Generated by GPT-5-mini| Ever Given | |
|---|---|
| Name | Ever Given |
| Caption | Container ship Ever Given in transit |
| Ship type | Container ship |
| Owner | Evergreen Marine Corporation |
| Operator | Evergreen Marine |
| Builder | Imabari Shipbuilding |
| Laid down | 2017 |
| Launched | 2018 |
| Completed | 2018 |
| IMO | 9811000 |
| Length | 399.94 m |
| Beam | 58.0 m |
| Draft | 14.5 m |
| Gross tonnage | 219079 |
| Deadweight | 199629 t |
| Capacity | 20124 TEU |
Ever Given Ever Given is a large container ship built in 2018 and operated by Evergreen Marine. The vessel became widely known after a 2021 grounding in the Suez Canal that caused an international disruption to maritime commerce and prompted salvage, legal, and regulatory responses involving shipping lines, insurers, and port authorities. The ship's size, ownership, and the incident connected a range of actors from shipbuilders to global supply-chain stakeholders.
Ever Given is a "very large" container vessel with dimensions designed to maximize TEU capacity within Panamax and post-Panamax parameters, measuring about 399.94 m in length and 58.0 m in beam. Built by Imabari Shipbuilding at the Sakaide yard and delivered to the Taiwanese shipping company Evergreen Marine Corporation, the ship was flagged in Panama and registered with IMO number 9811000. Its gross tonnage of approximately 219,079 and deadweight around 199,629 tonnes give it a nominal capacity of about 20,124 TEU, enabling carriage of containerised cargo between major hubs such as Shanghai, Rotterdam, Port of Singapore, and Los Angeles. Propulsion is provided by a single slow-speed diesel engine built to meet International Maritime Organization standards, with auxiliary systems for electrical generation and ballast control influenced by standards from classification societies such as Lloyd's Register and ClassNK. The hull form and rudder arrangement reflect optimisation for block coefficient and manoeuvrability under laden and ballast conditions, considerations shared with sister ships in the Evergreen fleet constructed during the late 2010s shipbuilding boom.
After delivery, the ship entered scheduled liner service on routes linking Asia, Europe, and North America, frequently calling at transhipment hubs including Port of Ningbo-Zhoushan, Port of Yantian, Port of Antwerp, and Port of Hamburg. The vessel operated under the commercial management of Evergreen Marine and was employed on strings often coordinated by vessel-sharing agreements among carriers such as ONE, MOL, and COSCO Shipping networks. Throughout routine operations, the ship interacted with classifications and inspections overseen by International Association of Classification Societies members and complied with conventions administered by the International Labour Organization and the International Maritime Organization. Crewing and watchkeeping practices on board followed standards influenced by the STCW Convention. The ship's voyages contributed to containerised trade flows that underpinned freight rates tracked by indices like the Shanghai Containerised Freight Index and market participants including Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd.
On 23 March 2021, while transiting the Suez Canal en route from Tanjung Pelepas (Malaysia) to Rotterdam (Netherlands), the vessel became grounded amid a convoy near the canal's southern section. Strong winds associated with a sandstorm and reported loss of steerage led the ship to run aground and block the canal, creating an obstruction that halted northbound and southbound transits and affected ships operating under flags such as Liberia and Bahamas. The grounding rapidly escalated into a global shipping crisis, with queues of container ships, bulk carriers, and oil tankers anchored at chokepoints near Port Said and Suez; affected stakeholders included liner operators like MSC and charterers dependent on cargoes from exporters such as China COSCO Shipping customers. Authorities from the Suez Canal Authority coordinated initial response, while insurers and classification societies assessed potential hull and cargo damage under conventions administered by bodies including the International Group of P&I Clubs.
Salvage operations were led by international salvage firms including Smit International and involved tugs from entities such as d'Appolonia-contracted units and Egyptian maritime assets. Salvors used dredgers to remove sand and conducted a series of timed refloating attempts relying on tidal windows and ballast adjustments. After several days, a coordinated salvage succeeded and the ship was refloated, enabling a transit to the nearby anchorage for inspection by divers, naval architects, and representatives from Lloyd's Register and the shipowner. The Suez Canal Authority detained the vessel pending compensation claims related to canal closure, salvage costs, and lost transit revenue; legal proceedings involved Evergreen, insurers, and Egyptian authorities with values discussed at arbitration and in civil courts. Investigations into causation included reports from flag-state administrators, master and crew statements, voyage data recorder analysis, and inquiries by organisations such as the Japan Transport Safety Board-style marine investigators; findings examined human factors, weather reports from services like DMI and Météo-France, and technical aspects overseen by IMO guidance on grounding incidents.
The grounding produced immediate disruptions to liner schedules and prompt rerouting of some vessels around the Cape of Good Hope, increasing voyage distances for operators including Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd and affecting freight rate indices such as the Freightos Baltic Index. Supply chains for sectors relying on just-in-time logistics, including electronics suppliers in Shenzhen and automotive manufacturers in Düsseldorf, faced delays that highlighted vulnerability to single-route chokepoints. The incident accelerated discussions within international fora—such as meetings involving UNCTAD and IMO—about canal capacity, convoy rules, tug availability, and the prudence of ultra-large container ship deployment studied by research institutes like Lloyd's Register Foundation and Chatham House. Insurers and P&I clubs reassessed risk models and premium structures, while port authorities and shipping alliances evaluated contingency planning, transshipment options at hubs like Colombo, and regulatory proposals to tighten voyage-planning and pilotage standards. Category:Container ships