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| 23rd Headquarters Special Troops | |
|---|---|
| Unit name | 23rd Headquarters Special Troops |
| Dates | 1944–1945 |
| Country | United States |
| Branch | United States Army |
| Type | Special operations |
| Role | Deception, psychological warfare, reconnaissance |
| Size | Battalion-sized |
| Garrison | Windsor, England |
| Nickname | Ghost Army |
| Notable commanders | Colin G. Kelly Jr.; Arthur Boden |
23rd Headquarters Special Troops was a United States Army unit formed during World War II to conduct tactical deception and psychological operations in the European Theater of Operations. Conceived by planners from Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, the unit combined artists, designers, actors, and engineers to simulate infantry divisions, deceive Wehrmacht command, and support campaigns such as the Normandy landings, Operation Market Garden, and the Battle of the Bulge. Its work intersected with Allied deception plans like Operation Bodyguard, Operation Fortitude, and techniques pioneered by units linked to British Army deception organizations such as the London Controlling Section.
The unit was activated in 1944 at a time when deception initiatives coordinated by Dwight D. Eisenhower and staff from Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force sought to mislead Oberkommando der Wehrmacht intelligence. Recruitment drew from creative communities in New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, and San Francisco, and included veterans of the Works Progress Administration, artists from the Art Institute of Chicago, designers acquainted with Metropolitan Museum of Art, and illustrators who had worked for Fortune (magazine). Command relationships involved liaison with officers from SHAEF, planners from British Intelligence such as personnel associated with John Bevan, and coordination with units like the Special Air Service for operational integration. The unit’s existence remained classified until declassification decades after the war prompted scholarship at institutions including Harvard University, Yale University, and United States Army Center of Military History.
The battalion-sized unit comprised diverse sections modeled on conventional divisional headquarters and attached specialized platoons. Organizational elements included a signal company equipped to mimic radio nets known from 101st Airborne Division, a visual deception platoon producing inflatable armor reminiscent of M4 Sherman, a sound truck company tailoring audio to suggest movement by elements like 1st Infantry Division and 3rd Armored Division, and an engineers section supporting camouflage and dummy construction akin to works by Royal Engineers. Administrative chains interfaced with European Theater of Operations, United States Army staff, and tactical control often routed through corps headquarters such as U.S. Ninth Army and liaison with Allied formations including British Second Army.
Recruits underwent training blending theatrical techniques and military tradecraft at facilities near Windsor, Aldershot, and field sites used by Third United States Army. Instruction drew on the theatrical pedagogy of The Actors Studio, principles familiar to alumni of Juilliard School, and technical improvisation practiced by members formerly employed at Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer and Paramount Pictures. Tactics emphasized visual, sonic, and radio deception: visual arrays used inflatable tanks similar in appearance to M4 Sherman and mock artillery modeled after M7 Priest; sonic arrays employed pre-recorded tracks replicating sounds associated with General George S. Patton's Third Army convoys and General Omar Bradley's logistics; and radio deception mimicked call signs and traffic patterns used by units such as 82nd Airborne Division and 30th Infantry Division. Tradecraft training included counterintelligence awareness informed by Counter Intelligence Corps methods and techniques analogous to concealment practices used by British camouflage units.
The unit executed deceptive missions preceding and during major operations in Western Europe. Pre-invasion contributions supported Operation Neptune deception by simulating follow-on formations associated with formations like 2nd Army (United Kingdom), while operations in the Caen sector complemented Operation Goodwood. In the lead-up to Operation Market Garden, the unit staged false movements to distract German Second Army assets, and during the Battle of the Bulge elements simulated reinforcing columns to misdirect Heinz Guderian-era armored doctrine responses. Missions often coordinated with Special Operations Executive planning, Allied Strategic Deception directives, and local intelligence from units such as Monuments Men. After the European armistice the unit participated in occupation-related screen operations before inactivation in 1945.
Equipment combined commercially available materials and purpose-built decoys: inflatable rubber tanks and trucks approximating silhouettes of M4 Sherman and M3 Half-track, plywood mockups emulating M24 Chaffee profiles, and canvas screens resembling field fortifications like those used by Fortress Europe defenses. Sound systems used multi-track phonograph and electrical amplification technologies similar to those in civilian touring productions by RCA Victor and broadcast equipment used by BBC. Radio deception used transmitters and cryptographic protocols mirroring nets of formations such as 1st Infantry Division and 29th Infantry Division, exploiting phonetics standardized by Joint Communications Board. Camouflage techniques drew on paint schemes and disruptive patterns developed by Percival Spencer-style innovators and practices associated with British camouflage artists in World War I.
Personnel included artists, designers, and veterans who later achieved prominence in arts and public life, some of whom had affiliations with New York University, Columbia University, and Rhode Island School of Design. Command and staff officers maintained career connections to institutions like United States Military Academy and National War College. Casualties were low compared with frontline units, but individuals were killed or wounded during air attacks and reconnaissance missions; these losses were recorded by administrative offices connected to European Theater of Operations, United States Army casualty reporting and commemorated in memorials associated with Arlington National Cemetery and local American Battle Monuments Commission sites.
The unit’s story influenced postwar thought on deception, doctrine at United States Army War College, and curricula at Naval War College and King’s College London. Its methods informed Cold War deception projects tied to Central Intelligence Agency covert planning and NATO doctrine development at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. Cultural treatments include documentaries produced by entities like PBS and films inspired by the unit referenced in works examined at Museum of Modern Art film archives, while scholarly analysis appears in publications from Oxford University Press, Cambridge University Press, and articles in journals such as Journal of Military History and Intelligence and National Security. Exhibits at institutions including the National World War II Museum, Imperial War Museums, and Smithsonian Institution have displayed recreated decoys and archives that illustrate the unit’s contributions to Allied victory.
Category:Units and formations of the United States Army in World War II