossa; Siege of Sevastopol; Third Battle of Kharkov; Battle of Normandy |
| Awards | Pour le Mérite; Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves and Swords |
Field Marshal Erich von Manstein was a German senior officer who served as a commander and chief strategist for the Wehrmacht during the Second World War. He is best known for planning the Manstein Plan used in the Battle of France and for operational command in the Eastern Front, notably the Siege of Sevastopol and the Third Battle of Kharkov. His career remains highly controversial because of his association with the Nazi regime, operational decisions in occupied territories, and postwar accountability cases.
Early life and military career
Born in Berlin into a family with a long Prussian military tradition connected to the von Manstein family, he entered the Prussian Army cadet system and attended the Kriegsakademie equivalent institutions before commissioning in the Imperial German Army. Early service placed him with units of the German Empire such as the 5th Guards Regiment and postings that brought him into contact with senior officers from the Great General Staff and the Prussian Minister of War. He developed relationships with contemporaries including Paul von Hindenburg, Erich Ludendorff, August von Mackensen, and junior colleagues who later rose in the Reichswehr and Wehrmacht.
World War I and interwar years
During World War I, he served on the Western Front and Eastern Front, participating in campaigns involving the Battle of the Somme, the Battle of Verdun, and operations against the Russian Empire. He earned the Pour le Mérite and other decorations while working in staff positions influenced by the doctrines of the Schlieffen Plan and the heritage of the Great General Staff. After the Armistice of 11 November 1918 and the Weimar Republic period, he remained in the Reichswehr where he worked with figures such as Hans von Seeckt, Kurt von Hammerstein-Equord, and Werner von Blomberg, contributing to covert rearmament and doctrinal continuity that fed into the Blomberg–Fritsch affair and the later expansion under Heinrich Himmler and Hermann Göring.
Role in World War II
In the run-up to the Invasion of Poland (1939), Manstein served in staff roles within the Oberkommando des Heeres alongside officers like Walther von Brauchitsch and Franz Halder. He authored the plan of attack for the Battle of France—commonly called the Manstein Plan—which redirected forces through the Ardennes via the Meuse River, leading to the collapse of the French Third Republic and the surrender at Compiegne. Promoted to field command, he led formations such as the XIX Army Corps and later commanded Army Group units on the Eastern Front against the Soviet Union during Operation Barbarossa. He directed operations in the Crimean Campaign, including the Siege of Sevastopol, coordinated counteroffensives culminating in the Third Battle of Kharkov together with commanders like Friedrich Paulus and Erwin Rommel, and opposed the Red Army advances during the Battle of Kursk and the Vistula–Oder Offensive. In 1944–45 he was involved in the defense against Operation Overlord and the Allied invasion of Western Europe as part of the collapsing German high command.
Military strategy and assessments
Manstein’s operational art emphasized maneuver warfare rooted in concepts from the Schlieffen Plan tradition and later developed through interactions with proponents of Blitzkrieg like Heinz Guderian, Günther von Kluge, and Erich Hoepner. Analysts compare his approach to that of Carl von Clausewitz’s operational principles and the staff practices of the Great General Staff. He prioritized decisive counterattacks, interior lines, and combined-arms coordination involving Panzer divisions, Luftwaffe support under leaders such as Hermann Göring, and mobile infantry. Historians and military theorists including Basil Liddell Hart, John Erickson, Gerhard Weinberg, David Glantz, and Christopher Browning have debated Manstein’s tactical brilliance against strategic shortcomings and logistical constraints.
Controversies and war crimes allegations
Manstein’s career is marked by controversies involving orders and policies on the Eastern Front tied to the Commissar Order, the Hungerplan, and security operations conducted by units like the Waffen-SS and the Einsatzgruppen. Evidence and testimony have implicated forces under his command in reprisals, anti-partisan operations, and actions against Jews and civilian populations in regions including Poland, Ukraine, and Crimea. Scholars such as Rolf-Dieter Müller, Jürgen Förster, Ian Kershaw, Hans Buchheim, and Michael Marrus analyze Manstein’s degree of knowledge and responsibility, while defenders like B.H. Liddell Hart and some postwar memoirists emphasize his professional detachment. Debates invoke documents from the Nuremberg Trials, captured orders analyzed by Allied intelligence and archival collections housed in institutions like the Bundesarchiv.
Postwar trial, imprisonment and release
After World War II, Manstein was detained by British and Allied authorities and became a defendant in war crimes prosecutions concentrated on actions in the Soviet Union and Poland. The British Military Court at Hamburg tried him in the late 1940s; prosecutors drew on testimonies involving officials from SS, Heinrich Himmler, Reinhard Heydrich, and field subordinates. Convicted on counts related to deportations and executions, he received a prison sentence that was later reduced amid Cold War political pressures involving figures such as Winston Churchill, Clement Attlee, Harry S. Truman, and Konrad Adenauer. Advocates for his release included conservative German politicians, former officers, and think tanks concerned with rearmament during the NATO era; he was released in the early 1950s.
Legacy and historiography
Manstein’s legacy interweaves assessments by military historians, memoirs, and documentary evidence. Works by B.H. Liddell Hart, Manstein’s own memoir "Verlorene Siege" (lost victories), and critical studies by Gideon Greif, Peter Lieb, Rolf-Dieter Müller, Ian Kershaw, Gerhard Weinberg, David Stahel, and Omer Bartov have shaped public and scholarly views. Debates address his operational skill in campaigns like the Battle of France and Sevastopol versus moral responsibility for war crimes and complicity with Nazi policies. His influence persists in military education at institutions such as the United States Military Academy, the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, and the Bundeswehr staff colleges, while museums, archives, and memorials in Germany, Russia, and France continue to re-examine his career amid evolving archival discoveries and comparative studies of commanders like Erwin Rommel, Gerd von Rundstedt, Heinz Guderian, Friedrich Paulus, Walter Model, and Albert Kesselring.