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Total Force Policy

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Total Force Policy
NameTotal Force Policy
TypeUnited States Department of Defense policy
Date signedAugust 1973
LocationThe Pentagon
ObjectiveIntegrate Reserve and National Guard units with the active component
StatusIn effect

Total Force Policy. It is a foundational United States Department of Defense doctrine formally established in August 1973 under Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger. The policy mandates the full integration of the Reserve components of the United States Armed Forces and the National Guard of the United States with the active component forces to form a single, cohesive military entity. Developed in the wake of the Vietnam War and the end of the draft, it aimed to create a more cost-effective and sustainable force structure while ensuring that the nation would not go to war without mobilizing its citizen-soldiers.

Background and Origins

The policy emerged from a confluence of strategic, political, and budgetary pressures following the Vietnam War. The unpopularity of that conflict, the dissolution of the Selective Service System draft, and the move to the All-volunteer force created a pressing need to redefine force composition. Key figures like Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird had begun advocating for greater reliance on the Reserve components of the United States Armed Forces during the Nixon Administration. The policy was formally enacted under Laird's successor, James R. Schlesinger, influenced by lessons from the Korean War and the need for a sustainable posture during the Cold War. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution era's over-reliance on active forces without a national call-up was seen as a major strategic flaw the policy sought to correct.

Key Components and Implementation

The core principle is the treatment of the active component, the Reserve components of the United States Armed Forces, and the National Guard of the United States as a single integrated force. Key components include the forward stationing of critical equipment for reserve units, the assignment of high-priority wartime missions to the Guard and Reserves, and the requirement for joint training exercises like REFORGER. Implementation involved restructuring the United States Army's Corps and Division plans to include round-out brigades from the Army National Guard. The Goldwater–Nichols Act of 1986 further solidified this integration by enhancing the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Unified Commands in mobilization planning.

Impact on Military Structure

The policy fundamentally reshaped the United States Armed Forces order of battle, making the Reserve components of the United States Armed Forces and National Guard of the United States essential to every major contingency plan. It led to the creation of "round-out" and "round-up" brigades within the United States Army structure and increased the operational role of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Command in missions like air refueling and combat search and rescue. This structural shift was first tested on a large scale during Operation Desert Storm, where extensive mobilizations of units like the 48th Infantry Brigade occurred. Subsequent operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq consistently relied on activated Guard and Reserve personnel.

Criticisms and Controversies

Critics have argued that the policy can lead to an over-reliance on part-time soldiers for prolonged conflicts, creating strain on individuals, families, and employers. The frequent mobilizations for the Global War on Terrorism led to debates about a "backdoor draft." Equipment disparities, often referred to as the "equipment gap," between active and reserve units have been a persistent issue, highlighted during the early stages of the Iraq War. Some analysts, including those at the RAND Corporation, have questioned whether the policy optimizes cost-effectiveness or merely shifts burdens. Legal challenges regarding the length and frequency of mobilizations under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act have also arisen.

Evolution and Modern Application

The policy has continuously evolved, particularly after the September 11 attacks. The 2008 National Defense Authorization Act led to the creation of the Army Reserve Component as an operational, rather than strictly strategic, reserve. Modern applications see Guard units like the 53rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team regularly deploying as cohesive formations. The Air Force has deeply integrated Air National Guard squadrons into its Air Expeditionary Force cycle. Contemporary challenges, such as competition with People's Liberation Army and operations in the Indo-Pacific Command theater, continue to drive assessments of reserve force readiness and integration, ensuring the policy remains a central tenet of United States military strategy.

Category:Military of the United States Category:United States Department of Defense policies