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| Chile Podemos Más | |
|---|---|
| Name | Chile Podemos Más |
| Native name | Chile Podemos Más |
| Country | Chile |
| Founded | 2023 |
| Political position | Centre-right to right-wing |
| Colours | Blue, White |
Chile Podemos Más
Chile Podemos Más is a Chilean political coalition formed in 2023 as a realignment of centre-right and right-wing forces for national elections. It brought together parties and figures with roots in the Concertación era, the Alianza reconfiguration, and later factional movements, aiming to unify electoral strategy against the New Majority successor coalitions and emergent left blocs. The coalition positioned itself as a governing alternative linking municipalities, regional leaders, and former cabinet members from administrations associated with the Sebastián Piñera presidencies.
The coalition's origins trace to post-2017 shifts following the 2019–20 Chilean protests and the 2020 constitutional process, during which multiple conservative and liberal groups debated reorganization. Early talks involved parties and movements that had competed under banners such as Chile Vamos and Vamos por Chile, with negotiations accelerated after the 2021 and 2022 electoral cycles. Prominent milestones included a founding congress in 2023, candidate primary agreements ahead of the 2025 general election cycle, and alliances in regional elections that echoed patterns from the 2016 municipal elections and the 2017 Chilean general election. The coalition sought to reconcile tensions between neoliberal proponents linked to the International Republican Institute networks and social conservatives aligned with religious and traditionalist groups.
Chile Podemos Más comprised established parties, splinter groups, and civic movements. Founding members included parties derived from the National Renewal tradition, elements of the Independent Democratic Union, and liberal factions originating in the Evópoli sphere. Smaller parties with roots in the Regionalist Movement and Christian democratic currents also participated, alongside independent lists of municipal leaders, former ministers, and legislators who had previously sat with the Chile Vamos coalition. Affiliated civic organizations ranged from business think tanks with ties to the Chamber of Deputies deputies to social movements connected to the Roman Catholic Church in Chile and evangelical networks.
The coalition identified as centre-right to right-wing, advocating economic policies influenced by the Chicago Boys legacy and market-oriented reformists, while accommodating social conservatives influenced by Catholic and evangelical currents. Its platform emphasized tax incentives for private investment, regulatory reforms referencing precedents from the 2005 pension reform debates, and support for private-public partnerships modeled on projects from the Ministry of Public Works portfolios. In security and constitutional matters it defended positions that recalled stances of actors present in the Constitutional Council discussions, favoring a strong executive and institutional stability akin to proposals during the 2018 campaign.
Chile Podemos Más contested municipal, regional, and parliamentary contests after its founding. It fielded candidates in mayoral races that included former mayors with histories in the 2016 municipal elections and legislators who had served in the LVI Legislature. Performance varied: gains in traditionally conservative provinces mirrored results from the 2017 parliamentary elections, while losses occurred in urban constituencies that had swung toward the Broad Front and Apruebo Dignidad coalitions. Polling ahead of national ballots showed competitive numbers against contenders from the Socialist Party of Chile and Christian Democrats splinters.
Leadership combined seasoned party executives and high-profile independents. Key figures included former cabinet ministers with links to the Ministry of Finance, ex-legislators who had served in the Senate of Chile and Chamber of Deputies of Chile, and municipal bosses from regions such as Valparaíso and Biobío Region. Organizational structures replicated party federations like those seen in the center-right coalitions, with a coordinating committee, electoral councils, and regional secretariats interacting with campaign teams that recruited consultants experienced in campaigns from the 2017 presidential election and the 2021 primaries.
In legislative arenas, members pushed bills on taxation, infrastructure, and public security that echoed earlier measures from portfolios managed under administrations such as the Second Piñera Government. Initiatives included amendments to pension funding schemes debated in the Comisión de Hacienda and proposals to streamline investment approvals referencing precedents in the Ley de Servicios Profesionales. The coalition's deputies and senators formed voting blocs on economic liberalization measures, influencing debates over fiscal rules and regional development funds similar to discussions in the Ley de Rentas Regionales processes.
Chile Podemos Más faced criticism from left and centre parties, including the Communist Party of Chile and the Socialist Party of Chile, for ties to business elites and past policy legacies linked to neoliberal reforms. Critics cited links between some members and scandals from the Penta case and Caval case eras, and opponents highlighted tensions between liberal economic positions and conservative stances on social rights that mirrored controversies from the 2011–2013 student protests in Chile. Internal disputes over candidate selection provoked defections to groups such as Demócratas and emergent provincial alliances, while watchdogs and civic groups called for transparency measures in party financing analogous to reforms proposed after the 2015 financing reforms.