Iraq Inquiry

Iraq Inquiry
source
Name	Iraq Inquiry
Also known as	Chilcot Inquiry
Formed	30 July 2009
Dissolved	6 July 2016
Jurisdiction	United Kingdom
Headquarters	Westminster
Chief1 name	Sir John Chilcot
Chief1 position	Chairman
Key people	Sir Lawrence Freedman, Sir Martin Gilbert, Sir Roderic Lyne, Baroness Usha Prashar

Iraq Inquiry. The Iraq Inquiry, commonly known as the Chilcot Inquiry, was an official British public inquiry into the nation's role in the Iraq War. Established in 2009 by Prime Minister Gordon Brown, it was chaired by Sir John Chilcot and aimed to examine the UK's involvement from 2001 to the withdrawal of forces in 2009. The inquiry's final report, published in 2016, provided a comprehensive and critical analysis of the decision-making processes, intelligence assessments, and postwar planning leading to the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

Background and establishment

The impetus for the inquiry grew from sustained political and public controversy over the United Kingdom's participation in the Iraq War and the aftermath of the conflict. Previous investigations, such as the Butler Review into intelligence and the Hutton Inquiry into the death of David Kelly, were seen as limited in scope. Under pressure, Prime Minister Gordon Brown announced the establishment of a full public inquiry to Parliament in June 2009, stating it would learn lessons for future governance. The inquiry was formally convened on 30 July 2009 under the chairmanship of Sir John Chilcot, a former senior civil servant. The panel included noted historian Sir Martin Gilbert, academic Sir Lawrence Freedman, former ambassador Sir Roderic Lyne, and crossbench peer Baroness Usha Prashar.

Conduct and proceedings

The inquiry was conducted under the Inquiries Act 2005 and held most of its hearings in public at the Queen Elizabeth II Conference Centre in Westminster. Over two years, it took testimony from 152 witnesses, including senior figures such as Prime Minister Tony Blair, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon, Chief of the Defence Staff Lord Boyce, and the head of the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), Sir John Scarlett. Key intelligence officials like the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, John Gieve, and weapons expert David Kelly were also scrutinized through evidence. The process was notably protracted, facing delays due to the volume of documentation and complex negotiations over the disclosure of sensitive communications, particularly between Tony Blair and President George W. Bush.

Key findings

The final report, published on 6 July 2016, spanned 12 volumes and 2.6 million words. It concluded that the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's regime was overstated and that peaceful alternatives to war had not been exhausted. The inquiry criticized the Joint Intelligence Committee for presenting findings with unwarranted certainty, notably regarding Iraq's purported weapons of mass destruction. It found that the UK's legal basis for action, the advice of Attorney General Lord Goldsmith, was presented to the Cabinet in a manner that was "far from satisfactory." The report was severely critical of postwar planning, stating that the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office failed to prepare for the widespread collapse of public order and the protracted insurgency that followed the Battle of Baghdad.

Criticism and controversy

The inquiry itself faced significant criticism for its lengthy duration, taking nearly seven years to complete. Many, including families of deceased British soldiers, expressed frustration over the delay and the perceived lack of accountability. The decision not to apportion blame or consider questions of criminal liability was a major point of contention. Some critics, including former United Nations weapons inspector Hans Blix, argued it did not sufficiently challenge the narrative presented by witnesses like Tony Blair. The handling of classified material, including the famous "Blair-Bush notes," and the decision to grant some witnesses like Alastair Campbell confidentiality over certain evidence also sparked controversy among politicians and in the media, including the BBC and The Guardian.

Impact and legacy

The publication of the report had a profound impact on British political discourse and historical understanding of the Iraq War. It led to calls for institutional reforms in how intelligence is assessed and presented to ministers, and for clearer processes for going to war, potentially requiring a formal Parliamentary vote. The findings heavily influenced subsequent debates on military intervention, such as those concerning Syria and Libya. While no direct legal consequences followed for political figures, the report cemented a critical public verdict on the war and significantly damaged the legacy of Tony Blair and the New Labour government. It stands as the most comprehensive official examination of the UK's most controversial military engagement since the Suez Crisis.

Category:2009 in British politics Category:Public inquiries in the United Kingdom Category:Iraq War