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| Duhem–Quine thesis | |
|---|---|
| Name | Duhem–Quine thesis |
| Field | Philosophy of science |
| Key figures | Pierre Duhem; Willard Van Orman Quine; Karl Popper; Thomas Kuhn; Imre Lakatos |
Duhem–Quine thesis The Duhem–Quine thesis contends that empirical tests do not isolate individual hypotheses but instead assess entire networks of assumptions, auxiliary hypotheses, and background theories. It challenges straightforward falsification and informs debates involving Pierre Duhem, Willard Van Orman Quine, Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, and Imre Lakatos about theory choice, confirmation, and scientific methodology.
The thesis is usually articulated in two complementary formulations: the underdetermination of theory by evidence argued by Pierre Duhem in relation to thermodynamics and experimental practice, and the holism of confirmation emphasized by Willard Van Orman Quine in connection with logical empiricism and analytic/synthetic distinctions. In practical terms the claim is that when an experimental prediction fails, scientists can attribute the failure to any member of the web of assumptions, including instrument reliability, initial conditions, or auxiliary laws—thereby linking to debates that engaged Albert Einstein, Niels Bohr, Erwin Schrödinger, and Werner Heisenberg about theory revision. Proponents often cite historical episodes involving Antoine Lavoisier, Michael Faraday, James Clerk Maxwell, and Lord Kelvin to illustrate how whole research programs, rather than single hypotheses, faced empirical appraisal.
Origins trace to Pierre Duhem's early 20th-century writings on thermodynamics and the practice of physics in France, where Duhem argued that isolated hypotheses cannot be tested independently of auxiliary assumptions and background theories. Mid-century analytic philosophy saw Willard Van Orman Quine extend Duhem's point in essays critiquing the verification principle endorsed by members of the Vienna Circle such as Rudolf Carnap and Moritz Schlick. The exchange influenced critiques by Karl Popper in works responding to falsificationism and by Thomas Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, where Kuhn discussed shifts in paradigms exemplified by episodes involving Isaac Newton, James Watt, and Louis Pasteur. Later contributions by Imre Lakatos, Paul Feyerabend, and Nancy Cartwright further refined historical and methodological perspectives, connecting to controversies in the histories of astronomy (e.g., Ptolemy vs Nicolaus Copernicus), chemistry (e.g., John Dalton), and biology (e.g., Charles Darwin).
Philosophers draw multiple implications: epistemic holism about confirmation linked to Quine’s broader naturalized epistemology, challenges to Popperian falsificationism, and support for underdetermination theses used by skeptics about scientific realism such as Bas van Fraassen and proponents like Hilary Putnam who debated realism versus instrumentalism. The thesis also intersects with discussions by Karl Pearson and Richard Feynman about experimental error, and with methodological pluralism advocated by Paul Feyerabend and Imre Lakatos. It raises questions about theory-ladenness debated by Norwood Russell Hanson and Thomas Kuhn, and about scientific realism pursued by Michael Devitt and Larry Laudan.
Responses include Popperian insistence on bold conjectures and critical testing emphasized by Karl Popper and refinements from Imre Lakatos’s methodology of scientific research programmes defending progressive heuristics. Critics like Bas van Fraassen accept underdetermination but advocate constructive empiricism; others such as Hilary Putnam and Michael Dummett challenge extreme skepticism by arguing for success explanations grounded in realist commitments. Historical counterexamples used by defenders include cases from Antoine Lavoisier's chemical revolution and James Clerk Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory; methodological counterarguments draw on statistical and Bayesian confirmations developed in work by Thomas Bayes, Pierre-Simon Laplace, Bruno de Finetti, and Dennis Lindley to show how degrees of belief can partially resolve underdetermination.
Scientists address the thesis through methodological strategies: robustness checks in experimental design illustrated in work at institutions such as CERN, cross-validation procedures influenced by practices at Bell Labs, and model comparison techniques used in laboratories like Los Alamos National Laboratory. Instrumental calibration, control experiments, and independent replication—practiced by researchers in projects associated with Human Genome Project and Large Hadron Collider collaborations—are routine responses. The thesis also shapes regulatory and policy evaluation discussions involving World Health Organization, Food and Drug Administration, and Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change where model ensembles, sensitivity analyses, and auxiliary assumption audits confront underdetermination in applied contexts.
Related ideas include confirmation holism, the problem of induction debated since David Hume and addressed by John Stuart Mill, and methodological pluralism associated with Paul Feyerabend. Variants encompass semantic holism discussed by Donald Davidson, pragmatic underdetermination in the writings of Pierre Duhem and Willard Van Orman Quine, and Bayesian approaches to model selection shaped by Thomas Bayes and Karl Pearson. Connections extend to debates about theory choice in the work of Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, and Larry Laudan, and to modern discussions of model uncertainty in fields represented by Judea Pearl, Bradley Efron, and Kenneth Arrow.