DoD Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation Process
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| DoD Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation Process | |
|---|---|
| Name | DoD Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation Process |
| Abbreviation | DoD IA C&A |
| Established | 1996 |
| Predecessor | Department of Defense Information Technology Security Certification and Accreditation Process |
| Succeeded by | Risk Management Framework |
| Jurisdiction | United States Department of Defense |
| Related | Committee on National Security Systems, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Defense Information Systems Agency |
DoD Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation Process The DoD Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation Process (C&A) was the Department of Defense procedure for assessing, authorizing, and monitoring information systems to manage risk and ensure compliance with Clinton administration directives, Goldwater–Nichols Act reforms, and Federal Information Security Management Act expectations. It integrated guidance from the National Security Council, Office of Management and Budget, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Defense Information Systems Agency to align system assessment with operational mission requirements and legal authorities. The process influenced subsequent frameworks adopted by National Institute of Standards and Technology, Committee on National Security Systems, and allied partners such as NATO and the Five Eyes community.
Overview
The C&A process provided a lifecycle-oriented methodology that combined elements of risk assessment from National Institute of Standards and Technology publications, accreditation authorities within the Department of Defense, and operational acceptance by commanders in the United States Army, United States Navy, United States Air Force, and United States Marine Corps. It emphasized certification as a technical evaluation performed by specialized organizations like the Defense Information Systems Agency and accreditation as a formal risk acceptance by designated officials, aligning with policy instruments issued by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The methodology interfaced with program offices at entities such as Naval Sea Systems Command, Air Force Materiel Command, and U.S. Cyber Command.
Historical Development and Policy Framework
Origins trace to early DoD computer security directives influenced by Presidential Decision Directive 63 and Defense Acquisition Regulations modernization efforts. High-level policy evolved through memos from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and standards promulgated by National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publications and the Committee on National Security Systems Instruction series. Legislative drivers included the Clinger–Cohen Act and later the Federal Information Security Management Act, which pushed interoperability with General Services Administration procurement practices and standards harmonization with International Organization for Standardization frameworks. DoD-wide adoption required coordination with program executive offices such as Program Executive Office Command, Control, Communications-Tactical and oversight by inspectors from the Government Accountability Office.
Key Components and Phases of the C&A Process
The canonical phases included system inventory and categorization guided by NIST Special Publication 800-60 equivalence, rigorous security control selection mapped to DoD Instruction 8500.2 predecessors, and system implementation subject to vulnerability assessment by organizations like National Security Agency and Commercial Solutions for Classified. Certification activities encompassed configuration management audits, penetration testing similar to practices in Department of Homeland Security programs, and risk assessment matrices influenced by NIST Special Publication 800-30 methodologies. The accreditation phase required submission of a Security Authorization Package to an Authorizing Official drawn from commands such as U.S. Strategic Command or U.S. Northern Command, who issued an Authorization to Operate subject to continuous monitoring obligations negotiated with program managers in Defense Logistics Agency and United States Transportation Command.
Roles and Responsibilities
Multiple offices and officials were assigned roles: Designated Approving Authorities drawn from Service Secretaries and combatant commands; Information System Security Officers embedded in program offices like Naval Air Systems Command; Certification Agents, often residing in Defense Information Systems Agency or accredited labs such as National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program participants; and system owners including acquisition executives in Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment. Oversight came from inspectors and auditors from Defense Contract Audit Agency and the Government Accountability Office, while coordination with policy came from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration and successors.
Assessment and Testing Methods
Assessment methods combined vulnerability scanning tools consistent with Department of Homeland Security directives, independent verification and validation techniques used in Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency procurement, and emulation testing employed by National Security Agency centers. Penetration testing, red team exercises akin to U.S. Cyber Command operations, and supply chain assessments aligned with Defense Contract Management Agency procedures were integrated. Test plans referenced control objectives comparable to NIST Special Publication 800-53, and relied on evidence from labs accredited under programs coordinated with National Institute of Standards and Technology and commercial testing by firms contracting with General Dynamics, Boeing, and Lockheed Martin.
Documentation and Evidence Requirements
The Security Authorization Package required precise documentation: System Security Plans developed by system owners in offices such as Naval Information Warfare Systems Command; Plans of Action and Milestones (POA&M) coordinated with program managers in Defense Information Systems Agency; Risk Assessment Reports used by Authorizing Officials in United States Cyber Command decisions; and continuous monitoring strategies documented for commands like U.S. European Command. Records included accreditation letters, configuration baselines maintained by Defense Contract Management Agency, and test reports from accredited laboratories referenced by National Institute of Standards and Technology guidance.
Transition to Risk Management Framework (RMF) and Legacy Comparisons
The DoD C&A process was formally superseded by the Risk Management Framework adoption influenced by NIST Special Publication 800-37 revisions, with formal transitions directed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and coordinated across Department of Defense components, including Defense Information Systems Agency, U.S. Cyber Command, and service acquisition commands. RMF emphasized continuous authorization, dynamic risk management, and integration with DoD Instruction 8510.01 policies, providing interoperability with frameworks used by National Institute of Standards and Technology, Committee on National Security Systems, and allied standards applied in NATO and European Defence Agency contexts. Comparative analyses by the Government Accountability Office and academic centers at institutions like Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Stanford University highlighted differences in risk acceptance, lifecycle integration, and performance measurement.