Generated by DeepSeek V3.2| Anglo-German Naval Agreement | |
|---|---|
| Name | Anglo-German Naval Agreement |
| Long name | Agreement between the United Kingdom and Germany regarding the Limitation of Naval Armaments |
| Type | Bilateral treaty |
| Date signed | 18 June 1935 |
| Location signed | London |
| Date effective | 18 June 1935 |
| Condition effective | Upon signature |
| Date expiration | 28 April 1939 (German abrogation) |
| Signatories | Sir John Simon , Anthony Eden , Sir Samuel Hoare , Joachim von Ribbentrop , Constantin von Neurath |
| Parties | United Kingdom , Nazi Germany |
| Languages | English, German |
| Wikisource | Anglo-German Naval Agreement |
Anglo-German Naval Agreement. The Anglo-German Naval Agreement was a pivotal bilateral treaty signed in London on 18 June 1935 between the United Kingdom and Nazi Germany. It permitted Germany to build a navy up to 35% of the total tonnage of the British Royal Navy and established parity in submarine forces. This agreement effectively sanctioned German rearmament in violation of the Treaty of Versailles and significantly undermined the collective security framework of the Stresa Front.
The agreement emerged from the complex diplomatic landscape of the mid-1930s, defined by the constraints of the Treaty of Versailles and the rise of Adolf Hitler. The Treaty of Versailles had severely restricted the Reichsmarine, prohibiting U-boats and capital ships over 10,000 tons. Hitler's regime, seeking to overturn the post-World War I order, openly pursued rearmament, announcing the existence of the Luftwaffe in March 1935. The United Kingdom, led by Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin and his National Government, was keen to avoid a costly naval arms race reminiscent of the pre-World War I era with the German Empire. British officials, including Foreign Secretary Sir Samuel Hoare and Sir John Simon, pursued a policy of appeasement, hoping to reach a separate, stabilizing understanding with Berlin outside the framework of the League of Nations. This approach directly conflicted with the efforts of France and Italy, which had just formed the Stresa Front with Britain to counter German aggression.
The treaty's key provision allowed the Kriegsmarine to expand to a total tonnage equaling 35% of the aggregate tonnage of the Commonwealth navy. This ratio applied to most surface vessel categories, including battleships, where Germany was granted 35% of British tonnage, allowing for the future construction of vessels like the ''Bismarck''-class. Most controversially, the agreement granted Germany the right to build a submarine force equal in tonnage to the entire British submarine fleet, a right it could exercise after giving notice. Specific qualitative restrictions from the Treaty of Versailles, such as limits on individual ship displacement, were effectively nullified. The pact included an exchange of information mechanism and was framed as a permanent contribution to naval arms control.
Informal discussions began in early 1935, with the formal British proposal delivered in Berlin in March. The chief German negotiator was the Ambassador-at-Large Joachim von Ribbentrop, who was instructed by Foreign Minister Constantin von Neurath and Hitler to secure the most favorable terms. The British team included Sir John Simon and the Lord Privy Seal, Anthony Eden. Negotiations were conducted directly and in secret, deliberately bypassing the other Stresa Front powers. The agreement was finalized rapidly and signed at the Foreign Office in London on 18 June 1935 by Ribbentrop, Simon, Hoare, and Eden. This swift, unilateral action by the British government stunned its allies.
The reaction from Paris and Rome was one of profound betrayal and anger. France viewed the agreement as a British endorsement of German treaty violations and a fatal blow to the Stresa Front and collective security. Italy, under Benito Mussolini, saw it as evidence of British unreliability. The Soviet Union interpreted it as a sign of Western powers accommodating Nazi Germany. Within Britain, the agreement had mixed reception; the Admiralty saw practical benefits in limiting German naval growth, while critics like Winston Churchill and First Lord Lord Stanley warned it legitimized German rearmament. Internationally, it emboldened Hitler, demonstrated the fragility of the Versailles system, and encouraged further unilateral actions like the Remilitarization of the Rhineland.
Hitler unilaterally abrogated the agreement on 28 April 1939, alongside the German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact, as tensions escalated before the Invasion of Poland. The abrogation was part of a broader renunciation of all naval restrictions. Its legacy is largely viewed as a failed experiment in appeasement that strengthened Nazi Germany militarily and diplomatically. The agreement facilitated the construction of a formidable German fleet, including U-boats that would later wreak havoc in the Battle of the Atlantic. Historians often cite it as a case study in the pitfalls of bilateral deals made at the expense of multilateral alliances, contributing to the diplomatic isolation of France and the eventual collapse of the interwar peace structure.
Category:1935 in the United Kingdom Category:1935 in Germany Category:Treaties of the United Kingdom Category:Treaties of Nazi Germany Category:Naval history of World War II Category:Interwar treaties