An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals

An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals is a philosophic treatise by David Hume that articulates an empiricist account of moral judgment and virtue within eighteenth‑century British thought. The work reframes debates ongoing among contemporaries such as Adam Smith, Thomas Reid, George Berkeley, Francis Hutcheson and engages intellectual currents represented by institutions like the Royal Society, the Scottish Enlightenment salons, and the print culture of Edinburgh. Hume situates his inquiry against precedents in the writings of Aristotle, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Immanuel Kant, and readers in the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society would later compare his method to those of Pierre Bayle and John Stuart Mill.

Background and Publication

Hume composed the Enquiry as a revisionary sequel to his earlier A Treatise of Human Nature, responding to criticism from peers such as Francis Hutcheson and public figures including William Robertson and Lord Kames. The text first appeared in 1751 in Edinburgh under the imprint of local booksellers active in networks connecting London, Paris, and Amsterdam, and it circulated among readers like Mary Wollstonecraft, Adam Ferguson, and diplomats at the Court of St James's. Hume’s revision strategy echoes practices used by Voltaire and the editors of The Spectator, while subsequent editions were shaped by exchanges with figures including Adam Smith, Gilbert Burnet, and publishers in the Age of Enlightenment.

Summary and Argument

Hume advances a sentimentalist theory of morals that locates moral distinctions in human feeling rather than in rational deduction, counterposed to positions associated with Rene Descartes and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. He argues that virtues are those qualities that elicit approval in spectators, drawing examples from natural history parallels discussed by Edward Gibbon and psychological observations resonant with George Berkeley. Hume analyzes justice as an artifice rooted in conventions governing property and social cooperation, confronting theories tied to Thomas Hobbes and anticipating criticisms later raised by Karl Marx and commentators on Jeremy Bentham. Throughout, Hume employs case studies and comparisons that invoke legal institutions like the Court of Chancery and civic examples from London and Edinburgh to illustrate how custom and utility shape moral sentiments, dialogues similar to those in the works of Plato and Seneca.

Key Concepts and Themes

Hume develops a taxonomy of virtues, distinguishing between "natural" and "artificial" virtues, and situates sympathy as central, aligning his analysis with psychological inquiries pursued by David Hartley and later by Thomas Brown. He formulates the doctrine that "reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions," engaging polemically with epistemological claims by John Locke and metaphysical systems of Baruch Spinoza and Gottfried Leibniz. The enquiry treats justice as a social institution justified by utility, invoking historical examples from Roman Republic jurisprudence and mercantile practices in Amsterdam and linking Hume’s account to practical politics familiar to readers of The Federalist Papers and contemporaries like Edmund Burke. Hume’s method—empirical, comparative, and inductive—resonates with methodological approaches in the Royal Society and anticipates analytic moves in writings by Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and critics in the Cambridge Moral Sciences Club.

Reception and Influence

Contemporaneous reception ranged from acclaim among Adam Smith, Francis Hutcheson’s circle, and readers in France such as Diderot to suspicion among clerical figures like Samuel Johnson and censors connected to the Church of England. The Enquiry influenced moral philosophy across Europe, shaping debates in salons frequented by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, informing commentators in Prussia and the intellectual programs of universities such as Oxford and Cambridge. Later philosophers—including Immanuel Kant, who wrestled with Hume’s arguments in the wake of early modern skepticism, and utilitarians like Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill—engaged Hume’s formulations when developing consequentialist and deontological frameworks. The work’s legacy extends into political thought addressed by Edmund Burke and economic theorizing pursued by Adam Smith, and it figured in historiographical treatments by Edward Gibbon and critics in the Victorian period.

Critical Responses and Interpretations

Scholars and critics have debated Hume’s sentimentalism versus rationalist accounts articulated by Immanuel Kant and G. W. F. Hegel, with interpreters ranging from the Cambridge School to analytic ethicists like Bernard Williams and Philippa Foot. Nineteenth‑century responses included revisionist readings by John Stuart Mill and institutional critiques from thinkers such as Karl Marx and commentators associated with Prussian philosophical circles. Twentieth‑century scholarship—by figures including A. J. Ayer, Richard Rorty, Elizabeth Anscombe, Derek Parfit, and Alasdair MacIntyre—has alternately defended, reconstructed, or contested Hume’s claims about moral psychology, the is‑ought gap, and the foundations of normative ethics. Contemporary interpretations appear across journals and academic forums at institutions like Princeton University, Harvard University, and the University of Edinburgh, where debates continue over Hume’s relevance to metaethics, moral psychology, and the historiography of the Enlightenment.

Category:Philosophy books