Generated by DeepSeek V3.2| On Certainty | |
|---|---|
| Name | On Certainty |
| Author | Ludwig Wittgenstein |
| Language | German |
| Published | 1969 |
| Publisher | Basil Blackwell |
| Media type | Posthumous collection |
On Certainty. It is a posthumously published collection of notes by the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, written in the last 18 months of his life and edited by his literary executors, G. E. M. Anscombe and Georg Henrik von Wright. The work constitutes a radical examination of the nature of knowledge, doubt, and the foundational "certainties" that underpin all human language and inquiry. Composed as a series of fragmentary remarks, it is primarily a critical engagement with the epistemology of G. E. Moore, particularly Moore's "Proof of an External World," while also deepening Wittgenstein's own later philosophy as seen in the Philosophical Investigations.
The immediate impetus for Wittgenstein's notes was his reading of papers by the Cambridge philosopher G. E. Moore, especially "A Defence of Common Sense" and "Proof of an External World." Moore, in his famous argument, claimed to prove the existence of the external world by holding up his hands and declaring "Here is one hand." Wittgenstein found Moore's approach deeply flawed, not in its conclusion but in its misunderstanding of the logical grammar of words like "know" and "certain." This critique unfolded against the broader backdrop of Wittgenstein's ongoing battle with traditional epistemology, including the legacy of René Descartes and the challenges posed by philosophical skepticism. His thinking was also shaped by his long-standing engagement with the works of Bertrand Russell and the pragmatist elements found in William James.
Wittgenstein argues that propositions like "I have two hands" or "The Earth has existed for a long time" do not function as items of empirical knowledge but as the "scaffolding" of our thought. He insists that the concepts of knowledge and doubt require a context of undisputed certainty to have any meaning; to doubt everything coherently is impossible. A key theme is that certainty is manifested in action, not in conscious mental states or justified belief. This leads to the idea that our fundamental certainties are not acquired through investigation or proof but are absorbed as part of learning a language game and a form of life, a concept central to his later work. He illustrates this with everyday examples, contrasting them with the abstract puzzles of traditional philosophy.
Central to the text is the metaphor of "hinge propositions" (or "hinges"). These are certainties, such as "My name is Ludwig Wittgenstein" or "Water boils at 100°C," that are immovable within a particular framework of inquiry. Like a door that turns on its hinges, all our questions, investigations, and instances of doubting turn on these unchanging certainties. Hinges are not justified by evidence; rather, they provide the framework within which justification and evidence make sense. They belong to the "mythology" of our conceptual scheme, akin to the rules of the Newtonian system. Attempting to doubt a hinge proposition, such as doubting one's own name, results not in philosophical profundity but in a kind of madness or the complete breakdown of a language game.
Wittgenstein's approach transforms the problem of skepticism. He does not attempt to refute the skeptic by providing better arguments or proofs, as Moore tried to do. Instead, he aims to dissolve skepticism by showing that radical doubt is senseless—it is an attempt to use language outside of any specific language game. The skeptic's doubt, such as questioning whether the Battle of Waterloo occurred, has no practical consequence and therefore no genuine content within our ordinary forms of life. In this view, the skepticism of David Hume or the methodological doubt of René Descartes is treated not as a threat but as a philosophical misunderstanding of how our concepts actually function.
On Certainty has had a profound impact on several areas of contemporary philosophy. It fundamentally shaped the development of ordinary language philosophy and influenced thinkers like G. E. M. Anscombe and J. L. Austin. Its themes resonate strongly within epistemology, contributing to the rise of contextualism and anti-foundationalist views of knowledge. The work is also a cornerstone for the field of Wittgensteinian epistemology and has been extensively engaged with by philosophers such as Stanley Cavell, Crispin Wright, and Michael Williams. Its ideas about the social and practical foundations of certainty continue to inform debates in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of language, and even fields like theology and anthropology. Category:Philosophical literature Category:Works by Ludwig Wittgenstein Category:Epistemology literature