Amihai Glazer

Amihai Glazer
Name	Amihai Glazer
Birth date	1947
Birth place	Haifa, Mandatory Palestine
Nationality	Israeli
Fields	Game theory, political economy, public choice
Alma mater	Hebrew University of Jerusalem, University of Rochester
Workplaces	University of California, Berkeley, University of California, San Diego, Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Amihai Glazer is an Israeli economist and political scientist known for contributions to game theory, public choice and the analysis of revolutions, collective action and political institutions. He has held academic posts at major universities and produced influential theoretical models that intersect with work in mechanism design, social choice theory, and the study of conflict and coalition formation. His research connects to debates involving scholars from Kenneth Arrow to Mancur Olson and has been published in leading journals associated with institutions such as American Economic Association and Econometric Society.

Early life and education

Glazer was born in Haifa during the late period of the British Mandate for Palestine and came of age in the early decades of the State of Israel. He studied at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem where he was exposed to economists influenced by Israel Kirzner and Jacob Marschak, and later earned a doctorate at the University of Rochester, which located him within the intellectual circles of the University of Rochester Department of Economics and scholars connected to the Cowles Foundation and the Monetary Economics tradition. During his formative years he interacted with economists and political scientists associated with the Public Choice Society and the Econometric Society.

Academic career and positions

Glazer has held faculty appointments at the University of California, Berkeley and the University of California, San Diego, and served as a professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem where he taught in departments that collaborate with the Jerusalem School of Business Administration and institutes linked to the Knesset and Israeli public policy research. He has been a visiting scholar at centers such as the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, the Institute for Advanced Study, and research programs affiliated with the National Bureau of Economic Research and the World Bank seminars. His professional service includes refereeing for journals of the American Political Science Association, the American Economic Association, and meetings of the Allied Social Science Associations.

Research contributions and theories

Glazer's research spans theoretical models of strategic interaction and applied analyses of political phenomena. He developed models of asymmetric information and commitment problems that build on John Nash equilibrium concepts and extend frameworks from Thomas Schelling and Robert Aumann. His work on collective action elaborates on insights from Mancur Olson and addresses incentives for participation within models akin to Hotelling and Downsian competition. In the study of revolutions and coups he integrates approaches from James Fearon and Theda Skocpol to formalize thresholds and bargaining dynamics between elites and masses, drawing on tools from mechanism design and the theory of repeated games. Glazer has also contributed to spatial models of policy choice, coalition formation analyses related to William Riker and John H. Aldrich, and the economics of conflict in traditions associated with Gary Becker and Edward Lazear.

His theoretical innovations include treatment of strategic uncertainty in voting environments linked to Kenneth Arrow impossibility implications, extensions of equilibrium selection literature pioneered by scholars like Harsanyi and Selten, and formal characterizations of commitment problems related to work by Thomas Sargent and Finn Kydland. Glazer's models frequently engage with institutional questions relevant to the Knesset, comparative frameworks involving the United Kingdom and United States systems, and policy design issues that resonate with analyses from the International Monetary Fund and OECD research programs.

Publications and selected works

Glazer's publications appear in leading outlets associated with the Econometric Society, the American Economic Review, and the Journal of Political Economy, as well as interdisciplinary volumes linked to the Cambridge University Press and the Oxford University Press. Representative works include articles on collective action, models of revolution, and voter behavior that dialogue with literature from Anthony Downs, William H. Riker, Kenneth Arrow, and Mancur Olson. He has contributed chapters to handbooks curated by editors affiliated with the National Bureau of Economic Research and has co-authored papers with scholars from the University of Chicago and Princeton University faculties. His selected monographs and edited volumes have been cited in courses at the London School of Economics, Harvard University, Yale University, and the University of Michigan.

Awards and honors

Glazer's scholarly achievements have been recognized by fellowships and honors including appointments to research fellow positions at institutions like the Institute for Advanced Study and grants from agencies such as the National Science Foundation and foundations affiliated with the Rockefeller and Ford philanthropic networks. He has delivered invited lectures at conferences organized by the Econometric Society, the American Political Science Association, and the Public Choice Society, and has been cited in policy briefings prepared for the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank.

Personal life and legacy

Glazer's career influenced generations of scholars working at the intersection of economics and political science, mentoring students who went on to positions at institutions including the University of California campuses, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, the London School of Economics, and the University of Chicago. His theoretical contributions continue to inform empirical projects undertaken at research centers such as the National Bureau of Economic Research and policy units within the Israeli Ministry of Finance and international organizations. Contemporary debates in the study of strategic interaction, collective action, and institutional design frequently cite his models alongside work by Kenneth Arrow, Mancur Olson, and Thomas Schelling.

Category:Israeli economists Category:Game theorists