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| FM 3-24 (Doctrine) | |
|---|---|
| Name | FM 3-24 (Doctrine) |
| Subject | United States Army field manual on counterinsurgency |
| Published | 2006 |
| Publisher | Department of the Army |
| Pages | varies |
| Country | United States |
FM 3-24 (Doctrine) FM 3-24 is a United States Army field manual published in 2006 that codified counterinsurgency approaches for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, aiming to integrate tactical, operational, and political approaches across the United States Army, United States Marine Corps, Coalition forces in Iraq and other partnered organizations. The manual drew on experiences from the Iraq War, War in Afghanistan (2001–2021), and historical cases such as the Malayan Emergency, Vietnam War, and Philippine–American War, to propose a holistic approach to population-centric operations and civil-military cooperation.
FM 3-24 was developed under the authority of the United States Department of Defense and authored with contributions from officers and scholars associated with institutions like the United States Military Academy, United States Army War College, and Naval Postgraduate School. Influences cited include works by veterans and academics linked to Iraqi insurgency (2003–2011), analysts from the Council on Foreign Relations, and historical practitioners from the British Army in the Malayan Emergency. The manual's promulgation followed policy directives from the Bush administration and operational guidance influenced by senior leaders such as General David Petraeus and advisors connected to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Multinational Force Iraq.
FM 3-24 emphasizes principles derived from historical counterinsurgency campaigns, advocating protection of the population, legitimacy-building measures, and synchronization of civil and security efforts with actors including the Iraqi Government (2005–2008), Afghan Transitional Administration, and local governance structures. It foregrounds unity of effort among units like the 101st Airborne Division, 1st Cavalry Division, and partnered police forces such as the Iraqi Police and Afghan National Police, advocating for intelligence-driven operations reminiscent of approaches studied in the Algerian War and Colombian conflict. The manual prescribes a mix of kinetic and non-kinetic measures informed by doctrine discussions at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, RAND Corporation, and Brookings Institution.
FM 3-24 organizes doctrine into chapters covering operational art, intelligence, civil engagement, stabilization, and tactical techniques, reflecting input from organizations such as the Combined Arms Center, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and the Army Professional Writing Program. Sections address force protection, information operations, and rule of law collaboration with entities like the Coalition Provisional Authority and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. Annexes include case studies referencing events such as the Battle of Fallujah (2004), the Siege of Marjah, and lessons from the Irish War of Independence.
Implementation relied on doctrine dissemination through professional military education at institutions like the National Defense University, Command and General Staff College, and School of Advanced Military Studies, and on theater-level training at centers such as the National Training Center (Fort Irwin), Joint Readiness Training Center, and Grafenwoehr Training Area. Units applied FM 3-24 in coordinated campaigns involving formations like Multinational Division North (Iraq), partnering with civilian agencies such as the United States Agency for International Development and NGOs active in regions including Anbar Province and Helmand Province. Training modules incorporated lessons from practitioners tied to the Surge in Iraq (2007) and doctrinal updates influenced by inputs from the Senate Armed Services Committee.
The manual shaped operational planning for campaigns executed by commands such as Multi-National Corps – Iraq and Regional Command South (Afghanistan), informing the conduct of operations during the Iraq surge and counterinsurgency efforts in Helmand Province. FM 3-24 affected interagency coordination with bodies like the Department of State (United States), and influenced coalition doctrine among partners including the United Kingdom Armed Forces, Australian Defence Force, and NATO entities such as ISAF. Its principles reportedly contributed to tactical successes in efforts to secure population centers and to programs for local capacity-building tied to initiatives from the Iraq Study Group and think tanks like Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Critics from outlets and institutions including the New York Times, Washington Post, and scholars at Harvard University and Princeton University argued that FM 3-24 overemphasized population-centric approaches, risked mission creep, and imposed doctrinal solutions on complex political problems rooted in cases such as the Iraq insurgency. Debates in forums like the Brookings Institution and hearings before the House Armed Services Committee questioned the manual's assumptions about legitimacy, measurement of success, and resource requirements, and pointed to contested outcomes in operations such as Operation Phantom Thunder and the Battle of Ramadi (2006).
FM 3-24's legacy includes informing later doctrinal publications and multi-domain concepts promulgated by the Department of the Army and NATO, influencing successors like revised field manuals produced by TRADOC and joint doctrine by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Its influence can be traced in training curricula at institutions including the United States Army War College and in doctrine adopted by allied militaries such as the Canadian Armed Forces and British Army. The manual remains a reference point in analyses by research organizations like the Center for a New American Security and the International Institute for Strategic Studies on the conduct of irregular warfare and stabilization operations.