Vance-Owen Peace Plan

Vance-Owen Peace Plan was a proposed international agreement in 1993 aimed at ending the Bosnian War, a central conflict of the Yugoslav Wars. Co-authored by Cyrus Vance and David Owen, the co-chairs of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, it sought to reorganize Bosnia and Herzegovina into a decentralized union of ten semi-autonomous provinces. The plan represented a major diplomatic effort by the United Nations and the European Community to achieve a negotiated settlement, though it ultimately failed to secure the necessary consensus from all warring parties and was superseded by the Dayton Agreement in 1995.

Background and context

The plan emerged during the intense and brutal phase of the Bosnian War, which erupted following the 1992 Bosnian independence referendum and the subsequent international recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a sovereign state. The conflict pitted the forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, led by Alija Izetbegović, against the Army of Republika Srpska under Radovan Karadžić and the Croatian Defence Council of Mate Boban. Widespread ethnic cleansing, particularly by Bosnian Serb forces during campaigns like the Siege of Sarajevo, created a severe humanitarian crisis. The international community, through bodies like the United Nations Security Council and the London Conference, sought a political solution to halt the violence, leading to the appointment of Vance and Owen as mediators under the auspices of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia.

Key provisions

The central proposal was to abolish the existing centralized structure and reconstitute Bosnia and Herzegovina as a decentralized union of ten autonomous provinces. These provinces were delineated primarily along ethnic lines, though three were designated as multiethnic. The plan mandated the demilitarization of these provinces and the withdrawal of all heavy weapons under the supervision of a UN peacekeeping force. It guaranteed extensive human rights protections and envisioned a weak central government in Sarajevo responsible only for foreign policy, international trade, and monetary affairs. A key element was the return of all refugees and displaced persons to their original homes, aiming to reverse the effects of ethnic cleansing.

Negotiation process

Negotiations were protracted and difficult, primarily held in Geneva and other European capitals under the mediation of Cyrus Vance and David Owen. The Bosniak leadership, represented by Alija Izetbegović, was reluctantly persuaded to accept the plan under immense international pressure, viewing it as a concession to aggression. The Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, led by Mate Boban, also signed after securing adjustments. The most significant opposition came from the Bosnian Serb leadership, including Radovan Karadžić and General Ratko Mladić, who rejected the plan as it required them to surrender significant conquered territory. A critical moment came when the Serbian President Slobodan Milošević, under threat of tighter international sanctions, pressured the Bosnian Serb parliament to initial the plan in April 1993, though they later definitively rejected it in a referendum.

Reception and reactions

International reaction was mixed but largely supportive from mediating powers. The United States, initially ambivalent under the Clinton Administration, later opposed the plan, favoring a lift and strike policy over what it saw as rewarding ethnic cleansing. Key European governments, including those of the United Kingdom and France, strongly backed the initiative. Within Bosnia, reaction split sharply along ethnic lines: Bosniaks largely viewed it as a tragic but necessary compromise, while Bosnian Croats saw strategic value. Bosnian Serbs overwhelmingly rejected it, and their political leaders in Pale denounced it vehemently. Critics, including UNHCR officials and human rights organizations, argued the plan effectively ratified the results of violent ethnic separation.

Implementation and aftermath

The plan was never implemented due to the definitive rejection by the Bosnian Serb assembly in May 1993. Its failure led to an escalation of the war, including intensified conflict between Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats in the Croat–Bosniak War. The diplomatic process continued, however, leading to the short-lived Union of Bosnian-Herzegovinian Republics and later the Contact Group plan. The principles of decentralization and ethnic autonomy explored in the plan heavily influenced subsequent negotiations, ultimately forming a conceptual precursor to the entities and cantons established by the Dayton Agreement, which finally ended the war in 1995. The Vance-Owen effort remains a significant case study in the challenges of peacemaking in intrastate conflict.

Category:1993 in Bosnia and Herzegovina Category:Bosnian War Category:Peace treaties Category:1993 in international relations