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Army High Command (OKW)

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Army High Command (OKW)
NameArmy High Command (OKW)
Native nameOberkommando der Wehrmacht
CountryNazi Germany
TypeHigh Command
Active1938–1945
GarrisonZossen
Notable commandersWilhelm Keitel

Army High Command (OKW) The Army High Command (OKW) served as the senior command staff of Nazi Germany's armed forces from 1938 to 1945, acting as the center for strategic direction, coordination, and liaison among the Heer, Kriegsmarine, and Luftwaffe. Established amid the reorganization that followed the remilitarization and political consolidation surrounding the Nazi Party and the Blomberg–Fritsch Affair, the OKW rapidly became intertwined with the decision-making networks of Adolf Hitler, the Schutzstaffel, and the German High Command (OKH). Its institutional evolution reflected rivalries with the OKH, the influence of figures such as Wilhelm Keitel and Alfred Jodl, and interactions with wartime events including the Invasion of Poland (1939), the Battle of France, and Operation Barbarossa.

History and Formation

The OKW was created in April 1938 following the ousting of Werner von Blomberg and Werner von Fritsch during the Blomberg–Fritsch Affair and the ensuing reorganization by Adolf Hitler and Hermann Göring. Its formation replaced the earlier Reichswehrministerium structures and paralleled developments such as the consolidation of power by the Nazi Party leadership and the centralization seen after the Night of the Long Knives. The OKW developed amid the diplomatic crises of the Munich Agreement era and the Anschluss, setting institutional priorities for the Sudeten Crisis and the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. Throughout the Second World War the OKW’s remit shifted in response to the demands of campaigns like the Battle of Britain and the North African Campaign.

Organization and Structure

Organizationally the OKW included departments mirroring the services: strategic staff elements, operations sections, intelligence liaison, and logistics coordination interfacing with the Heer, Kriegsmarine, and Luftwaffe. Headquartered at Zossen with major staffs at the Wolfsschanze and other field headquarters, it contained sections led by officers such as Alfred Jodl (Operations), liaison chiefs who interacted with the Abwehr and Reich Main Security Office, and legal-administrative divisions tied to the Reich Ministry of Armaments and War Production and the Four Year Plan. The OKW’s chain of command was nominally subordinate to Adolf Hitler while formally overseeing wartime coordination with service high commands including the Oberkommando des Heeres and the Oberkommando der Marine.

Roles and Responsibilities

The OKW was responsible for high-level strategic planning for theaters outside the main Eastern Front, overall operational directives, and coordination among branch commands during multi-theater operations such as Case Blue and Operation Market Garden. It issued Führer Directives and operational orders affecting campaigns like Operation Overlord and the Italian Campaign, acted as Hitler’s principal military staff through figures like Wilhelm Keitel, and served as liaison to political bodies including Joseph Goebbels’s Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda and Martin Bormann. The OKW also oversaw military jurisprudence in collaboration with institutions such as the Volksgerichtshof and coordinated intelligence sharing with services like the Abwehr and later the Sicherheitsdienst.

Key Personnel and Leadership

Leadership of the OKW featured senior officers whose careers intersected with major Nazi figures: Wilhelm Keitel as Chief of the OKW, Alfred Jodl as Chief of Operations, and subordinate chiefs like Erich von Manstein in operational planning contexts and staff officers who later became notable in postwar accounts. Politico-military interactions involved Heinrich Himmler, Hermann Göring, and Martin Bormann, while liaison officers connected the OKW with foreign policy actors such as Joachim von Ribbentrop and industrial leaders associated with the Reichswerke Hermann Göring. Several OKW officers appeared at the Nuremberg Trials where their roles were scrutinized alongside leaders like Albert Speer.

Operations and Strategic Decisions

The OKW played central roles in planning and directing operations including the Blitzkrieg in Poland, the Campaign in the West (1940), and strategic oversight of Operation Barbarossa, where planning assumptions about logistics and Generalplan Ost objectives became focal failures. Its operational remit extended to theaters such as North Africa where coordination with Erwin Rommel and the Afrika Korps occurred, and to anti-partisan and occupation policies in the Balkans and Western Europe. Strategic decisions by the OKW intersected with directives that affected the conduct of events like the Battle of Stalingrad and the Battle of the Bulge, and its staff engaged with issues of resource allocation amid crises including the Battle of Kursk and the Allied strategic bombing campaign.

Relationship with Wehrmacht and Nazi Leadership

Relations between the OKW, the Oberkommando des Heeres, and Nazi leadership were shaped by institutional rivalry, personal loyalty to Adolf Hitler, and overlapping jurisdictions with organizations like the SS and Gestapo. Tensions with the OKH, exemplified in debates over Eastern Front command and operational control during Operation Typhoon, reflected broader splits between professional military command and politicized Führer authority embodied by figures including Heinrich Himmler. The OKW’s role as Hitler’s military instrument placed it at the nexus of civil–military relations involving the Reich Chancellery and party apparati such as Martin Bormann’s office.

Legacy and Postwar Evaluation

Postwar assessments at the Nuremberg Trials and in subsequent historiography by scholars referencing archives from institutions like the Foreign Office and memoirs from figures such as Erich von Manstein and Karl Dönitz have judged the OKW for its complicity in war crimes, command failures, and the erosion of professional military autonomy. Historians note its bureaucratic centralization, decision-making under Adolf Hitler’s personal control, and the legal and moral accountability explored in works on the Holocaust and occupation policies in Eastern Europe. The OKW’s dissolution with the fall of Nazi Germany left a contested legacy examined in military studies, legal scholarship, and the memory politics surrounding World War II.

Category:Military units and formations of Nazi Germany