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| Damietta LNG | |
|---|---|
| Name | Damietta LNG |
| Country | Egypt |
| Location | Damietta Governorate |
| Status | Operational / Decommissioned (see History) |
| Capacity | 5.5 million tonnes per annum (design) |
| Contractors | ENI, Technip, Jacobs Engineering Group |
| Operator | Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company |
| Start commissioning | 2004 |
| Closed | 2012 (mothballed), reopened 2019 (partial) |
Damietta LNG is a liquefied natural gas project located near Damietta Governorate on the Mediterranean coast of Egypt. The plant was developed to liquefy natural gas for export and to strengthen Egypt's role in the global liquefied natural gas market alongside projects in Qatar, Australia, and Norway. It interacted commercially and geopolitically with regional infrastructures such as the Arab Gas Pipeline, Suez Canal, Ras Laffan projects, and markets in Europe, Turkey, and Greece.
The facility was designed as a mid‑scale liquefaction terminal serving upstream fields in the Nile Delta, Eastern Mediterranean, and onshore fields like Zohr field and Rashid field. Built during a period of heavy investment by oil majors and national oil companies, it attracted partners including Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation, ENI, Rashid Petroleum, British Gas (BG Group), and later collaboration with Sonatrach and Gazprom Neft in regional gas trade discussions. The plant linked to regional infrastructure such as the Ain Sokhna port, Alexandria port, and pipeline networks connecting to Israel–Egypt gas relations and Cyprus energy talks.
Planning and contracting in the late 1990s and early 2000s involved international contractors and financiers from Italy, France, United Kingdom, and United States. Major engineering and procurement contracts were awarded to Technip, Snamprogetti, Saipem, and Jacobs Engineering Group. The plant began commissioning in 2004 and exported LNG under offtake agreements with buyers in Spain, Greece, Turkey, and traders in Japan and South Korea. Political changes in 2011 Egyptian Revolution, fluctuating domestic demand, and discoveries such as the Zohr gas field led to operational pauses and a mothballing decision around 2012. Subsequent diplomatic and commercial negotiations with companies like ENI and governments including Italy, Greece, and Cyprus influenced its partial restart efforts from 2016 onward.
The plant employed a dual‑train liquefaction process using mixed refrigerant or propane precooled mixed refrigerant technologies common to contractors such as Linde plc and Air Liquide. Design capacity was approximately 5.5 million tonnes per annum, with storage tanks, jetties, and marine loading facilities capable of handling LNG carriers similar to those calling at Ras Laffan and Rotterdam port. Utilities included seawater cooling systems, refrigerant compressors supplied by GE (General Electric), and control systems integrating equipment from ABB, Siemens, and Honeywell. Onsite facilities comprised gas treatment units, sulfur recovery units related to processing from sour gas streams in the Nile Delta area, and tie‑ins to the Egyptian Natural Gas Company transmission network.
Initial ownership and joint venture structures involved the Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company (EGAS), ENI, and international partners; over time stakes shifted with renegotiations involving Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation (EGPC), EGAS, and private contractors. Operation and maintenance contracts were sometimes performed by consortiums including TechnipFMC and Snam. Commercial management coordinated sales with traders such as BP, Shell, TotalEnergies, Trafigura, Glencore, and Vitol while linking LNG nominations to ports in Spain, Italy, Greece, and markets in East Asia.
Damietta LNG influenced Egyptian export revenues, balancing imports and domestic supply during seasonal fluctuations, and played a role in regional energy diplomacy among Egypt–Israel relations, Egypt–Greece cooperation, and Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum discussions. Its existence affected gas pricing, shipping flows through the Suez Canal, and competitive dynamics with major exporters like QatarEnergy and Gazprom. Financial stakeholders included international banks and export credit agencies from Italy, France, United Kingdom, and United States that financed initial construction and refinancing rounds tied to long‑term supply contracts.
Environmental assessments addressed impacts on Mediterranean coastal ecosystems, marine biodiversity near Damietta Governorate, and emissions from liquefaction operations compared with onshore gas consumption. Concerns involved potential seawater intake effects on marine protected areas and compliance with standards referenced by organizations such as International Maritime Organization, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and multinational lenders. Safety systems incorporated emergency shutdowns, firewater networks, and coordination with local authorities in Port Said and Rashid (Rosetta), and conformed to industry standards promulgated by entities like American Petroleum Institute and International Organization for Standardization.
Operational history included periods of dispute over gas supply contracts, pricing renegotiations with companies such as ENI and traders including BG Group and Shell, and political disputes following the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. The mothballing decision prompted debates involving Egyptian ministries, investors, and labor unions, and attracted scrutiny from international arbitration forums and commercial banks. There were also reports and investigations into maintenance liabilities, insurance claims, and community concerns in the Damietta Governorate and adjacent coastal municipalities.
Category:LNG terminals Category:Energy infrastructure in Egypt