Generated by GPT-5-mini| Employment Division v. Smith | |
|---|---|
| Case name | Employment Division v. Smith |
| Citation | 494 U.S. 872 (1990) |
| Court | Supreme Court of the United States |
| Decided | April 17, 1990 |
| Majority | Antonin Scalia |
| Dissent | William J. Brennan Jr.; Thurgood Marshall (joined parts); Harry Blackmun (joined parts) |
| Laws | First Amendment; Oregon Revised Statutes |
Employment Division v. Smith
Employment Division v. Smith was a landmark Supreme Court of the United States decision addressing the interplay between the First Amendment protection of free exercise of religion and generally applicable state laws. The case involved members of the Native American Church who used the sacramental substance peyote in religious ceremonies and were denied unemployment benefits under Oregon Revised Statutes. The Court's ruling prompted national debate and legislative responses including the passage of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
In the late 20th century, questions about religious liberty had arisen in contexts involving the Congress, the Supreme Court, and federal statutes such as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Precedent from cases like Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder had applied heightened scrutiny to laws burdening religious practice, involving justices affiliated with institutions like the American Civil Liberties Union and the United States Department of Justice. The petitioner respondents were associated with the Native American Church and religious traditions linked to indigenous groups historically affected by legal disputes in forums including the Navajo Nation and the Bureau of Indian Affairs.
Two members of the Native American Church, Alfred Smith and Galen Black, were employed at private businesses in Oregon. Both ingested peyote, a Schedule I chemical under federal law that is also regulated under state statutes such as the Oregon Revised Statutes, during religious ceremonies. After being dismissed, they applied for unemployment benefits administered by the Employment Division of Oregon, which denied benefits on the basis that their work termination resulted from work-related misconduct—use of a controlled substance—contravening state criminal law. The case proceeded through the Oregon Supreme Court and ultimately to the Supreme Court of the United States.
In a majority opinion authored by Antonin Scalia, the Supreme Court of the United States held that neutral, generally applicable laws that incidentally burden religious practices do not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the United States Constitution absent a showing of legislative intent to target religion. The Court reversed the decision of the Oregon Supreme Court and ruled that the denial of unemployment benefits was lawful. The ruling departed from the compelling interest test that had been applied in prior decisions such as Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder.
Justice Antonin Scalia reasoned that neutral laws of general applicability need not satisfy strict scrutiny because allowing religious exemptions would permit every citizen to become a "law unto himself". The majority distinguished this case from Sherbert v. Verner by emphasizing the categorical difference between individualized exemptions administered by agencies like state employment divisions and generally applicable criminal statutes such as those enacted by the Oregon Legislative Assembly. The opinion referenced concerns about the administrative burdens illustrated in litigation involving institutions like the Internal Revenue Service and the United States Postal Service if widespread religious exemptions were permitted. The majority also discussed precedents including Reynolds v. United States and considered relationships to tribal governance issues relevant to Bureau of Indian Affairs policies.
Justice William J. Brennan Jr. wrote a dissent, joined in parts by Thurgood Marshall and Harry Blackmun, arguing that the decision undermined established protections for religious exercise and departed from the Court's precedents such as Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder. The dissent criticized the majority for failing to apply a compelling interest test and warned of consequences for religious minorities including communities like the Native American Church and faith traditions protected in cases like Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah. The dissenters invoked constitutional doctrines developed in earlier terms of the Court, noting implications for litigation brought by organizations including the American Civil Liberties Union and religious liberty advocates in federal circuits such as the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The decision generated immediate political and legal responses: Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in 1993 to restore the compelling interest test for federal law, prompting litigation in which the Supreme Court of the United States addressed RFRA in City of Boerne v. Flores. Several states enacted their own versions of RFRA, and subsequent cases including Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah and later Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. navigated the contours of free exercise and statutory protections. The ruling influenced litigation strategies of entities such as the American Civil Liberties Union, the National Association of Attorneys General, religious organizations including the Native American Church, advocacy groups like People for the American Way, and scholars at institutions like Harvard Law School, Yale Law School, and Stanford Law School. The decision remains central in discussions in venues such as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and academic symposia at the American Bar Association.