A-theory of time
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| A-theory of time | |
|---|---|
| Name | A-theory of time |
| Introduced | Ancient philosophy |
| Proponents | Augustine of Hippo; Aristotle; Saint Augustine; Augustine of Hippo; William James; J. M. E. McTaggart; A. N. Prior; Roderick Chisholm; C. D. Broad; G. E. Moore |
| Region | Western philosophy |
| Main interests | Metaphysics; Philosophy of time; Philosophy of mind |
A-theory of time The A-theory of time is a class of philosophical positions that treat temporal passage, presentness, or the becoming of events as ontologically fundamental. Proponents typically hold that distinctions among past, present, and future reflect metaphysical features of reality rather than merely linguistic or perspectival differences, and they debate how that claim interacts with physics, consciousness, and formal ontology.
Overview
A-theory debates trace to antiquity in discussions by Plato, Aristotle, Augustine of Hippo, and later medieval figures like Thomas Aquinas, and they reemerged in modern philosophy with figures such as Immanuel Kant, G. W. F. Hegel, and Arthur Schopenhauer. Twentieth-century treatments were shaped by critics and defenders including J. M. E. McTaggart, C. D. Broad, A. N. Prior, and H. P. Grice, and by exchanges among analytic philosophers like Roderick Chisholm, G. E. Moore, and W.V.O. Quine. Contemporary discourse engages philosophers and scientists such as David Lewis, Hans Reichenbach, Henri Bergson, Alfred North Whitehead, D. H. Mellor, Tim Maudlin, and Carlo Rovelli.
Varieties and Key Claims
A-theory includes several varieties: presentism associated with thinkers like Arthur Prior and J. M. E. McTaggart’s discussions; the growing-block view connected with C. D. Broad and contemporary proponents; moving-spotlight formulations discussed by Roderick Chisholm; and hybrid positions defended by philosophers such as Adolf Grünbaum and D. H. Mellor. Key claims include that only present entities are ontologically robust (presentism), that the past and present exist but the future does not (growing-block), or that temporal properties constitute an objective metaphysical flow (moving spotlight). Each variant responds to problems raised by critics including J. L. Mackie, Bertrand Russell, J. S. Mill, and Ludwig Wittgenstein.
Arguments For and Against
Arguments for A-theory appeal to phenomenology of time as emphasized by William James, Edmund Husserl, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty; to ordinary-language commitments defended by G. E. Moore and H. P. Grice; and to metaphysical intuitions treated by Thomas Reid and G. E. Moore. A-theorists often deploy modal and tense logics developed by Arthur Prior and Alfred Tarski to formalize tensed truth and to respond to criticisms from tenseless theorists like D. H. Mellor and J. J. C. Smart. Critics draw on arguments from the theory of relativity by Albert Einstein and commentators such as Hermann Minkowski, on paradoxes identified by J. M. E. McTaggart, and on ontological economy advocated by Willard Van Orman Quine, David Lewis, and Hilary Putnam. Key disputes concern tense operators, entailment relations, and the compatibility of becoming with relativistic spacetime described by Hermann Weyl, John Stachel, and Max Planck.
Major Historical and Contemporary Proponents
Historical proponents include Plato, Aristotle, Augustine of Hippo, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, Isaac Newton (implicitly in his absolute time), Immanuel Kant, and Henri Bergson. In the twentieth century, defenders or renovators included C. D. Broad, A. N. Prior, Roderick Chisholm, Arthur Prior, G. E. Moore, Alfred North Whitehead, William James, and John Hospers. Contemporary advocates or sophisticated defenders who engage scientific objections include Tim Maudlin, Dean Zimmerman, Michael Tooley, Ned Markosian, Bradley Monton, Barry Dainton, and Kristie Miller.
Formal and Metaphysical Analyses
Formal analyses employ tense logic from Arthur Prior, modal frameworks influenced by Alfred Tarski and Saul Kripke, and metaphysical apparatus from David Lewis’s counterpart theory and Willard Van Orman Quine’s ontological criteria. Philosophers have modeled A-theoretic claims using relativized presentness functions informed by Henri Poincaré and Hermann Minkowski’s geometry and by causal set approaches advocated by David Bohm and R. D. Sorkin. Metaphysical debates intersect with discussions of persistence by Peter Van Inwagen, Ted Sider, Trenton Merricks, and Fred Feldman and with theories of properties and events by David Armstrong, Jonathan Lowe, D. M. Armstrong, and Brian Ellis.
Implications for Physics and Consciousness
A-theory implications for physics engage responses to Albert Einstein’s relativity, critiques by Hans Reichenbach, and compatibility work with relativistic spacetime by Carlo Rovelli, Tim Maudlin, and Huw Price. Some A-theorists propose preferred foliations or metaphysical structures akin to Newtonian absolute time to reconcile passage with relativistic covariance, while others appeal to quantum interpretations discussed by Niels Bohr, Werner Heisenberg, John Bell, David Bohm, and Carlo Rovelli. In the philosophy of mind, A-theory supporters draw on phenomenology by Edmund Husserl, cognitive science research influenced by Noam Chomsky, Daniel Dennett, and Antonio Damasio, and consciousness debates involving David Chalmers and Patricia Churchland to argue that temporal passage is tied to experiential presence and the unity of consciousness.