Australian Defence Strategic Review

Australian Defence Strategic Review
Name	Australian Defence Strategic Review
Caption	Cover of the 2023 strategic review
Country	Australia
Period	2023
Commissioner	Richard Marles (Deputy Prime Minister)
Author	Gregory Clark (Review Chair)
Jurisdiction	Commonwealth of Australia

Australian Defence Strategic Review The Australian Defence Strategic Review was a comprehensive national assessment that examined strategic threats, force posture, and capability priorities for the Commonwealth of Australia following shifts in the Indo‑Pacific security environment. Commissioned by the Prime Minister of Australia and overseen by the Minister for Defence, it informed decisions affecting the Australian Defence Force, alliance arrangements with the United States of America, and regional engagement with states such as the People's Republic of China, Japan, and India. The review synthesized input from former defence officials, academics, and industry representatives connected to institutions like the Australian National University, Griffith University, and the Lowy Institute.

Background and Rationale

The review was initiated against a backdrop of strategic competition involving the People's Republic of China, tensions over the South China Sea and East China Sea, and evolving commitments under the Australia–United States alliance and the AUKUS trilateral security pact. It followed previous strategic statements including the 2009 Defence White Paper, the 2016 Defence White Paper, and the 2020 Force Structure Plan. Geopolitical events such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine (2022), the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, and maritime incidents near Taiwan prompted reassessment of posture, logistics, and basing discussed at forums like the Shangri‑La Dialogue and the ASEAN Regional Forum.

Review Process and Methodology

The review combined qualitative and quantitative analysis drawing on expertise from former secretaries of the Department of Defence, chiefs of the Royal Australian Navy, Australian Army, and Royal Australian Air Force, legal scholars associated with the High Court of Australia, and economists from the Reserve Bank of Australia. Methodology included scenario planning based on historical case studies such as the Battle of Guadalcanal, wargaming in collaboration with the United States Indo‑Pacific Command and the Five Eyes intelligence partners, and modelling used by think tanks including the Griffith Asia Institute and the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. Consultation rounds involved submissions from defence contractors like Lockheed Martin, BAE Systems, Boeing, and Australian firms represented by Austal and the Defence Industry Ministerial Board.

Key Findings and Strategic Assessments

The review concluded that Australia faces higher risk of coercive or kinetic contingencies in the Indo‑Pacific, citing trends observed in the South China Sea arbitration (Philippines v. China), the Sino‑Indian border standoffs, and activities around the Malacca Strait. It emphasized importance of integrated air and missile defence informed by lessons from the Gulf War (1991) and the Yom Kippur War (1973), and stressed resilience in lines of communication linking to partners like New Zealand and Papua New Guinea. The assessment highlighted capability gaps revealed by operations such as Operation OKRA and humanitarian missions after the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami, underscoring the need for expeditionary logistics, maritime domain awareness, and survivable sea‑based strike options similar to systems fielded by United States Navy carrier strike groups.

Recommendations and Policy Changes

Recommendations included force posture adjustments drawing on models like the Singapore Armed Forces dispersal, acquisition priorities resembling the United Kingdom’s defence modernisation efforts, and enhanced interoperability under frameworks akin to the Five Power Defence Arrangements. Policy changes proposed strengthening basing and access arrangements with partners including Japan Self-Defense Forces, expanded joint exercises with the United States Marine Corps, and diplomatic initiatives in forums such as the East Asia Summit. The review advocated procurement of long‑range strike systems, air‑defence layers, and survivable logistics nodes informed by concepts like distributed lethality and anti-access/area denial countermeasures.

Defence Capability and Force Structure Implications

Capability implications spanned naval, air, and land domains. Naval recommendations prioritized more surface combatants and submarine sustainment echoing attributes of the Collins-class submarine program and debates around future replacements similar to choices faced by the Royal Navy. Air force proposals emphasized acquisition of platforms with stand‑off strike comparable to the F‑35 Lightning II and advanced tanker and tanker‑escort concepts parallel to KC‑30A operations. Army structure adjustments suggested increased light and mechanized formations modeled on the British Army's brigade reorganization and greater investment in integrated fires and surveillance akin to systems used by the United States Army.

Budgetary and Industrial Considerations

The review addressed budgetary pressures in the context of fiscal frameworks set by the Australian Treasury and parliamentary oversight through the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit. It recommended industrial policies to bolster sovereign shipbuilding at yards like ASC Pty Ltd and support for defence SMEs coordinated with the Australian Industry & Defence Network. Proposals called for sustainment funding profiles to match life‑cycle costs similar to debates around the Future Submarine Programme (SEA 1000), and export facilitation aligned with controls like those in the Wassenaar Arrangement.

Reception, Implementation, and Criticism

Reactions varied across political parties in the Parliament of Australia, commentators at the Grattan Institute, and former officials from the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation. Supporters praised alignment with allies such as United Kingdom and United States, while critics warned of escalation risks with the People's Republic of China and questioned affordability as debated in op‑eds in the Sydney Morning Herald and the Australian Financial Review. Implementation relied on parliamentary approval, industrial mobilisation, and follow‑on statements from the Minister for Defence Industry; subsequent audits by the Australian National Audit Office and oversight by the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade tracked progress.

Category:Defence policy of Australia