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| 2019 Agreement for Peace and New Constitution | |
|---|---|
| Name | 2019 Agreement for Peace and New Constitution |
| Date signed | 2019 |
| Location signed | Santiago, Chile |
| Parties | Chilean Government; Mapuche and indigenous organizations; Chilean Congress |
2019 Agreement for Peace and New Constitution
The 2019 Agreement for Peace and New Constitution was a landmark political accord reached amid mass mobilizations and institutional crisis in Chile during 2019 and 2020, involving national leaders, civic movements, indigenous organizations, and international mediators. The accord set terms for a constitutional process, transitional arrangements, and mechanisms for addressing social demands arising from protests tied to issues associated with the Augusto Pinochet era, neoliberal reforms, and demands echoed by organizations such as the Estallido Social movement and student federations like the Federación de Estudiantes de la Universidad de Chile.
The accord followed months of demonstrations sparked by incidents including fare increases on the Santiago Metro and broader grievances connected to privatization policies implemented under Augusto Pinochet, disputes involving pension reforms linked to the AFPs, and longstanding tensions in the Mapuche conflict in regions such as Araucanía Region and Biobío Region. Political actors from the Chile Vamos coalition, the Concertación, and newer formations like Frente Amplio faced pressure alongside institutions such as the 1980 Constitution and the Corte Suprema. Civil society actors including the Colectivo de Abogados and Human Rights Watch-linked networks documented protests and demands for rights recognized under international instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Negotiations convened representatives from parliamentary blocs including the Senate of Chile and the Chamber of Deputies of Chile, delegates from presidential offices, leaders of indigenous organizations, and municipal actors like the Asociación Chilena de Municipalidades. Key figures included members of parties such as the Partido Socialista de Chile, the Partido por la Democracia, the Unión Demócrata Independiente, and the Partido Comunista de Chile. Dialogues drew on precedents such as the constitutional processes of Spain and the South African transition. International personalities and bodies—delegations from the European Union, envoys associated with the United Nations, and observers from the Organization of American States—monitored talks leading to a formal signing ceremony in Santiago that codified procedures for a constituent assembly and timelines for referendums.
The agreement established a procedure for convening a constituent body modeled on comparative practices seen in the Icelandic constitutional process and referenced mechanisms used during the South African transition. It set rules for electing members of a constitutional convention, quotas for representation reflective of indigenous peoples such as the Mapuche people, the Aymara people, and the Rapa Nui people, and provisions for gender parity inspired by reforms in countries like Argentina. Institutional designs included safeguards related to judicial review involving institutions comparable to the Federal Constitutional Court model and budgeting oversight with references to frameworks used by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in transitional economies.
Implementation created transitional organs that drew personnel from the Ministerio del Interior, the Servicio Electoral de Chile, and municipal registries alongside civil society delegates from groups like the Marcha Nacional de Mujeres and student organizations such as the Confederación de Estudiantes de Chile. A Constitutional Convention was elected under rules echoing practices from the Bolivia and supervised by electoral tribunals comparable to the Tricel. Transitional truth-seeking initiatives referenced models like the South African TRC and the Rettig Commission to address human rights allegations documented by organizations including Amnesty International.
The accord reshaped party dynamics involving the Christian Democratic Party (Chile), Renovación Nacional, and emergent civic platforms, altering legislative agendas in the Congress of the Republic of Chile. Social movements—from trade unions such as the Central Unitaria de Trabajadores to environmental collectives like Fridays for Future affiliates in Chile—leveraged openings to press for reforms in pension systems administered by AFPs, public health initiatives tied to institutions like the Hospital Clínico Universidad de Chile, and indigenous rights claims before bodies such as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Electoral outcomes and policy debates were influenced by precedents in Latin American constitutionalism and comparative cases from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Ecuador.
Critics from media outlets such as the El Mercurio editorial line, think tanks like the Libertad y Desarrollo foundation, and political actors including leaders of Chile Vamos argued the process risked instability similar to crises in countries like Venezuela. Legal scholars linked to institutions such as the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile and the University of Chile debated constitutional design features, citing tensions with the 1980 Constitution of Chile legacy and potential conflicts with international obligations under treaties like the CEDAW. Indigenous leaders and human rights advocates including representatives of the Indigenous and Peasant Movement of Cotopaxi criticized aspects of implementation while various unions staged strikes invoking precedents from labor disputes in Argentina and Peru.
International responses included endorsements and technical assistance from the United Nations Development Programme, monitoring by the Organization of American States, and statements from heads of state such as the presidents of Argentina, Colombia, and Mexico. Financial institutions such as the Inter-American Development Bank offered support for logistical aspects while diplomatic missions from the United States, the European Union, and countries like Spain and France provided observers and comparative expertise drawn from constitutional reforms in the European Union and Latin American precedents.
Category:Constitutions of Chile Category:2019 in Chile