Carcieri v. Salazar
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| Carcieri v. Salazar | |
|---|---|
| Case name | Carcieri v. Salazar |
| Citation | 555 U.S. 379 (2009) |
| Argued | March 24, 2009 |
| Decided | June 8, 2009 |
| Docket | 07-526 |
| Holding | The phrase "now under Federal jurisdiction" in the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 refers only to tribes under federal jurisdiction in 1934. |
| Majority | Thomas |
| Joinmajority | Scalia, Kennedy, Alito, Roberts |
| Concurrence | Alito (in part) |
| Dissent | Stevens (joined by Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer) |
Carcieri v. Salazar was a United States Supreme Court decision resolving whether the Secretary of the Interior may take land into trust for a Native American tribe that was federally recognized after 1934. The Court held that the statutory phrase "now under Federal jurisdiction" in the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 refers to tribes under federal jurisdiction in 1934, limiting the Department of the Interior's authority to take land into trust for tribes recognized after that date. The ruling affected tribal land acquisition, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, Department of the Interior, and numerous federal courts and tribal governments across the United States.
Background and Legislative Framework
The case centers on the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, enacted during the New Deal era under Franklin D. Roosevelt to reverse allotment and restore tribal self-government; the Act authorized the Secretary of the Interior to acquire land in trust for "Indians" who were "now under Federal jurisdiction." Legislative history involved debates in the United States Congress, including the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs and the House Committee on Indian Affairs, and intersected with earlier statutes affecting Indian tribes, such as the General Allotment Act and various treaties like those between the United States and the Narragansett Tribe of Rhode Island. Executive implementation has been administered through the Bureau of Indian Affairs and influenced by decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, and other federal tribunals interpreting the text against precedent from cases such as United States v. Nice and Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock.
Facts of the Case
The plaintiffs included Rhode Island officials and private landowners who opposed the Secretary's decision to take land into trust for the Narragansett Tribe of Rhode Island, a tribe federally recognized in 1983. The Narragansett sought to have a parcel in Charlestown, Rhode Island taken into trust; the State of Rhode Island and intervenors, citing local zoning and taxation concerns, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island. The district court's decision, and the subsequent ruling of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, addressed conflicts involving the Trust doctrine, tribal sovereignty matters adjudicated in cases like Worcester v. Georgia, and the interplay among federal recognition procedures, the Department of the Interior's Office of Federal Acknowledgment, and state regulatory authority exemplified by disputes in other states such as California and Oklahoma.
Supreme Court Proceedings and Opinion
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, hearing argument in March 2009 before issuing a decision in June authored by Associate Justice Clarence Thomas. The majority construed "now under Federal jurisdiction" using textualism and historical sources, looking to contemporaneous materials from the 1930s and prior Executive actions, and concluded that Congress intended to reference tribes already under federal jurisdiction in 1934. Joining Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, Samuel Alito, and John Roberts, the Court reversed the First Circuit and remanded. Justice Alito wrote a short concurrence addressing remedial questions; Justice John Paul Stevens dissented, joined by Justices David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer, arguing for a broader reading that accorded deference to the Secretary of the Interior and statutory purpose grounded in the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.
Legal Reasoning and Doctrinal Impact
The majority relied on textualist analysis and canons of construction used in cases such as Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. and Statutory Interpretation precedents, though the Court limited deference to the Secretary's interpretations. The decision affected doctrines related to federal trust responsibility, tribal sovereign immunity, and the scope of agency authority under statutes involving Indian affairs. Lower courts and agencies applied the ruling to determine which tribes qualify for trust acquisitions, impacting precedents in the First Circuit, the Ninth Circuit, and the D.C. Circuit. The opinion prompted examination of the interplay among federal statutes, treaty obligations, and administrative processes including the Office of Federal Acknowledgment procedures for recognition and the Department of the Interior's Indian Affairs rules.
Subsequent Developments and Implementation
After the decision, the Department of the Interior issued guidance and rulemaking to implement the Court's ruling, affecting pending trust applications for tribes such as the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe and others recognized post-1934. Congress responded with proposed legislation, including bills introduced in the United States Senate and the United States House of Representatives to amend the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 language; legislative actors such as members of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs debated statutory fixes. Litigation followed in multiple circuits, producing varied outcomes on remand and spurring administrative appeals to the Interior Board of Indian Appeals. The ruling also influenced tribal economic development projects, gaming activities under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, and state-tribal relations in jurisdictions like Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and Washington State.
Criticism and Scholarly Analysis
Scholars and advocates critiqued the decision from perspectives in Native American law, administrative law, and legislative history. Commentators in law reviews scrutinized the majority's textualist approach versus purposivist readings championed by the dissent, citing works on administrative deference, federal Indian law, and statutory construction. Native organizations, including the National Congress of American Indians and regional tribal councils, highlighted practical consequences for tribal sovereignty and land restoration efforts, while legal academics compared the ruling to other Supreme Court decisions affecting tribal jurisdiction such as Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe and Montana v. United States. Debates continue in courts, legislatures, and scholarly forums about remedies, potential congressional corrections, and the long-term effects on tribal land bases and federal-tribal relationships.