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| 3rd State Duma | |
|---|---|
| Name | 3rd State Duma |
| Native name | Третий Государственной Думы |
| Legislature | Federal Assembly of Russia |
| House type | Lower house |
| Term | 2000–2003 |
| Established | 2000 |
| Disbanded | 2003 |
| Preceding | 2nd State Duma |
| Succeeding | 4th State Duma |
3rd State Duma The 3rd convocation of the State Duma sat from 2000 to 2003 following elections that reshaped post-Soviet Russian politics. Its composition reflected alignments among figures linked to Vladimir Putin, Viktor Chernomyrdin, Yegor Gaidar, Gennady Zyuganov, and parties such as Unity, Fatherland – All Russia, Communist Party of the Russian Federation, Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, and Yabloko. During its term the Duma legislated alongside the Federation Council, interacted with the Presidency of Russia, and responded to domestic crises like the Second Chechen War and international events including the September 11 attacks and NATO enlargement.
The 2000 election followed the 1999 legislative cycle and the 2000 presidential election that brought Vladimir Putin to power, involving parties such as Unity, Fatherland – All Russia, Communist Party of the Russian Federation, Liberal Democratic Party of Russia and blocs connected to Boris Berezovsky, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Yuri Luzhkov, Sergey Kiriyenko and Mikhail Kasyanov. Campaigning featured prominent figures like Anatoly Chubais, Yevgeny Primakov, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Grigory Yavlinsky, Sergey Shoigu, and regional leaders from Moscow Oblast, Saint Petersburg, Tatarstan, Chechnya, and Sverdlovsk Oblast. The electoral framework involved proportional representation and single-member districts under laws influenced by debates in the Constitutional Court of Russia, decisions of the Central Election Commission (Russia), and precedents from the 1993 Russian constitutional crisis.
The Duma's balance of power featured deputies from Unity, Communist Party of the Russian Federation, Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, Yabloko, and Rodina associates, with leadership roles occupied by figures linked to Gennady Seleznyov, Boris Gryzlov, Vladimir Yegorov, and parliamentary administrators drawn from regional elites such as Akhmad Kadyrov supporters and industrialists connected to Gazprom, LUKoil, Yukos, and Rosneft. Committee chairs often included veterans like Viktor Ilyukhin, Igor Lebedev, Sergey Mironov, and lawmakers with prior service in the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR or ministries led by Sergei Stepashin and Yury Luzhkov. The Duma maintained working relations with the Prime Minister of Russia and the Presidential Administration of Russia while engaging with international delegations from European Parliament, OSCE, United Nations General Assembly, and bilateral contacts with United States Congress members.
Major legislative initiatives addressed security, taxation, and privatization with laws touching Tax Code of the Russian Federation, amendments affecting Criminal Code of Russia, and statutes on the 2001 budget, federal property privatization, and energy sector regulation impacting Gazprom, RAO UES, LUKoil, and Yukos. The Duma debated bills on counterterrorism in response to incidents involving Moscow theater hostage crisis precursors and security measures related to the Second Chechen War and terrorism concerns after September 11 attacks. It passed legislation altering the legal status of regional authorities in republics such as Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Chechnya, and engaged with laws on pension reform connected to proposals from Anatoly Chubais and fiscal policy promoted by Alexei Kudrin and Mikhail Kasyanov. Internationally relevant statutes addressed treaties like the Kursk (submarine) incident inquiries and ratification matters involving the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and agreements with International Monetary Fund and World Bank programs.
Key standing committees included those on Budget and Taxes, Security, Defense, International Affairs, and Energy with prominent members drawn from factions aligned with Unity (political party), Communist Party of the Russian Federation, Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, and Yabloko. Parliamentary groupings often reflected patronage networks tied to oligarchs such as Boris Berezovsky, Roman Abramovich, Vladimir Potanin, Oleg Deripaska, and corporate boards of Severstal, Sberbank, VTB Bank, and Surgutneftegas. Subcommittees handled relations with supranational bodies like the Council of Europe, OSCE, and bilateral friendship groups with China, Germany, United Kingdom, France, and United States.
Domestically the Duma influenced fiscal consolidation and reforms advocated by ministers including Alexei Kudrin and Mikhail Kasyanov, affecting enterprises like Gazprom and sectors overseen by ministries led by Igor Sechin and Viktor Khristenko. Its stance on Chechnya intersected with leaders such as Akhmad Kadyrov and military commanders tied to operations in Grozny and the North Caucasus, while foreign policy positions engaged with NATO-Russia Council debates, relations with European Union, disputes over Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty matters, and bilateral tensions involving United States Department of State diplomacy after Iraq disarmament crisis episodes. Parliamentary diplomacy included interparliamentary exchanges with the Bundestag, French National Assembly, U.S. Congress, and delegations from Japan and China.
The convocation was marked by controversies involving corruption allegations linked to privatization of enterprises such as Yukos and legal confrontations involving Mikhail Khodorkovsky, conflicts over media influence by Gazprom Media and NTV, and accusations of vote manipulation in districts influenced by regional strongmen like Yury Luzhkov and Ramzan Kadyrov. High-profile disputes implicated businessmen Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky, judiciary interactions involving the Supreme Court of Russia, and investigative actions connected to prosecutions led by prosecutors affiliated with Viktor Cherkesov and law enforcement officials. Debates over draft laws provoked protests from civic groups associated with Memorial (society), Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and opposition politicians such as Grigory Yavlinsky and Boris Nemtsov.
Historians and political scientists assess the 2000–2003 Duma as pivotal in consolidating power around Vladimir Putin and party structures like United Russia precursors, reshaping post-Soviet institutions including the Presidency of Russia, Constitutional Court of Russia, and regional power balances in Tatarstan and the North Caucasus. Scholarship links its legislative output to economic trends documented by Rosstat, policy shifts overseen by Ministry of Finance (Russia), and subsequent electoral reforms leading into the 2003 convocation that featured figures such as Boris Gryzlov and Sergei Mironov. Its record remains focal in debates over rule of law, oligarchic influence, and Russia’s trajectory in the early 21st century among analysts at Carnegie Moscow Center, Chatham House, Council on Foreign Relations, and Russian academic institutions like Higher School of Economics.
Category:State Duma convocations of the Russian Federation