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| Canberra Plan | |
|---|---|
| Name | Canberra Plan |
| Field | Philosophy |
| Originated | 1990s |
| Region | Canberra |
| Notable figures | David Lewis; Frank Jackson; Michael Smith; Philip Pettit; David Chalmers |
Canberra Plan is a philosophical methodology associated with analytic philosophy and philosophical methodology debates that seeks to combine conceptual analysis, naturalistic considerations, and theoretical virtues to produce reductive analyses of normative and metaphysical notions. It was developed in the late twentieth century by a cluster of philosophers working in and around institutions in Australia and internationally, and it has influenced discussions in metaphysics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, ethics, and metaethics. Proponents situate it amid longstanding disputes involving analytic tradition figures and contemporary debates sparked by works from Oxford and American philosophers.
The Canberra Plan emerged from seminars and publications tied to scholars affiliated with Australian National University, University of Sydney, and visiting figures from Princeton University, Rutgers University, and University of Oxford. Early formulations responded to challenges posed by the Kripke semantics revolution, the revival of interest in naturalism, and analytic responses to the projects of W.V.O. Quine, Gilbert Ryle, and G.E. Moore. Key early exponents interacted with publications and conferences that also hosted philosophers associated with David Lewis, Frank Jackson, and Timothy Williamson, shaping the Plan as a synthesis of conceptual explication and empirical constraint.
The theoretical foundations draw on a constellation of positions and works from twentieth-century analytic philosophy. The Plan takes inspiration from David Lewis's work on theoretical virtues and modal realism, Frank Jackson's early arguments concerning reduction, and Wilfrid Sellars's aspiration to reconcile manifest and scientific images. It also engages with Saul Kripke's causal theories of reference, Hilary Putnam's semantic externalism, and W.V.O. Quine's critique of the analytic–synthetic distinction. Methodologically, the Plan aligns with projects like logical positivism's emphasis on analysis but diverges by incorporating empirical results from cognitive science, neuroscience, and linguistics to inform philosophical theorizing.
Central methodological moves include describing folk or manifest concepts, positing precise theoretical roles, and seeking naturalistic or reductive analyses that mesh with best scientific theories. Proponents deploy tools from modal logic, functionalism, and type theory alongside appeals to experimental findings in psychology and psycholinguistics. Key concepts in the Plan are: role specification inspired by Gottlob Frege's distinction between sense and reference; analytic reduction influenced by Carnap; and theoretical virtues such as simplicity and explanatory power drawn from Isaiah Berlin-style pluralism and David Lewis's criterion of theoretical virtue. The methodology typically unfolds in stages: conceptual explication, theoretical positing, and empirical adjudication using results from experimental philosophy and the philosophy of cognitive science.
Major proponents include philosophers linked to the Australian and Anglophone analytic communities, notably figures who taught or collaborated with scholars at Australian National University and University of Oxford. Advocates have included philosophers influenced by Frank Jackson and David Lewis; others who have elaborated versions of the Plan draw on work by Michael Smith, Philip Pettit, David Chalmers, and commentators in the tradition of Peter Strawson. Criticisms arise from several camps: defenders of robust metaphysical realism influenced by Saul Kripke and Graham Priest argue the Plan risks collapsing genuine metaphysical distinctions; proponents of phenomenology and continental philosophy criticize its analytic presuppositions; and skeptics in the tradition of Hilary Putnam and Thomas Nagel question whether empirical sciences can settle normative or intentional questions. Experimental philosophers from institutions such as New York University and University of California, Berkeley have also challenged empirical assumptions used by Plan adherents.
The Canberra Plan has been applied to debates in metaethics, where it aims to naturalize moral terms by specifying roles and locating realizers in the sciences; in philosophy of mind to pursue varieties of physicalist or functionalist reduction; and in philosophy of language to analyze reference and content. It has influenced work on consciousness that engages David Chalmers's distinction between easy and hard problems, and on mental content debates tied to Hilary Putnam and Jerry Fodor. Interdisciplinary collaborations have linked the Plan to research programs at Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, MIT, and Harvard University, particularly where philosophers coordinate with cognitive scientists, neuroscientists, and linguists. The approach also appears in applied projects concerning moral psychology at centers like University of Oxford's ethics programs and experimental labs at University College London.
Contemporary debates center on whether the Plan's fusion of conceptual analysis and empirical constraint can deliver robust reductions without eliding normative or modal features. Critics drawing on David Lewis-style modal metaphysics and defenders influenced by Frank Jackson continue to dispute the adequacy of role specifications. Recent literature engages with work from experimental philosophy proponents, responses by scholars at Princeton University and Rutgers University, and intersections with contemporary epistemology influenced by Timothy Williamson. Developments include pluralist adaptations incorporating insights from phenomenology and pragmatic accounts offered by philosophers associated with Columbia University and New York University. Ongoing conferences at venues such as American Philosophical Association meetings and workshops at Australian National University continue to refine methodological commitments and test applications against empirical findings.
Category:Philosophical_methods