Better Buying Power
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| Better Buying Power | |
|---|---|
| Name | Better Buying Power |
| Formed | 2010 |
| Jurisdiction | United States Department of Defense |
| Chief1 name | Frank Kendall |
| Chief1 position | Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics |
| Parent agency | United States Department of Defense |
Better Buying Power
Better Buying Power is a series of United States Department of Defense initiatives launched to increase efficiency, control costs, and improve performance in defense acquisition programs. Initiated under the leadership of senior acquisition officials, the program influenced procurement processes across services, agencies, and acquisition communities during the administrations of Presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump. It generated policy memos, implementation guides, and reviews that affected major programs managed by organizations such as the United States Air Force, United States Navy, and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.
Background and Origins
The initiative emerged amid scrutiny following high-profile cost growth and schedule delays in programs like the F-35 Lightning II, Zumwalt-class destroyer, and Littoral Combat Ship programs, which prompted oversight from bodies including the United States Congress, the Government Accountability Office, and the Office of Management and Budget. Key figures in the initiative’s origin include acquisition leaders such as Ashton Carter, William Lynn, Frank Kendall, and senior officials from the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics office. Influences on doctrine came from historical reforms like the Packard Commission recommendations and contemporary reviews such as the Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment.
Objectives and Principles
Better Buying Power emphasized objectives including cost control, productivity, and disciplined trade-offs among schedule, performance, and buying power. The principles drew on public administration and acquisition reform traditions exemplified by institutions like the Brookings Institution, RAND Corporation, and Center for Strategic and International Studies. The initiative encouraged workforce development through training from organizations such as the Defense Acquisition University, and adoption of competitive approaches seen in procurement reforms influenced by decisions from the District of Columbia Circuit and guidance from the Federal Acquisition Regulation community.
Initiatives and Implementation Phases
The program progressed through multiple versions often referred to as "phases" and issued memos, implementation guidance, and best-practice lists affecting areas like requirements, contracting, and sustainment. Phases were promulgated under Secretaries of Defense including Robert Gates and Leon Panetta and promulgated by acquisition leads in memoranda that reached service acquisition executives in the United States Marine Corps and United States Space Force planning staffs. Initiatives incorporated commercial practices observed at firms such as Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics, and Raytheon Technologies, while regulators and oversight bodies like the Congressional Research Service tracked outcomes.
Impact on Defense Acquisition Practices
Adoption of the program affected procurement metrics, program baselines, and trade-off analyses in Major Defense Acquisition Programs monitored by the Defense Acquisition Board and the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office. Effects were visible in program offices responsible for platforms like the KC-46 Pegasus, Virginia-class submarine, and Patriot (missile), where emphasis on affordability, modular open systems, and performance incentives altered contracting approaches with primes and suppliers including SAIC and Huntington Ingalls Industries. Changes in acquisition workforce behavior were assessed by analyses from MITRE Corporation and academic centers such as Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Stanford University.
Criticisms and Controversies
Critics argued that the program sometimes prioritized cost over capability, risking operational effectiveness as debated in hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee and the House Committee on Armed Services. Analysts from think tanks including the Center for a New American Security, Heritage Foundation, and Cato Institute produced divergent evaluations, while oversight organizations like the Project on Government Oversight and the Union of Concerned Scientists highlighted concerns about transparency and technical risk. Debates referenced procurement outcomes in contested programs such as the F-22 Raptor modernization efforts and sustainment challenges highlighted in reports by the Government Accountability Office.
Case Studies and Program Examples
Illustrative examples include application of practices to the F-35 Lightning II program, cost-reduction efforts for the Stryker vehicle family, and reforms applied to the Airborne Warning and Control System recapitalization. Implementation traces appear in acquisition decisions for the Freedom-class littoral combat ship and sustainment strategies for the AH-64 Apache and CH-47 Chinook. Program offices at the Naval Sea Systems Command, Air Force Materiel Command, and U.S. Army Materiel Command implemented tailored Better Buying Power techniques, while contractors such as BAE Systems and Textron engaged in performance-based logistics and incentive fee arrangements to align with initiative goals.