Frank Jackson

Frank Jackson
Name	Frank Jackson
Birth date	1943
Birth place	Melbourne, Australia
Alma mater	University of Melbourne, University of Oxford
School tradition	Analytic philosophy
Main interests	Philosophy of mind, Metaphysics, Epistemology
Notable ideas	Knowledge argument, A Priori physicalism
Influences	David Lewis, J. J. C. Smart, Hilary Putnam
Influenced	David Chalmers, Daniel Dennett, Ned Block

Frank Jackson is an influential Australian philosopher renowned for his significant contributions to contemporary analytic philosophy, particularly in the philosophy of mind and metaphysics. He is best known for formulating the famous knowledge argument against physicalism, a thought experiment involving a super-scientist named Mary who learns all physical facts about color while living in a black-and-white room. Jackson's work has profoundly shaped debates on consciousness, qualia, and the nature of mental states, establishing him as a central figure in late 20th and early 21st-century philosophical discourse.

Early life and education

Born in 1943 in Melbourne, he pursued his undergraduate studies at the University of Melbourne, where he earned a Bachelor of Arts degree. He then continued his philosophical training at the University of Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar, completing his B.Phil. and D.Phil. under the supervision of notable figures like Michael Dummett. His early academic development was significantly influenced by the rigorous traditions of Oxford philosophy and through engagement with the works of David Lewis and J. J. C. Smart, which steered his interests toward the core problems of materialism and perception.

Philosophical work

Jackson's philosophical output is characterized by rigorous argumentation and a commitment to conceptual analysis, spanning key areas including metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. He made early contributions to the study of conditionals and decision theory, often employing the method of possible worlds semantics popularized by David Lewis. His influential 1977 paper, "Perception," defended a representative theory of perception, arguing against direct realism. Throughout his career, he has engaged deeply with the Australian materialism of his contemporaries, while also developing unique positions on mental causation and folk psychology.

Knowledge argument

His most famous contribution is the knowledge argument against physicalism, first presented in his 1982 article "Epiphenomenal Qualia" and later expanded in his 1986 book, "What Mary Didn't Know." The argument centers on the thought experiment of Mary, a brilliant scientist who has learned all the physical information about color vision while confined to a black-and-white environment. Upon first seeing a red object, she learns something new—what it is like to see red—suggesting that not all facts are physical facts. This argument became a cornerstone in the philosophy of consciousness, provoking extensive responses from philosophers like Daniel Dennett, Paul Churchland, and David Lewis.

Physicalism and qualia

Although the knowledge argument initially led him to endorse epiphenomenalism—the view that qualia are non-physical mental properties that lack causal efficacy—Jackson later famously recanted this position. In the 1990s, he argued for a version of A Priori physicalism, contending that all facts, including those about conscious experience, are physical facts knowable a priori from the complete physical truth. This shift involved sophisticated analyses of conceptual and metaphysical necessity, engaging with critics like David Chalmers and Ned Block. His work continues to define central problems regarding the explanatory gap between physical processes and subjective experience.

Later career and recognition

Jackson held prestigious academic positions, including a long tenure as a professor at the Australian National University and later at Princeton University. He served as the director of the Research School of Social Sciences at ANU and was elected a Fellow of the Australian Academy of the Humanities and a Corresponding Fellow of the British Academy. His influential 1998 book, "From Metaphysics to Ethics," developed his mature views on the role of conceptual analysis in serious metaphysics. He has received numerous honors, including the Order of Australia, for his service to philosophy and higher education.

Selected bibliography

* *Perception: A Representative Theory* (1977) * "Epiphenomenal Qualia" (1982) * "What Mary Didn't Know" (1986) * *Conditionals* (1987) * "Mental Causation" (1996, with Philip Pettit) * *From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis* (1998) * "Mind and Illusion" (2003) * *The Philosophy of Mind: A Beginner's Guide* (2004, with Michaelis Michael)

Category:Australian philosophers Category:1943 births Category:Philosophers of mind Category:Analytic philosophers Category:University of Oxford alumni Category:Australian National University faculty