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Federalist No. 39

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Federalist No. 39
TitleFederalist No. 39
AuthorJames Madison
PublicationThe Federalist Papers
DateMarch 12, 1788
Original publicationThe Independent Journal
Series number39
TopicConstitutional structure

Federalist No. 39

Federalist No. 39 is an essay written by James Madison and published as part of The Federalist Papers in March 1788 in The Independent Journal defending the proposed United States Constitution during the ratification debates in New York. Madison addresses whether the proposed Constitution creates a government that is national in character or federal in character, situating his argument amid disputes involving figures such as Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, Patrick Henry, George Mason, and John Adams. The essay engages controversies stemming from earlier events like the American Revolutionary War, the weaknesses exposed by the Articles of Confederation, and debates at the Philadelphia Convention.

Background and context

Federalist No. 39 appears in the context of intense ratification contests across states including Massachusetts, Virginia, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire. Madison wrote as part of a coordinated series with contributors including Alexander Hamilton and John Jay under the pseudonym "Publius", responding to opponents aligned with figures such as Samuel Adams, Patrick Henry, and George Clinton. The essay addresses structural issues raised at the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 where delegates from states like Virginia, New Jersey, Connecticut, and Maryland negotiated compromises including the Great Compromise, the Three-Fifths Compromise, and provisions affecting representation and the balance between large states like New York and small states like Delaware.

Summary and main arguments

Madison opens by defining a republican constitution in light of ideas discussed by theorists such as John Locke, Baron de Montesquieu, and practical models like the Roman Republic and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. He argues the proposed Constitution is neither purely national like the centralized regimes of Louis XIV-era France nor purely federal like the loose confederation under the Articles of Confederation; rather it combines elements of state sovereignty exemplified by bodies like the Virginia General Assembly with national attributes such as the power to regulate foreign affairs comparable to prerogatives exercised by the Continental Congress during the American Revolutionary War. Madison distinguishes between the origin of constitutional authority—coming from the people of the United States collectively as in the Preamble to the United States Constitution—and the operation of governmental powers distributed among national institutions including the United States Congress, the President of the United States, and the federal judiciary culminating in the Supreme Court of the United States. He emphasizes mechanisms such as representation, enumeration, and the delimitation of powers that reconcile interests of entities like New York, Virginia, Massachusetts, and South Carolina.

Federalist No. 39 in the debate over republicanism and federalism

Madison frames the Constitution within republican theory debated by thinkers connected to the Enlightenment, including Montesquieu and David Hume, and practical republican experiments like the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the Roman Republic. He seeks to allay fears voiced by critics like Patrick Henry and George Mason that the Constitution would produce consolidated rule resembling monarchies such as Great Britain under George III or centralized states like France before the French Revolution. By juxtaposing federal examples like the Articles of Confederation and the Confederate States of America's later claims, Madison articulates a constitutional model where sovereignty originates with the people, addressing issues raised by state actors including the New York Ratifying Convention and the Virginia Ratifying Convention.

Reception and contemporaneous responses

Contemporaries debated Madison's distinctions at ratifying conventions in Massachusetts, Virginia, and New York, where figures such as John Jay, Alexander Hamilton, George Clinton, Samuel Adams, and Elbridge Gerry contested the meaning and implications of national versus federal authority. Opponents referenced events like Shays' Rebellion and deficits under the Articles of Confederation to argue for stronger state protections, while supporters pointed to international examples involving Prussia, Spain, and the diplomatic relations handled by the Continental Congress to justify national powers. Press commentary in papers like The Independent Journal and pamphlets by authors sympathetic to Federalist positions amplified Madison's reasoning, provoking rebuttals from Anti-Federalist writers using names like "Brutus" and "Cato."

Historical significance and interpretation

Scholars have long regarded No. 39 as central to understanding Madison's constitutional theory, influencing historians and political theorists from Charles A. Beard and Gordon S. Wood to modern interpreters in the tradition of Ronald Dworkin and Akhil Amar. Debates over the essay's meaning intersect with studies of the Great Compromise, the Electoral College, and the delineation of powers among institutions like the House of Representatives, the Senate, and the Supreme Court of the United States. Federalist No. 39 has been used to understand constitutional disputes in eras ranging from the Civil War and debates over nullification to twentieth-century clashes over the New Deal and twentieth- and twenty-first-century controversies involving the United States v. Lopez and the expansion of federal authority during administrations from Andrew Jackson to Franklin D. Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan.

Influence on constitutional scholarship and jurisprudence

Judges and scholars have invoked Madison's distinctions in constitutional interpretation in cases adjudicated by the Supreme Court of the United States and lower federal courts, informing doctrines related to federalism, enumerated powers, and popular sovereignty addressed in rulings such as those concerning the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, and debates culminating in decisions like McCulloch v. Maryland and Gibbons v. Ogden. Constitutional commentators from schools associated with figures like Alexander Hamilton and James Madison have debated originalist and living Constitution approaches in light of No. 39, influencing legal scholars including Antonin Scalia, Brett Kavanaugh, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Saul Levin in their writings and opinions. The essay remains a staple in syllabi at institutions such as Harvard Law School, Yale Law School, and Columbia Law School, and continues to shape comparative studies involving constitutions in countries like Canada, Australia, and Germany.

Category:The Federalist Papers