2020 Cyber Security Strategy

2020 Cyber Security Strategy

The 2020 Cyber Security Strategy set out a national approach to resilience and defence combining statecraft, technology, and partnerships. It sought to align priorities across agencies such as the Cabinet Office, National Cyber Security Centre, GCHQ, and the Ministry of Defence with industry actors including BT Group, Cisco Systems, and Microsoft. The strategy referenced international frameworks like the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, and commitments under the United Nations.

Background and context

The strategy emerged amid high-profile incidents involving actors linked to Fancy Bear, Lazarus Group, and criminal groups profiled by Europol and the FBI. It followed prior documents from the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure, the National Audit Office, and commentary in reports by Chatham House and the Royal United Services Institute. Political impetus derived from discussions in the House of Commons, debates involving the Prime Minister's Office, and white papers influenced by the Institute for Government and the National Security Council.

Strategic objectives and priorities

Objectives emphasized protecting critical services named in lists maintained by the National Cyber Security Centre and sectors such as finance overseen by the Financial Conduct Authority and energy regulated by the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets. Priorities included bolstering resilience for infrastructure linked to HS2, supply chains involving firms like BAE Systems and Rolls-Royce, and safeguarding research environments at institutions such as University of Oxford and Imperial College London. The strategy aligned deterrence aims articulated by the Ministry of Defence with public-private coordination advocated by TechUK and London Stock Exchange Group.

Governance and implementation framework

Governance assigned roles across the Cabinet Office, Home Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and the Treasury, with operational delivery through the National Cyber Security Centre and law enforcement via the National Crime Agency. Oversight mechanisms referenced parliamentary scrutiny from the Select Committee on Science and Technology and engagement with the Information Commissioner's Office. Funding lines linked to budget decisions by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and investment commitments involving British Business Bank initiatives.

Key initiatives and programs

Programs included national incident response coordination leveraging the Cyber Security Information Sharing Partnership, a skills drive tied to initiatives with National Health Service trusts and apprenticeships supported by City & Guilds. Technology initiatives promoted adoption of standards from ISO/IEC committees and procurement reforms interacting with Crown Commercial Service. Research partnerships featured collaborations between GCHQ's National Cyber Security Centre and universities such as University of Cambridge, private labs like Darktrace, and ventures involving Arm Holdings.

Risk assessment and threat landscape

Threat assessment enumerated persistent threats from state-aligned groups associated in public reporting with Axiom, Turla, and Sandworm, along with financially motivated actors documented by INTERPOL and Europol. Risks to supply chains cited incidents involving vendors like SolarWinds and vulnerabilities discussed in advisories from NIST and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. The document highlighted risks from emerging technologies under development at DeepMind, Huawei Technologies, and laboratories linked to Home Office Scientific Development Branch.

Legal, regulatory, and policy measures

Legal measures referenced incorporation of cyber provisions under statutes debated in the House of Commons and enforcement through the Crown Prosecution Service. Regulatory alignment involved coordination between the Information Commissioner's Office, the Financial Conduct Authority, and sector regulators such as Ofcom and Ofgem. Policy measures engaged frameworks from the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime and diplomatic instruments negotiated at the United Nations General Assembly and NATO ministerial meetings.

International cooperation and capacity building

International cooperation emphasized partnerships with allies including the United States Department of State, the Government of Australia, and the Government of Canada, plus multilateral work in fora such as the G7 and EU Agency for Cybersecurity. Capacity-building programs targeted partner nations in collaboration with the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and institutions like the World Bank and International Telecommunication Union, while operational cooperation involved exchanges with Cyber Command (United States) and training through the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence.

Category:Cybersecurity policy Category:United Kingdom government policy