Morgenthau Plan

Morgenthau Plan
Henry Morgenthau · Public domain · source
Date conceived	September 1944
Location	Second Quebec Conference
Authors	Henry Morgenthau Jr., Harry Dexter White
Purpose	Post-war plan for Germany

Morgenthau Plan was a proposed Allied policy for the occupation and restructuring of Germany following World War II. Formally titled the Program to Prevent Germany from Starting a World War III, it was drafted in September 1944 by United States Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau Jr. and his deputy, Harry Dexter White. The plan advocated for the severe deindustrialization and pastoralization of Germany to permanently eliminate its capacity for future military aggression, a radical departure from other post-war planning within the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration.

Background and context

The plan emerged amidst the final stages of World War II, as Allied leaders began serious planning for the post-war order. Morgenthau’s views were heavily influenced by the perceived failures of the Treaty of Versailles and the rapid rearmament of Germany under the Nazi Party. He was deeply affected by reports of The Holocaust and believed a harsh peace was necessary. The proposal gained initial traction during the Second Quebec Conference in September 1944, where Morgenthau presented it to President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Churchill initially opposed the scheme but later acquiesced, influenced by discussions linking it to post-war Lend-Lease aid for the United Kingdom.

Key provisions

The central aim was to transform Germany into a primarily agricultural and pastoral country. Key stipulations included the complete dismantling of the Ruhr and Saar industrial regions, with their machinery either destroyed or distributed as reparations. Major industries like iron, steel, and chemicals were to be prohibited. The plan also called for the political partition of Germany, potentially into several independent states, and extensive territorial cessions. It envisioned strict Allied control over all economic activity and education to eradicate militarism. Furthermore, it listed specific individuals and organizations, like the Gestapo and the General Staff, for automatic arrest.

Reception and debate

The plan ignited immediate and fierce controversy within the United States government. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and Secretary of State Cordell Hull vehemently opposed it, arguing it would create a humanitarian disaster and breed resentment. Stimson warned it would make Europe a “breeding ground for future war.” Details were leaked to the press, sparking public debate. German propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels seized on the leak, using it to bolster resistance on the Western Front by claiming the Allies sought enslavement. Faced with intense criticism, Franklin D. Roosevelt publicly disavowed the plan’s harshness, though elements of its punitive approach influenced later directives.

Influence and aftermath

Although never adopted as official policy, the plan had a direct impact on the initial post-surrender directive for Germany, JCS 1067, which instructed the United States Army under General Dwight D. Eisenhower to take a restrictive stance on German economic revival. Its spirit was also reflected in the early Industrial plans for Germany set by the Allied Control Council. However, the escalating Cold War and the perceived threat from the Soviet Union prompted a major policy reversal. The decisive shift came with the 1947 speech by United States Secretary of State George C. Marshall outlining the Marshall Plan, which emphasized European economic recovery, including in the Western zones of Germany.

Legacy and historical assessment

Historians view the plan as a critical, albeit short-lived, episode in Allied planning. It is often cited as the high-water mark of the “punitive peace” school of thought, contrasting sharply with the later rehabilitation embodied by the Marshall Plan and the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany. The controversy it generated helped discredit extreme proposals for deindustrialization and solidified the argument that a stable, productive Europe required a economically viable Germany. The plan remains a subject of study for understanding the transition from wartime animosity to the reconstruction of West Germany as a key ally during the Cold War.

Category:World War II Category:Allied occupation of Germany Category:1944 in international relations