2009 Turkish Airlines Flight 1951

2009 Turkish Airlines Flight 1951
Name	2009 Turkish Airlines Flight 1951
Caption	Wreckage of the aircraft at Schiphol Airport
Date	25 February 2009
Summary	Controlled flight into terrain during approach due to thrust reduction and autopilot/autothrottle interaction
Site	Near Amsterdam Airport Schiphol, Haarlemmermeer, North Holland
Aircraft type	Boeing 737-800
Operator	Turkish Airlines
Tail number	TC-JGE
Origin	Istanbul Atatürk
Stopover	Amsterdam Airport Schiphol
Destination	Amsterdam Airport Schiphol
Occupants	135
Passengers	128
Injuries	84

2009 Turkish Airlines Flight 1951 was a scheduled Turkish Airlines passenger flight from Istanbul Atatürk Airport to Amsterdam Airport Schiphol that crashed during final approach on 25 February 2009. The Boeing 737-800 impacted the ground short of the runway at Schiphol Airport near Haarlemmermeer, causing fatalities, multiple injuries, and extensive media coverage in Turkey, the Netherlands, and internationally. The accident prompted investigations by the Dutch Safety Board, the Turkish Directorate General of Civil Aviation, and the United States National Transportation Safety Board and led to changes in Boeing procedures, EASA guidance, and airline training practices.

Background and Flight

Flight 1951 departed Istanbul Atatürk Airport bound for Amsterdam Airport Schiphol with 128 passengers and 7 crew aboard a Boeing 737-800 registered TC-JGE, built by Boeing Commercial Airplanes and delivered to Turkish Airlines in 2006. The captain, a Turkish Airlines senior pilot, and the first officer were operating a routine international flight under Instrument flight rules to Schiphol Airport, coordinating with Air Traffic Control units including Amsterdam Approach and the Schiphol Tower. Weather at Amsterdam included low cloud and heavy rain reports from KNMI, and the crew briefed for an ILS approach to runway 18R while monitoring air traffic control instructions and the aircraft's Flight Management System.

Accident

During the final approach to runway 18R at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol the aircraft's left-hand radio altimeter provided spurious low readings, causing the autothrottle to reduce thrust to idle as part of the Boeing 737's automatic logic, while the autopilot and flight director remained engaged. Despite warnings from the Ground Proximity Warning System and crew attempts to advance the throttles, the aircraft descended below the glidepath and struck a mobile home park and terrain short of the threshold, impacting near the Schiphol Polderbaan area. The fuselage fractured, landing gear collapsed, and fires broke out; emergency response units from Schiphol Airport fire service, Dutch emergency services, and Red Cross volunteers conducted rescue operations, evacuating survivors to hospitals including VUmc and AMC Amsterdam.

Investigation

The Dutch Safety Board led the formal investigation, assisted by the National Transportation Safety Board under ICAO Annex 13 protocols, with participation from Turkish Directorate General of Civil Aviation, Boeing, and component manufacturers such as Honeywell and Thales Group. Investigators examined flight data recorders and cockpit voice recorders recovered from the wreckage, interviewed crew and air traffic controllers from Air Traffic Control the Netherlands, and analyzed maintenance records, prior incident reports, and radio altimeter test data. The probe included simulation studies at Boeing facilities and reconstruction of instrument and control logic interactions to determine sequence of events leading to the impact.

Causes and Contributing Factors

The investigation concluded that the immediate cause was the reduction of engine thrust to idle by the autothrottle in response to a spurious left radio altimeter signal, combined with inadequate monitoring of airspeed and altitude by the flight crew. Contributing factors included a faulty smart thermal switch in the radio altimeter unit, design and certification issues with the Boeing 737 autothrottle and flight control laws, crew resource management aspects involving the captain and first officer, and ambiguities in Turkish Airlines training and Boeing operational documentation. The interaction of automated systems—specifically the autothrottle entering a "retard" mode during the approach—was linked to prior reports of anomalies from operators such as Air Berlin and British Airways, prompting scrutiny from EASA and the FAA.

Aftermath and Safety Changes

Following the accident, Turkish Airlines revised its approach and crew resource management training, and Boeing issued operational advisories and software updates for Boeing 737NG autothrottle logic in coordination with the Federal Aviation Administration and EASA. The Dutch Safety Board published recommendations to improve airworthiness directives, maintenance procedures for radio altimeter equipment, and airline procedures for monitoring automated systems during approaches; manufacturers such as Honeywell and Thales Group updated component guidance. Airports and operators including Schiphol Airport, Istanbul Atatürk Airport, and international carriers implemented enhanced safety management system procedures and revised checklists, while regulatory agencies like the Dutch Civil Aviation Authority and Turkish Directorate General of Civil Aviation increased oversight of maintenance and training programs.

Legal and Regulatory Consequences

The crash prompted legal actions and regulatory responses: families of victims pursued civil claims against Turkish Airlines and manufacturers including Boeing, while prosecutors in the Netherlands and Turkey examined potential negligence and corporate responsibility. The European Aviation Safety Agency and Federal Aviation Administration issued airworthiness directives and operational notices affecting Boeing 737 fleets in operators such as Ryanair, Lufthansa, and United Airlines. Insurance markets involving IATA-member carriers adjusted risk assessments, and international aviation bodies including ICAO considered amendments to standards for automated flight system certification, training, and cockpit alerting to reduce recurrence risk.

Category:Aviation accidents and incidents in 2009 Category:Airliner accidents and incidents caused by instrument failure Category:Accidents and incidents involving the Boeing 737 Next Generation