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1960 Defence White Paper

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Parent: Blue Streak (missile) Hop 4
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1960 Defence White Paper
Title1960 Defence White Paper
Date presented1 February 1960
Presented byHarold Macmillan
Secretary of stateHarold Watkinson
Commander in chiefElizabeth II
JurisdictionUnited Kingdom
Previous1957 Defence White Paper
Next1962 Defence White Paper

1960 Defence White Paper. Formally titled *Report on Defence*, this policy document was presented to Parliament by Conservative Secretary of State for Defence Harold Watkinson in February 1960. It represented a significant revision of the radical policies set out in the 1957 Defence White Paper by Duncan Sandys, moving away from sole reliance on nuclear deterrence. The paper aimed to restore conventional military capabilities in response to evolving geopolitical tensions, particularly the perceived threat of limited war in regions like the Middle East and Southeast Asia.

Background and context

The 1960 White Paper was drafted against a backdrop of shifting global strategy and criticism of its predecessor. The 1957 Defence White Paper had instituted deep cuts to conventional forces, emphasizing the British independent nuclear deterrent centered on the V bomber force and the forthcoming Blue Streak missile. However, by the late 1950s, events such as the Suez Crisis, the Korean War, and ongoing decolonisation highlighted the need for flexible, non-nuclear military responses. The rise of national liberation movements and the doctrine of Flexible response being developed in Washington influenced British strategic thinking. Key figures like Harold Macmillan and Harold Watkinson, advised by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, sought to address the perceived over-reliance on nuclear weapons articulated by Duncan Sandys.

Key proposals and policies

The paper's central policy shift was the endorsement of a "balanced force" concept, reinstating the importance of conventional warfare capabilities alongside the nuclear deterrent. It cancelled the vulnerable, land-based Blue Streak missile as the future cornerstone of the deterrent, opting instead to pursue the seaborne Polaris system through negotiations with the United States. It authorized increased expenditure on the British Army of the Rhine, Royal Navy carrier forces, and tactical air power under RAF Fighter Command and RAF Bomber Command. The paper also committed to maintaining a global military presence, with specific focus on the Persian Gulf and supporting the CENTO and SEATO alliances. Importantly, it abandoned the strict manpower ceilings of the 1957 Defence White Paper, allowing for a larger professional army.

Impact on British armed forces

The policy reversal had immediate and tangible effects on the British Armed Forces. The Royal Navy saw a reprieve for its aircraft carriers, including HMS *Ark Royal*, and accelerated development of new classes like the County-class destroyer. The British Army halted its planned reduction, bolstering units for deployment to Aden, Kenya, and other imperial hotspots. The Royal Air Force expanded its transport fleet, including Britannia aircraft, and continued development of tactical nuclear weapons like Blue Steel. The cancellation of Blue Streak led to the 1962 Nassau Agreement with John F. Kennedy, securing Polaris missiles. This period also saw the development of the TSR-2 aircraft project as a multi-role conventional and nuclear strike platform.

Political and public reception

The White Paper received a mixed reception across the political spectrum. The Labour Party, led by Hugh Gaitskell, supported the move towards conventional rearmament but criticized the government's perceived vacillation and the costs of the cancelled Blue Streak project. Some Conservative backbenchers remained loyal to the vision of Duncan Sandys. Defence commentators in publications like The Times and The Economist generally welcomed the pragmatic shift, acknowledging the lessons from conflicts like the Malayan Emergency. The public reception was muted, overshadowed by broader economic concerns, though the decision to scrap Blue Streak after significant expenditure attracted criticism from the Public Accounts Committee.

Long-term consequences and legacy

The 1960 Defence White Paper established a strategic template that endured for decades, cementing the "balanced forces" model and the procurement of the Polaris system. It set the stage for continued British involvement in Cold War confrontations such as the Indonesia–Malaysia confrontation and the Aden Emergency. The policy framework directly influenced subsequent reviews, including the 1966 Defence White Paper by Denis Healey. Its legacy is seen in the sustained investment in both nuclear and conventional capabilities, a posture that shaped Britain's role in NATO and its eventual transition to the Trident system. The paper marked the definitive end of the radical 1957 Defence White Paper era, illustrating the enduring complexity of balancing nuclear deterrence with global conventional commitments.

Category:Defence white papers of the United Kingdom Category:1960 in military history Category:1960 in politics Category:Cold War military history of the United Kingdom